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Associationism — in its most basic formulation, the view that all cognition begins with the 
compounding of simple sensations into chains of ideas — is frequently held to have been 
introduced by John Locke in 1700, expanded on by David Hartley and David Hume, and come 
into its own in the 19th century with psychologists like James Mill and Alexander Bain. The aim 
of this dissertation is to argue that Locke is not an associationist, and that he has been cast on the 
wrong side of a fundamental divide over the role of the understanding in the connection of ideas. 
I show that Locke coins the term “association of ideas” not to launch a new architectonic for 
psychology based on acquired habit, but to diagnose what he sees as the biggest obstacle to right 
understanding: madness. Hume’s positive embrace of association has often been read back onto 
Locke, resulting in the easy conflation of the two thinkers under the banner of empiricism. In 
championing the powers of the active perception over the automaticity of association, however, 
Locke’s psychology stands apart from later empiricist philosophies of mind.  
 
Along with challenging Locke’s traditional characterization as an associationist, this project 
explores the ramifications of Locke’s concept of association for his broader commitments. Locke 
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believes that natural philosophy is possible due to our ability to perceive the truth or falsity of 
propositions, or, failing this, to make probabilistic judgments about their truth-value. The 
capacities that allow for these mental acts, reason and judgment (respectively), are gifts from 
God that allow us to flourish in our environment, despite our mediocre mental endowments. I 
argue that associated ideas show that these capacities sometimes fail us, compromising Locke’s 
intellectualist picture. Something like false knowledge is possible in Locke’s system, insofar as 
associated ideas generate propositions that are perceived to be true but which are in fact false. I 
call such propositions “mad errors,” and describe their profound ramifications for Locke’s ethics 
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1 INTRODUCTION: ASSOCIATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONISMS 
This project begins with the conjecture that early modern philosophy was centrally 
concerned with mental pathology. The 17th century was an era in which accusations of 
irrationality and enthusiasm were leveled against religious and political dissenters, and in which 
nations were engulfed in bloody dissent over what it meant to govern and to worship reasonably. 
Intellectual error was not a happy prospect but was impossible to deny, and rationality could not 
be taken for granted. The proper conduct of the understanding was prerequisite for the ambitions 
that gripped the age, most notably towards civic peace and happiness in the future life. If the 
mind was healthy, it could perceive the world and its place in it, but the threat of pathology 
loomed large. Right management of the understanding was a Christian duty. 
Despite this growing attention to mental health, and despite the madmen and women who 
must have been a daily sight for natural philosophers before widespread institutionalization, what 
we would today call psychosis was not often considered as a philosophical problem. Cartesian 
dualism extricated reason from the grips of the corruptible, impassioned body and posited that 
only the latter was touched by insanity. Physician-philosophers working within the Epicurean 
tradition, such as Thomas Willis, also envisioned a rational soul able to be compromised but 
ultimately left unaltered by aberrations in the animal and vital functions of the corporeal soul. 
Unlike the faults that the exercise of the rational faculties could cure, madness required 
physiological and behavioral interventions, not intellectual ones. Of primary concern to early 
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modern theorists of mind was how the rational soul overcame obstacles, and the most profound 
of all, madness, fell outside of this concern because it was caused by the body.  
Against this background the originality of John Locke (1632–1704) comes into relief in 
ways that have not been attended to in the literature. While he has rightly been read as 
participating in the mental-hygienic project of providing a “postlapsarian cure” for the fallen 
state of the human mind (Corneanu 2012, p. 1), instead of relegating madness to the body Locke 
defines it in ideational terms, and insists it is of central concern for the philosopher of mind. 
Although like many of his contemporaries Locke views false beliefs, prejudices, and intellectual 
laziness as epistemico-moral failings that can be overcome via the divinely-gifted intellect, his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding presents a madness as a contrast class, undercutting 
the optimism of his contemporaries: his psychopathology raises more problems than it solves. 
Madness, for Locke, is different in kind from other mental weaknesses, and he takes seriously its 
ability to corrupt every aspect of the human being, including the understanding and even 
personhood.   
Locke’s original turn is in defining madness as a certain type of relation between ideas 
that he calls an association. Rather than a failure in the use of the active powers of the 
understanding, association is a pathology of the powers of passive perception, sensation and 
reflection that renders certain ideas immune to the effects of reason and judgment. The 
association of ideas can lead to the intransigent insistence on fallacious ideas that Locke saw as 
the single biggest threat to civic peace and religious tolerance. When ideas associate and become 
irreformable, they fundamentally challenge the intellectual humility, reformability, and sociality 
that characterize Locke’s vision of the liberal thinker. When Locke attributes religious 
enthusiasm or political dogmatism to the association of ideas, he is claiming that it is worse than 
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irrational; it is a permanently debilitating pathology. Association is foremost a medical problem, 
albeit one with profound epistemic implications. Locke repeatedly calls association a disease, 
and goes to pains to assure that his reader not interpret him metaphorically: “I shall be pardon’d 
for calling it by so harsh a name as Madness,” he writes of it, “when it is considered, that 
opposition to Reason deserves that Name, and is really Madness” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 395).1 The 
Essay, Locke writes, aims to provide a natural history of human understanding, and he follows 
Bacon’s advice to “attach negatives to our affirmatives” through the consideration of related 
absences to phenomena of interest (Bacon 2000, p. 112). Madness becomes a way to bring 
mental health into view: insofar as Locke’s general project assesses how rationality can bring 
human beings closer to God and closer to an ideal political state on earth, association is a central 
concern. 
The initial task of this project is to offer a new account of Locke’s theory of association, 
which was seized upon and transformed by a surge of self-identified associationist psychologists 
of the 18th and 19th centuries, eclipsed by these later accounts, and accordingly neglected and 
mischaracterized by historians of philosophy. Scholars have been tempted either to minimize the 
originality of Locke’s view by comparing it with those of his contemporaries, or to exaggerate its 
influence by conflating it with those of later associationists. There is, indeed, little agreement 
about the extension of the term. In his entry for the Dictionary of the History of Ideas (1968), 
Robert Young traces the roots of associationism back to Plato, Aristotle, Juan Luis Vives and 
Thomas Hobbes, but describes it as maturing in the 18th century from “the systematic 
exploitation of Locke’s paradigm for interpreting experience” under the care of Edmund Law, 
                                                
1 This citation from the Essay and all that follow refer to the book, chapter, and section of the 
quotation, followed by the page number in (Locke 1974).  
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John Gay, David Hartley, David Hume, and Erasmus Darwin, before coming to fruition into the 
19th century. Howard Crosby Warren’s monograph, A History of the Association Psychology 
(1921), begins with Aristotle, and treats René Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, George Berkeley, 
Hume, and Hartley before moving on to the main 19th-century figures like the Mills, Alexander 
Bain and G. H. Lewes. David Rapaport’s History of the Concept of the Association of Ideas 
(1974) focuses on Francis Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Locke, Gottfried Leibniz, 
Berkeley, Hume, and Immanuel Kant.  
An obvious difference in these genealogies is the inclusion of rationalists in the latter 
two. Young sees a central tenet of the school to be the associationist origins of all complex ideas, 
and believes a defining feature of associationist thought to be its empiricism: all complex ideas 
begin with simple sensations. Warren and Rapaport take a broader view, including those 
accounts that accept the possibility of innate ideas but emphasizing the importance of 
connections between ideas to rational thought. Under these readings, associationists are simply 
those thinkers who recognize the importance of relations between ideas to cognition. Rapaport 
calls Descartes an associationist because chains of ideas, connected via experience, play a central 
role in Descartes’s theory of memory, in which animal spirits flow from the pineal gland through 
the same brain pores they have flown before, carving in the engrams that constitute memories.2 
The order in which ideas are experienced impacts the direction recall takes, as when, for 
example, “if I see two eyes along with a nose, I imagine straight away a forehead & a mouth, & 
all the other parts of a face, because I am not accustomed to seeing the former without the latter” 
                                                
2 See also Kallich (1945); Warren (2013); Gaukroger (2002) and Sutton (1998), all of whom use 
the term “associationist” to refer to Descartes’s theory of ideas connected in memory. 
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(Descartes 1983, p. 179).3 In this respect, Descartes was just as much of an associationist as 
Locke — both were dedicated to the central role of experience in the construction of (some) 
complex ideas. 
Rapaport’s account is felicitous insofar as it distinguishes two strains of associationism, 
each understood broadly enough to accommodate a wide range of early-modern thinkers. The 
first establishes the connection of ideas as a universal mechanism that acts as the basis of 
knowledge — Rapaport cites Girolamo Fracastoro, Tommaso Campanella, and Baruch Spinoza 
as foundational for this tradition (into which Berkeley and Hume would later fall). A separate 
tradition, which finds its roots in the Baconian idols and includes Descartes and Hobbes, 
contrasts associated ideas with actively combined ones and blames them for a wide class of 
intellectual faults. Rapaport claims that these two branches meet in Locke, arguing that while 
Locke limits association to the pathological connection of ideas, the mechanism he describes in 
fact underlies all cognition in his system: “Ultimately, this brought the whole psychic field under 
a unified law, although Locke was unaware that associatio idearum and reflection obey the same 
law” (1974, p. 81). While below I disagree — stridently! — with this reading of Locke, 
Rapaport’s acknowledgement of a parallel associationist tradition in which associated ideas are 
not universal but rather pathological is valuable.  
By grounding the associationist school in empiricist commitments, however, Young gives 
a more specific and useful delineation of the school, which better tracks those philosophers and 
psychologists who actually employed the label to refer to their work through the 18th and 19th 
centuries. According to Young, the membership in this lineage can be defined by allegiance to 
two principles:  
                                                
3 My translation. 
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“(1) that complex mental phenomena are formed from simple elements derived 
ultimately from sensations and  
(2) that the mechanism by which these are formed depends on similarity and/or 
repeated juxtaposition of the simple elements in space and time.” (Young 1968, p. 
111) 
Rationalists like Descartes would, of course, roundly reject the first principle. Indeed 
Descartes bemoans the fact that since “there is nothing whose true nature we perceive by the 
senses alone, it turns out that most people have nothing but confused perceptions throughout 
their entire lives” (1985, p. 220). And while Descartes would tolerate Young’s second principle 
with respect to simple perception, he defines learning as a mental phenomenon rather than an 
embodied one, and unlike later associationists would reject any sort of psychological automatism 
about higher thought. As Young notes, to extend the term “associationism” to anyone who 
subscribes to a theory of the connection of ideas in order to displace the Aristotelian 
psychological picture is to ignore the significance of the second criterion: that propositional 
thought depends on associative principles, such that thinking and learning are the result of 
mechanistic processes.  
 On the other hand, if Young’s second principle is insisted on, the associationist school 
loses another sympathizer — John Locke. Like Descartes, Hobbes, and Pierre Gassendi, Locke 
rejects the Scholastic notion of intentional species, instead developing a mechanistic model of 
sensory perception in which the sensoria of human beings deliver up to the understanding 
appearances, rather than reality. But for these philosophers, including Locke, relations between 
simple ideas are only part of perception — the passive part. The faculties of mind actively 
rearrange, compound, and compare ideas in order to generate propositional thought, in stark 
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contrast to the sort of passive association indicated in Young’s second principle. To conflate 
their positions with later self-described associationists for whom mechanistic habituation is the 
central mechanism of thought, then, is to get these figures very wrong.  
 Theories of perception underwent a profound change in the early modern period. The 
Scholastics’ faith that the sensorium delivered up objects and their relations holistically to the 
rational mind began to seem naive — Galileo had shown how wrong natural philosophers were 
about the surface of the moon and the nature of motion. Natural philosophers sympathetic with 
corpuscularianism faced a problem when it came to explaining knowledge: if the essences of 
objects in the external world could not be known at all, and their properties only indirectly 
through the effects they had on the sensorium, what justified belief? A common answer was that 
complex ideas relied on the order and frequency in which simple ideas were delivered up from 
real things to the understanding — on the connections between ideas that were perceived and 
stored in memory. Objects and relations that were fractured and fragmented through the process 
of perception had to be reassembled, and the constant conjunction of simple ideas formed the 
basis on which complex ideas and propositional thought about real entities were possible, and the 
profusion of sensations ordered. 
 The constant conjunction of ideas in experience is a powerful basis on which to 
understand the mind’s capacity to learn, abstract, and navigate its environment. The 
reinforcement of connections between ideas through further experience can provide an inductive 
basis for assumptions about their correspondence with reality, and about the causal relations that 
stand between them. Connected ideas can be the foundation for habits, explaining, for example, 
why the understanding does not need to repeat, over and over, the inference that the perception 
of a circle variously shaded may in fact represent a sphere. Certain patterns of experience can 
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become mastered, and certain chains of ideas can become foundational for other, more complex, 
inferences. In the early modern period it was widely assumed that the ability to learn about his 
environment in this way was a gift to man from God, for which his faculties had been ideally 
designed.  
 Relying on the powers of mind to construct representations of the outside world makes 
knowledge of objects and relations quite vulnerable, however. The passive reception of chains of 
ideas allows for complex ideas to be formed, unscrutinized, in the understanding and habitual 
behaviors to be shaped automatically, rather than voluntarily. Every natural philosopher who 
uses chains of ideas as the basis for knowledge of substances owes an explanation for why these 
chains should be trusted, and for how the corpuscularian picture can be reconciled with an active 
and rational soul. Figures who have been located in the rationalist tradition, most notably 
Descartes, were every bit as concerned as empiricists like Robert Boyle with the mental-hygienic 
practices that assured that connections between ideas were sound. Language became one nexus 
for the scrutiny of connected ideas —Hobbes focused on how the use of abstract terms could 
mislead the understanding into conjoining ideas that in fact did not correspond to real relations. 
Physiology was another. Malebranche, for example, conceived of the difference between 
necessary and unnecessary connections between ideas as due to the motions of the animal spirits. 
 Like many of his contemporaries, Locke puts great stake in the ability of the 
understanding to suspend judgment while its active faculties do their work. Reason can assess a 
connection between ideas to make sure that they in fact agree with each other by searching for a 
middle term that can explain the relationship between them. Complex ideas of modes can be 
refined and perfected. In the case of substances, however, knowledge can only come from an 
understanding of real essence, which Locke thinks to be impossible for creatures of our mediocre 
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intellectual endowments. It is the corporeal natures of substances that would be demonstrative, 
and such knowledge is impossible. Instead objects and relations of substances are subject to 
probabilistic judgments based on the correspondence of remembered experiences, future 
experiments, and the testimony of others: the conjunction of ideas allows for belief, even if the 
nature of that conjunction does not allow for knowledge. 
 Locke’s picture here is in its fundamentals Baconian, and not atypical of his time. 
Unlike his contemporaries, however, he acknowledges not only the risks of lazy induction, 
credulousness about the testimony of others, and failures of memory that come from faulty 
connections between ideas. In addition he acknowledges a further pathology that can result from 
a reliance on constant conjunction, which, drawing on his long-standing fascination with 
medicine, he calls madness. Madness is caused by the association of ideas, a unique kind of 
relation that goes beyond constant conjunction by binding ideas so tightly that the active powers 
of the understanding cannot distinguish them, and treat them as if they were one simple idea. 
While Locke believes bad habits can be broken and good habits consciously formed, associated 
ideas are not at all intentional, and have never been attended to by the mind, or scrutinized by the 
rational faculties. Locke not only acknowledges how the review of connections between ideas 
produces shades of irrationality, but goes further than his contemporaries by acknowledging real 
cases in which any such oversight is utterly absent. He believes association to be the worst 
possible form of mental pathology, “so great a force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral 
as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is not any one 
thing that deserves more to be looked after” (II.xxxiii.9, p. 397).  
 Insofar as his basic “way of ideas” relies on the active powers of the understanding 
rather than automatic habituation to judge the streams of ideas delivered up to it by sensation, 
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Locke’s picture is more Cartesian than it is associationist, sensu Young. Young writes that 
“Locke laid the foundation of one aspect of associationism in accounting for the origin of ideas 
by means of the juxtaposition in experience of simple ideas to form complex ones,” but this 
analysis seems to strip credit from Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi, and others whose theories about 
the connection of ideas preceded Locke’s, and to mischaracterize him as subscribing to “a 
mechanistic, though not materialistic, epistemology” (Young 1968, p. 112). Locke’s general 
theory of ideas fits into the connection-of-ideas picture, in which ideas are compounded, 
contrasted and abstracted through active, rather than mechanistic, powers. But it can only be 
anachronistically read as associationist in Young’s sense.  
 It is plausible that this anachronistic reading of Locke as an associationist is one of the 
causes for the prevalence of what Margaret Atherton has called “the standard view,” according to 
which Locke, qua empiricist, is “committed to a highly economical theory of the structure of the 
mind […] [as] endowed only with simple combinatorial networks” (1998, p. 49). This view is 
common among non-specialists.4 While historians of philosophy for the most part acknowledge 
that Locke views association negatively, they often suggest that he shouldn’t; that he 
embarrassingly fails to realize that association acts as a universal mechanism within his own 
system. Martin Kallich, for example, speaks of Locke’s regrettable failure to extend his 
discussion from unnatural to “natural associations” (1945, p. 145), and Wayne Waxman writes 
that Locke ignores association’s “importance in the explanation of human understanding itself” 
(2005, p. 371). Young sees fit to broaden Locke’s narrow treatment on the grounds that “his 
                                                
4 Atherton characterizes this view as “a kind of ‘common knowledge’ picture of Locke and his 
relationship to empiricism,” and attributes it to Noam Chomsky and Jerrold J. Katz. She 
suggests, however, that it is implicitly at work in some dominant philosophical approaches to 




discussion of association of ideas was consistent with and consequent upon the whole complex 
of ideas which led to the establishment of the empiricist tradition in science and philosophy” 
(1968, p. 112); and John Sutton, in a sympathetic gesture, substitutes “misassociation” on 
Locke’s behalf, implicitly suggesting that Locke had a theory of positive association (1998, p. 
198). Rapaport is more overtly critical, rebuking Locke for failing to see the relevance of his own 
theory: while Locke “brought the whole psychic field under a unified law, [he] was unaware that 
associatio idearum and reflection obey the same law” (1974, p. 81). 
 It is true that as an account of the mechanisms of cognition the Essay is a 
disappointment, and that Locke’s discussion of associated ideas seems to offer only an abortive 
attempt at deliverance. Ultimately, however, Locke is more concerned with providing a standard 
of reasonableness for civic-minded Christians than with making a contribution to epistemology 
or philosophical psychology. In this manner Locke’s agenda is quite different from David 
Hume’s, often held up as the figurehead of the associationist school. Locke discusses the 
association of ideas only twice in his published works, in the fourth edition of the Essay and in 
the manuscript drafted at about the same time and published posthumously as Of the Conduct of 
the Understanding (1706). In contrast, association is ubiquitous in Hume; its principles are 
invoked to explain such central functions of the understanding as belief, the indirect passions, 
and sympathy. Hume writes that if anything can entitle him to “so glorious a name as that of an 
inventor, ’tis the use he makes of the principle of association of ideas” (1938, p. 31). Despite 
Locke’s coinage of the term, this assessment seems warranted: for while Hume’s theory of 
associated ideas is clearly drawn from Locke’s, the “use he makes of” it is very different. The 
difference is due less to conflicting definitions of the term “association of ideas” than to 
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opposing views on the place that automatic connections between ideas should hold in a theory of 
human understanding.  
 In one of the few analyses comparing association in Locke and Hume, John P. Wright 
notes that “Hume appears to show that what Locke really uncovered was the sordid background 
of reason itself” (1987, p. 116). Wright means that Hume extends Locke’s observation that in 
certain cases ideas become connected without any oversight from the active understanding, and 
generalizes it to encompass much of cognition. While for Locke association is the exception that 
proves the rule of a profoundly active and intentional mind, for Hume it is a broadly applicable 
explanatory mechanism, formalized in three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and 
effect.5 In his system these psychological laws explain healthy connections of ideas in the mind, 
taking on the roles belonging to the active faculties of the understanding in the Lockean picture.  
 In the chapters that follow we shall see that, pace Hume, Locke finds association far 
from a satisfying explanation for cognition: he describes it not only as a failure of the 
understanding but as a medical crisis. Broadly speaking, Locke is at pains to stave off 
mechanistic interpretations of his epistemology. He emphasizes throughout the Essay that human 
beings have received a divine bounty of mental powers, capable of shaping ideas to match the 
natural signs provided by God. Although Locke is often characterized as an arch-empiricist, he 
refers to the contents of the mind, not its structure, as a tabula rasa: we are born with faculties of 
mind, what he terms its “powers,” that are essential to its function.6 
                                                
5 Of these only “resemblance” characterizes the relations that connect impressions. 
6 Locke also suggests that we are born with certain behavioral proclivities, most notably a 
tendency towards sin and self-indulgence that he sees as the result of Adam’s fall (Spellman 
1988) and a drive towards flourishing which is at the heart of natural law. 
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 The next two chapters make the case that Lockean association should be characterized in 
terms of its medical valence, its location in passive perception, and its incurability. When taken 
together, these aspects show that Locke’s theory is unique, and collapses neither into the 
broadly-held views of his day about the connection of ideas nor into the mechanistic Humean 
picture, in which the active powers of the understanding are eclipsed by the passions. I present 
Locke’s account of associated ideas as mad ideas in Chapter Two, and in Chapter Three show 
how mad ideas can become incorporated into pathological propositions that I call “mad errors.”  
 On the basis of this new understanding of Locke’s theory, I argue that association is 
relevant for two interconnected areas of scholarly dispute about Locke’s views: the ethics of 
belief, treated in Chapter Three, and personal identity, to which I devote Chapter Four. In both 
cases, Locke is attempting to solve a problem introduced by his sensationalism, his belief that all 
ideas come from either outer or inner sensation (reflection). In the first instance, if the certainty 
of knowledge is not assured through God-given innate ideas, how can it be responsibly 
established? In the second, if persons are constituted by chains of ideas rather than a mental 
substance or soul, how is the moral responsibility that undergirds divine judgment possible? The 
existence of associated ideas does not make it impossible for Locke to answer these questions, I 
argue, but it does complicate the answers insofar as it reveals human beings to be deeply 
vulnerable, both as knowers and as actors. Madmen are a testament to this, and one that Locke 
does not avert his gaze from. His unflinching attention to the fallibility of the human 
understanding reaps philosophical dividends that have had a lasting effect on psychopathology: I 
conclude in Chapter Five with a coda about the fate of Locke’s own shadow school of 
associationism, what I call medical associationism, in the centuries following him.  
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2 ACTIVE CONNECTIONS AND PASSIVE ASSOCIATIONS 
2.1 A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
There has been a growing insistence by historians that contemporary philosophical 
divisions — into the epistemological, the metaphysical, and the ethical — are not easily 
applicable to early modern philosophical projects. In particular, it has been argued that in the 17th 
century moral and epistemological concerns were intertwined in regimens of self-improvement, 
which bore a closer relation to the ancient project of paideia than the impersonal formalizations 
of contemporary analytic philosophy. In the early modern period to act the angel was to think 
like an angel, to stretch the limits of the mediocre mental endowments that man became heir to 
upon exile from the garden, and to use God-given intellectual powers to read the moral law out 
of the book of nature.  
Peter Harrison, for example, has written that “the early modern preoccupation with sin 
meant that in the realm of epistemology error was often equated with sin, and the human 
propensity to invest false claims with the character of truth was attributed to Adam’s fall” (2007, 
p. 3). Rather than a secular revolution, Harrison describes the religiosity of the modern period 
leading to an explosion of primarily anthropological, rather than epistemological or 
metaphysical, philosophy. The driving questions of the period concerning human nature, and 
humanity’s relationship with God, were practical ones. Susan James has suggested that this 
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emphasis on philosophy as a method of moral-epistemological self-improvement has escaped 
scholarly notice because it is so different from contemporary epistemology, whose fundamental 
questions concern the nature of knowledge, rather than the human powers and weaknesses that 
mediate its acquisition (1997, p. 161).  
 Sorana Corneanu has described a specific philosophical strain in the early modern period 
that she calls medicina-cultura animi, or the “medicine of the mind,” in which “the purification, 
rectification and reordering of the human mind were […] inscribed among the general aims of 
experimental natural philosophy” (2012, p. 1). Advocates of this tradition, among whom 
Corneanu includes Bacon, Boyle, Robert Hooke, Joseph Glanvill, and others, take so seriously 
the limitations of the intellect that man’s ability to access innate ideas, to form true propositions, 
and to accurately describe the world around him are thrown into question. Within this rubric, 
epistemological investigation is closely allied with medical practice, insofar as its aim is 
therapeutic; its aim is, in Corneanu’s words, to generate “a package of guidelines to be used as 
instruments in a curative and cultivating regimen, assumed as the task of a Christian 
philosopher” (p. 118). Many of the regimens suggested by cultura animi philosophers are echoed 
in medical handbooks that promote “philosophical remedies” for melancholia, such as the focus 
on positive thoughts or the use of reason to break through irrational preoccupations and passions 
(Schmidt 2004).  
 But they were also the backbone of the natural-philosophical projects that preoccupied 
members of the Royal Society. Its apologist, Thomas Sprat, describes the goal of the new science 
as to “supply our thoughts with excellent Medicines, against their own Extravagances, and will 
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serve in some sort, for the same ends, which the Moral professes to accomplish” (1702, p. 342).7 
Locke himself frames his project of managing the understanding in medical terms:  
“The variety of distempers in men’s minds is as great as those in their bodies; 
some are epidemic, few escape them, and everyone too, if he would look into 
himself, would find some defect of his particular genius. There is scarce anyone 
without some idiosyncrasy that he suffers by.” (1996, p. 215) 
This admixture of the medical and the moral is a signature of the cultura animi tradition, and 
reflects the broader synthesis of ancient and biblical authority that occupied philosophers in the 
17th century.   
 Harrison, Corneanu and others have drawn the connection between the mental-hygienic 
projects of the modern period and their classical influences. Of especial interest is the Stoic 
tradition, in which philosophy was viewed as an “art of living,” with rationality being the central 
prudential, as well as epistemic, aim (Sellars 2013). Alongside the revival of Stoic ethics by 
figures like Justus Lipsius and Guillaume Du Vair, we might see the cultura animi tradition as a 
Christian revival of Stoic ideas about the centrality of rationality in the pursuit of a good life. For 
early modern physicians of the soul, intellectual healing was also a form of religious 
transformation. To become more rational was to be better prepared to know the natural law, and 
was, in itself, an act of thanksgiving for our God-given mental faculties. Thus we see Locke 
write, 
“He that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and seeks 
sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this 
                                                
7 While Corneanu focuses on the British empiricist milieu, her analysis could almost certainly be 
extended to the continent: Descartes famously described the preservation of health as the 
principle aim of his philosophical studies (1983, p. 329). 
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satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he should miss 
Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and 
places it as he should, who in any Case or Matter whatsoever, believes or 
disbelieves, according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses 
against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties, which were given him to no 
other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability.” 
(IV.xvii.24, p. 688) 
Insofar as the management of mental maladies was a moral project, it was also an 
eschatological one, and Locke and his contemporaries were devoted to establishing an ethics of 
belief that could support the Christian account of divine judgment and punishment. Christianized 
formulations of ancient distinctions between the active and passive powers of mind emerged — 
like that of Aëtius, for example, who describes how, upon the “controlling part of [the] soul like 
paper well prepared for writing on,” some conceptions form without conscious effort, “while 
others come about by our instruction and attention” (Hankinson 2011, p. 63). In the early modern 
period, the active faculties were those that we must manage if we are to find God through 
reason’s light. Intellectual practices had a direct effect on divine deserts. What sort of ideas are 
generated actively, and what sort passively; what psychological processes should be considered 
exemplary active or passive functions, and how their employment relates to sin and deliverance; 
these were the central stakes of early modern debates about the mind.  
 Along with this general picture, the moderns inherited from ancient sources a means for 
determining whether knowledge was formulated rightly, through the proper application of the 
understanding: the suspension of assent. Corneanu describes how the Ciceronian notion of 
philosophy as “a kind of science and steadfast opinion of one yielding his assent upon good 
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grounds only” became a touchstone in the early modern period, in which diverse figures, most 
notably Bacon, allied the regulation of assent with the very possibility of justified and righteous 
belief (2012, p. 65). Bacon distinguishes between anticipations of the workings of nature, which 
the philosopher arrives at haphazardly, and interpretations, which result from engaging in the 
proper method. He emphasizes that his aim is in no way to champion the permanent suspension 
of belief, writing, “That which I meditate and propound is not Acatalepsia but Eucatalepsia; not 
denial of the capacity to understand, but provision for understanding truly; for I do not take away 
the authority from the senses, but supply them with helps; I do not slight the understanding, but 
govern it.” The understanding needs must be regulated, to cure what Bacon frequently refers to 
as “diseases” or “distempers” of the mind that results from, in Joseph Glanvill’s felicitous phrase, 
“precipitate judgments.”  
 Like many of his Royal Society colleagues, Locke embraces Bacon’s doctrine of 
suspension. While the first edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) 
provides a fundamentally hedonistic account in which the will is completely determined in its 
pursuit of the good, in the second Locke makes allowances for suspension. Beliefs about whether 
an action will cause pleasure or pain, under this picture, are not automatic but result from the 
work of the understanding to assess its ideas before acting. Action thus results from an 
intellectual engagement with the passions that drive men towards and away from different 
desiderata. Locke believes the improvement of our assessments about how best to relieve 
uneasiness are made possible through this capacity of suspension:  
“For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to 
suspend the execution and satisfaction of its desires, and so all, one after another, 
is at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weigh 
 
 19 
them with others. In this lies the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right 
comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the 
conduct of our lives, and our endeavors after happiness.” (II.xxi.47, p. 263) 
The importance of suspension to Locke’s psychology is clear, but its exact role — as 
constitutive of free action, or as merely exemplary of it — has been debated. Within the set of 
acts that commence with suspension and culminate in willed action, Locke writes, lies the liberty 
Man has. This has led some scholars to suggest that without the power of suspension, man is no 
better than an automaton (Yaffe 2000; LoLordo 2012). At the conclusion of this chapter I will 
argue against this view, and follow Julie Walsh (2015) in claiming that it is rather the acts of the 
understanding that follow the suspension of assent that are essential to human freedom: 
suspension alone is insufficient. The power to suspend can be seen as a passive one, which 
allows for the revision of ideas through the acts of the understanding that in fact constitute 
liberty.  
 Locke distinguishes the active and passive powers that constitute thinking in Book II 
Chapter 21 of the Essay, where he contrasts the passive “Power to receive Ideas, or Thoughts, 
from the operation of any external substance” with the active powers “to bring into view Ideas 
out of sight, at one’s own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit” (II.xxi.72, p. 
286).8 The faculties which act on ideas are subsidiaries of the understanding, and include 
discernment, the recognition of sameness and difference between ideas; composition, the 
combination of ideas; abstraction, the generalization of an idea beyond its original context; and 
                                                
8 Elsewhere Locke notes, however, that “thinking” is popularly taken to only refer to active 
powers of mind: “Thinking, in the propriety of the English Tongue, signifies that sort of 
operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it with some degree of 
voluntary attention, considers any thing” (II.ix.1, p. 143). 
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memory, which preserves ideas together which have occurred together in experience, storing 
them so that they can be recalled by retention. It is these faculties that, for Locke, explain the 
generation of complex ideas, and their taxonomy constitutes a “true History of the first 
beginnings of Humane Knowledge” (II.xii.15, p. 162). They are the activities of the 
understanding that the suspension of assent allows for, and which constitute liberty. 
 An immediate repercussion of taking seriously Locke’s division between active and passive 
powers of mind is that any naive characterization of him as an arch-empiricist — a 
characterization that can pave the way to equating his psychology with that of later 
associationists — must be rejected. It is clear that Locke’s infamous tabula rasa does not 
indicate that the mind itself is a void, only occupied through experience. Rather we are born with 
not only different propensities, but also different mental powers — indeed Locke will disappoint 
those liberal admirers who read him closely when he admits that we are born with varying 
intellectual endowments. God has given us the faculties to allow us to know Him, through our 
investigations of the natural world, our interpretations of scripture, and our intuitive knowledge 
of Him. We start with a clean slate and must fill it through our labor, but the tools by which to 
populate it with ideas are already in hand. In the following section I discuss how the active 
powers of the understanding begin this work through the generation of complex ideas.  
2.2 LOCKE’S THEORY OF HEALTHY IDEAS 
 Locke’s contemporaries, notably John Sergeant, Henry Lee, and Gottfried Leibniz, 
criticized him for replacing deductive reasoning from general maxims with the mechanical 
determination of the agreement or disagreement of ideas (Yolton 1956, pp. 73–79). But Locke 
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saw himself as preempting such accusations in the Essay. “What room then,” he asks in a 
rhetorical flourish, “is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense and inward 
Perception? What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the enlargement of our 
Knowledge and regulating our Assent” (IV.xvii.2, p. 668). And indeed, the overarching thesis of 
this work is that Locke does not replace the mental faculties with the passive connection of ideas, 
as later associationists would do — his picture is more complicated.9  
 As noted above, Locke describes the understanding as having both passive powers (to be 
affected from without) and active powers (to cause change from within) that generate ideas. Both 
active and passive powers contribute to perception, belief, and knowledge. Locke puts great 
stock in the immediacy of intuitive knowledge, claiming that simple ideas as well as certain 
propositions are perceived without any intervention by the active faculties. In such cases 
knowledge is not volitional, but immediate and automatic. But the bulk of Book IV of the Essay 
is concerned with demonstrative and probabilistic knowledge, which only come as the result of 
an exertion of the mental faculties. I will refer to this work of the active powers as intellectual 
labor. The first stage of intellectual labor is the generation of complex ideas from simple ones, 
creating the stuff of demonstrative and probabilistic knowledge. The second is the assemblage of 
these complex ideas into propositions whose truth or falsity we can assess. The generation of 
complex ideas will be discussed in this chapter, and the creation of propositions in the next. 
                                                
9 Locke takes care to make clear that, while he employs the traditional term “faculty,” he trusts 
his reader to know he means it in a new way: “These Powers of Mind, viz. Of Perceiving, and of 
Preferring, are usually call’d by another Name: And the ordinary way of Speaking is, That the 
Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all 
Words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being supposed (as I 
suspect is has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul, that performed those Actions of 
Understanding and Volition” (II.xxi.5, p. 236). 
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 Against the Scholastic tradition, Locke argues that the immediate objects of perception are 
not types determined by essences, but throngs of simple ideas that are discrete but which can be 
grouped on the grounds of co-occurrence in experience. Locke believes that simple ideas can be 
born in the mind from two sources — and only two sources, for there are no other “Windows by 
which light is let into this dark Room” (II.xi.17, p. 164). The first way, through sensation, gives 
humans simple ideas of the outside world. These ideas are generated in the sensorium in 
response to stimuli from the environment, and are immediately perceived by the mind. When the 
mind similarly perceives its own operations — that is, the manipulation of ideas by “powers 
intrinsical and proper to it self” (II.i.24, p. 118) — it generates a second class of ideas about 
these operations. This process is called reflection, and Locke refers to it as “internal Sense” 
(II.i.4, p. 105). Both classes of simple ideas, those generated from sensation and from reflection, 
are delivered, as it were, automatically to the understanding. Locke writes, 
“In this Part the Understanding is meerly passive; and whether or no, it will have 
these Beginnings, and as it were materials of Knowledge, is not in its own Power. 
For the Objects of our Senses, do, many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas 
upon our minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not 
let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man, can be wholly 
ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These simple Ideas, when offered to the 
mind, the Understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are 
imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can 
refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which, the Objects set before it, do 
therein produce.” (II.i.25, p. 118)  
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All ideas resulting from sensation and reflection are introduced to the active perception as 
simple, unalterable, true components of knowledge, for “God in his Wisdom” has “set them as 
Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able to discern one Thing from another” 
(II.xxxii.14, p. 388). While we cannot know underlying causes of simple ideas, we still have 
knowledge that they are real — what Locke calls sensitive knowledge (IV.iii.5, p. 539). He 
emphasizes that simple sensations may not resemble their causes — as a corpuscularian, 
committed to the primary-secondary quality distinction as formulated by his colleague Boyle, 
Locke recognizes that “the operation of insensible particles on our Senses” may produce a 
sensation (say, of the color violet) that relates to its source in a manner far more complicated than 
we could ever conceive. “It being no more impossible,” he writes, “that God should annex such 
Ideas to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he should annex the Idea of 
Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no 
resemblance” (II.viiii.13, pp. 136–137). 
 Unlike Descartes, then, Locke does not define simple ideas in terms of their amenability 
being intuitively understood — in a sense simple ideas remain opaque to us, since we will never 
know, for example, the underlying structure that gives rise to the perception of violet. 
Nonetheless for Locke simple ideas are real because they are constant natural signs we can rely 
on, part of God’s plan, and the result of His goodness (Rickless, forthcoming). And unlike Hume, 
Locke need not argue for the causal relation between impressions of things outside us and our 
simple ideas. It is not constant conjunction but the origin of our passive powers of perception, 
carefully crafted for us by our creator, that assure our ideas correspond. The receipt of simple 
ideas is, therefore, a gift of knowledge from God to us. In its receipt of this sensitive knowledge 
of the external world the understanding is totally passive. Locke compares the mind, helpless 
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against the imprint of simple ideas, to a mirror; he also compares it to the organs of the body, 
which cannot avoid sensing. 
 Thus like later associationists Locke believes that simple ideas are passively perceived, 
insofar as they are caused from without and impressed upon the understanding. They cannot be 
divided into component parts, and result directly from the engagement of the sensorium with 
external bodies, or, in the case of reflection, with the mind’s own ideas. But they are, 
nonetheless, real: “simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular 
productions of Things without us, really operating upon us” (IV.iv.4, p. 564). Even a secondary 
quality that exists purely in the sensorium, such as whiteness or bitterness, is consistently 
produced by the same type of external body and thus “has all the real conformity it can, or ought 
to have, with Things without us” (IV.iv.4, p. 563). Locke gives the examples of the ideas of 
coldness and hardness, which contribute to the complex idea of a piece of ice, and the scent and 
whiteness of a lily — qualities which, he says, “being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it 
nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into 
different ideas” (II.ii.i, p. 119). Because the understanding is only capable of combining and 
reordering ideas already present in the mind, it is unable to generate simple ideas, nor destroy 
those it already has.  
 In the fourth edition, Locke closes Book II of the Essay by offering a typology of the kinds 
of connections possible between simple ideas.10 Some ideas, he writes, “have a natural 
                                                
10 Locke demurs from clarifying the ontological status of his concept of “idea.” He emphasizes 
that he is using the term in the most general way to describe “whatever is meant by Phantasm, 
Notion, Species” — lumping together “phantasm,” which plays a prominent part in the 
materialist philosophy of mind of Hobbes, and “species,” a cynosure of the Scholastic 
vocabulary (I.i.8, p. 47). Despite the criticisms by Stillingfleet, Sergeant, Norris and others of his 
new usage Locke would, at times petulantly, refuse to clarify whether he saw ideas as substances 
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Correspondence and Connexion one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason 
to trace these, and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in 
their peculiar Beings” (II.xxxiii.5, p. 395). These are the connections that bind our complex 
ideas, which, Locke emphasizes, we do not discover, but rather create to link the simple ideas 
delivered up to the understanding by experience. As examples of complex ideas Locke gives 
“Beauty, Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Universe” (II.xii.1, p. 164). While there are as many 
potential complex ideas as there are combinations of simple ideas, all are substances (“a man”), 
modes (ideas that depend on substances for their manifestation, such as “gratitude”), or relations 
(“older,” “husband”). We generate complex ideas to resemble, with more or less success, co-
occurring properties of objects perceived either in the external world (for substances) or in the 
mind (for abstract ideas and mixed modes). The mind manipulates simple ideas into complexes 
through a variety of active powers described above — of recalling, discerning, compounding, 
abstracting, and comparing. Locke is explicit that simple ideas must be combined through the 
intellectual labor of the understanding; complex ideas are not delivered up through passive 
perception like simple ideas are: 
“But as the Mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple Ideas, so it 
exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple Ideas, as the Materials 
and Foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The Acts of the Mind wherein 
it exerts its Power over its simple Ideas are chiefly these three, 1. Combining 
several simple Ideas into one compound one, and thus all Complex Ideas are 
made [….]” (II.xii, p. 163) 
                                                                                                                                                       
or modes, rejecting the received ontology of his critics (Yolton 1956). But in the Essay and in 
correspondence Locke makes it clear that ideas are not limited to representations of objects in the 
external world but encompass all ideas that pass through the understanding. 
 
 26 
Locke continues to use the language of action throughout his discussion of complex 
ideas. He describes how ideas of particular substances are generated when “by Experience and 
Observation of Men’s Senses” certain clusters of simple ideas are “taken notice of to exist 
together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or 
unknown Essence of that substance” (II.xxiii, p. 296). In order to generate a complex idea of a 
substance, then, the individual must first perceive the co-occurrence of simple ideas in what 
Locke likes to call “constant experience,” and then add to that conglomerate the “confused” 
notion of substance. Thus Locke concludes that “our specifick Ideas of Substances are nothing 
else but a Collection of a certain number of simple Ideas, considered as united in one thing” 
(II.xxiii, p. 305). 
 Nonetheless, Locke is often taken as holding forth a mechanistic picture of the generation 
of complex ideas, analogous to the perception of simple ones. For example, Vere Chappell claims 
that in Locke’s view we also receive via sensation and reflection “compounds consisting of two 
or more simple ideas joined together” (2011, p. 37). On this reading, complex ideas are not 
generated by the mind on account of the co-occurrence of simple ideas, but are in fact constituted 
by that co-occurrence, which immediately results in the presentation of a complex idea to the 
understanding from the sensorium. Complex ideas, under this reading, are also a product of 
passive perception, since “the reason these simple ideas are joined together in my mind is simply 
that the visible qualities to which they severally correspond are really joined together” (ibid.). 
Thus Chappell concludes that complex ideas of substances are, like simple ones, impositions on 
the mind, and no less passive, contrasting them with the voluntary creations of the mind such as 
fantastical ideas of substances, or modes.  
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 Chappell might be basing this inference on Locke’s frequent description of the treatment of 
certain complex ideas as simple ones by the understanding. While complex ideas are an active 
production of the understanding, their complexity need not always be the object of attention, an 
elusive faculty Locke often describes in tropes — “as it were, the Eye of the Soul” (II.x.7, p. 
152). Once they have been joined together under a name, ideas are often considered together in a 
single complex as a result of habituation, rather than volition: 
“The Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple 
Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by 
Reflection on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these 
simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one 
thing, and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for 
quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by 
inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea 
which indeed is a complication of many ideas together.” (II.xxiii, p. 295)  
Locke here describes two steps. First, the understanding combines simple ideas together 
that co-occur constantly in experience and unifies them under a single name. Second, the 
grouping together of ideas becomes so habitual that the cluster functions as a simple idea. In the 
case of substances, we accustom ourselves to the assumption that we are interacting with a 
discrete sort of object, when what we perceive is the frequent co-occurrence of a set of 
properties. Despite the apparent automaticity of complex ideas, pace Chappell Locke states 
explicitly,  
“Though the Mind be wholly passive, in respect to its simple Ideas: Yet, I think, 
we may say, it is not so, in respect to its complex Ideas: For those being 
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Combinations of simple Ideas, put together, and united under one general Name; 
’tis plain, that the Mind of Man uses some kind of Liberty, in forming those 
complex Ideas.” (II.xxx.3, p. 373) 
Famously, Locke rejects the possibility that we can know the real essences of objects in 
the external world. The sort of probabilistic belief about substances that comes from experience, 
often through the habituation of judgment, is acceptable to him as the next best basis for faith in 
the existence of things. In this he is not original; the experimental tenets of the Royal Society 
authorized the acceptance of facts upon “the testimony of nature” in lieu of demonstrative proof. 
 Locke notes, “the Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown people alter’d by the 
Judgment, without our taking notice of it” (II.ix.8, p. 145). Nonetheless, Locke’s famous 
discussion of Molyneux’s problem makes clear that the habitual and unattended-to compounding 
of simple ideas into complex ones is the result of, at least originally, an active engagement with 
observation and experience, that is, an act of intellectual labor. Molyneux posed the question to 
Locke of whether a blind man who recovers his sight must learn that the ideas of a shaded circle 
and of a round mass both correspond to the same three-dimensional object. Locke agrees with 
Molyneux that ideas that we may assume to be perceived automatically as complexes (such as 
the idea of a sphere) are instead the product of training and experience. Locke puts Molyneux’s 
question to the reader “as an occasion for him to consider, how much he may be beholding to 
experience, improvement, and acquired notion, where he thinks, he has not the least use of, or 
help from them” (II.ix.8, p. 146).  
  Molyneux’s problem also shows that the active powers that generate complex ideas are 
fallible. If the understanding is not exposed to the right sort of experiences, its ideas will not 
reflect actual clusters of properties in the world, that is, will not have real ideas. The work of the 
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understanding is to continually adapt its ideas to experience — thus while the blind man “at first 
sight” would not be able to differentiate between three-dimensional objects, he can learn that the 
feel and sight of a corner constantly co-occur, and ultimately can compound them. In his 
discussion of innate ideas, Locke emphasizes that even ideas that we cannot remember 
perceiving must at one point have entered our conscious awareness (I.iv.20, p. 98).  
 Tuveson has written that Locke visualizes the understanding “as a living power, reflecting 
upon the continuum of experiences, arriving at combinations which present a fairly reliable 
correspondence to external reality” (1960, p. 19). This adaptability in relation to experience is 
reiterated throughout Locke’s discussions of development, that is, “by what steps we enlarge our 
Ideas from our first Infancy.” He describes, for example, how the child first has a notion of 
“Mamma” that is quite particular to his own mother, and then corrects himself to separate out the 
individual complex idea of her person from the abstract idea of mothers in general (III.iii.7, p. 
411). The adult’s grasp on a complex idea of a substance can also be transformed through further 
observation and experiment — thus the nominal essence of a swan is different for the city-
dweller and for the ornithologist, and the former’s can improve with study (II.xxiii.14, p. 305). 
This is the heart of Locke’s notion of the tabula rasa: the mind begins without ideas, but with the 
tools necessary to transform the simple ideas it receives into useful complexes that can ultimately 
ground propositional thought. Locke’s picture is of the properly-conducted understanding 
engaging in a process of constant correction and improvement. 
 Given Locke’s acknowledgement that complex ideas can be formulated without much 
attention and can become so habitual that they appear to the understanding as simple, it is clear 
why readers have interpreted him as thinking that connected ideas follow each other immediately 
and automatically in all cases. Locke is at pains, however, to make clear that most complex ideas 
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are still the result of active judgment. He saw a profound difference between ideas once 
perceived to go together that over time become connected and associations, which automatically 
follow each other for reasons not grounded in experience. The crucial difference is that the latter 
sort are not conjoined by an act of the understanding, and so cannot be fixed by one — they are 
outside the reach the active powers of mind. Crucially, the active powers of the understanding 
are what assure we have the right ideas, not just the most obvious or easiest ones. For Locke the 
active powers are our link to God’s goodness, and give our understanding the capacity to find 
truth. While ideas can become connected outside of their auspices, these connections are no 
better than random linkages, leading to intellectual chaos rather than pious clarity.  
2.3 LOCKE'S THEORY OF ASSOCIATED IDEAS 
 Along with describing intellectual error as the result of anticipating, rather than 
interpreting, connections between our ideas about the natural world, Bacon also used the 
language of anticipation to discuss madness. “Anticipations,” he writes, “are quite strong enough 
to induce agreement, since even if men were mad in one common way together, they could agree 
among themselves well enough” (2000, p. 38). What protects men from madness is not, then, 
consensus or authority, but rather an application of the proper method. But while (as Corneanu 
has demonstrated) Bacon’s emphasis on method as a prophylactic and cure for mental weakness 
was popular during Locke’s day, this particular suggestion about madness was not widely 
adopted. Among Locke’s contemporaries, madness was for the most part held to be a problem of 
soma, rather than of ideas. Hobbes defines it as an overabundance of passion, as does Descartes, 
though he also attributes it in places to the dark fumes of the melancholic humors and the 
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meanderings of the animal spirits. Among the Royal Society set Thomas Willis’s 
neurophysiology was highly influential, and his Pathologiae Cerebri et Nervosi Generis 
Specimen (1667) gave complex accounts of mania, melancholia, and other sorts of 
psychopathology in terms of the motion of the animal spirits through the brain and nerves.  
 Locke’s theory of the association of ideas is in the first instance notable because it provides 
an ideational theory of madness that situates mental illness against the cultura animi framework 
of self-improvement. I say “against” because for Locke madness does not have the moral-
epistemological character of other sorts of intellectual failings that come about when we fail to 
improve our ideas during suspension. Our ideas of substances can be ill-crafted in all sorts of 
ways. They can be confused and obscure when we fail to distinguish our ideas from each other, 
or use words to refer to ideas that are not distinct (II.xxix). They can be inadequate when they 
only partially or incompletely represent the world as we experience it (II.xxxi). And when 
connections that we do not experience in reality are drawn between simple ideas the results are 
fantastical, such as the idea of a centaur or of a human body made out of glass, which are “made 
conformable to no Pattern existing, that we know” (II.xxx.5, p. 374).  
 If the notion of existence is also annexed to fantastical complex ideas, Locke calls them 
“wrong” insofar as they “disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred” (II.xxxii.26, p. 
394). In the case of mixed modes, such as justice, the “truth” of the existence of the ideas is 
given, since all that is required for their realness is that it is possible for the simple ideas 
contained in them to co-occur in reflection. As long as the simple ideas that constitute them are 
consistent with each other, they cannot be “chimerical.” In the case of substances, however, the 
situation is quite different. Since our complex ideas of substances aspire to capture the actual co-
occurrence of properties in the world — that is, to be representational — they can fail to 
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correspond to their “archetype,” or intensional object, and thus be “false” insofar as they contain 
an implicit proposition about existence.  
 All of these are the sorts of errors the mind can fall into “in its Apprehension and 
Knowledge of Things” (II.xxix.1 p. 363), and they can be corrected through the understanding’s 
labor. Associated ideas are not amenable to these sorts of correctives. Rather than connected 
through an act of the understanding, associated ideas are pathologically conjoined by 
connections that, while in fact unnatural, become, as it were, naturalized — that is, which appear 
natural to the understanding. While the fantastical idea of a human body made out of glass can be 
resolved into its component parts and thus recognized to not correspond with reality, if the 
complex idea becomes an associated one, the idea of “body” will always be followed by the idea 
of “glass,” even in the face of contradictory evidence about the nature of these substances — the 
two become “as if they were but one Idea” (II.xxxiii.7, p. 396).  
 Locke distinguishes associated ideas from healthy ideas only in the fourth edition of the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700), the last edition published during his lifetime. It 
was clearly important to Locke to introduce the new term, and he devotes an entire chapter to 
explaining association. His decision to introduce the new theory was made by April of 1695, 
when he wrote to his friend William Molyneux, “I think I shall make some other additions […] 
particularly concerning the Connexion of Ideas, which has not, that I know, been hitherto 
consider’d and has, I guess, a greater influence upon our minds, than is usually taken notice of” 
(1824, p. 534). Around that same time, presumably after writing to Molyneux, Locke made the 
decision to coin a term for this particular type of connection, crossing out the word “Connexion” 
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of ideas and replacing with “Association” in a draft for a new chapter to the Essay, what would 
become Chapter 33. 11  
 Associated ideas differ from healthy ones not in terms of their content but in terms of their 
relationship to the powers of the understanding. As opposed to ideas compounded by the active 
powers in response to experience, Locke writes, 
“There is another Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas 
that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, 
that ’tis very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no 
sooner at any time comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it; 
and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang always 
inseparable shows themselves together.” (XX.xxxiii.5, p. 395)  
He gives several examples. In one, a young man learns to dance in a room with a trunk, 
and an association forms between the steps and the trunk. When he is called upon to dance in a 
different chamber, he finds himself incapable of it, since the trunk is absent. He simply cannot 
call up the chain of ideas without first perceiving their associate, the trunk (II.xxxiii.16, p. 399). 
In another, a man eats far too much honey as a small child and is so traumatized by getting sick 
from it that he is, for the rest of his life, too disgusted by the substance to eat it, since the very 
thought of him makes him sick (II.xxxiii.7, p. 396). The idea of “honey” has become associated 
                                                
11 Bodleian Library, MS. Locke e. 1, p. 32. The word would have carried an ominous meaning in 
Locke’s time — according to the Oxford English Dictionary, among its usages in the 17th 
century is an accord between individuals to get up to mischief. In fact a 1682 usage given by the 
OED is from the London Gazette, in which an article described “That Seditious paper, The 
Association, lately found in the Early of Shaftesbury’s closet.” Shaftesbury was Locke’s 
benefactor, so we can see the term might have been of special significance to him. As Simpson 
has noted, Milton uses the term to describe Lucifer’s band of angels, as well as calling the 
subversive Eve Adam’s “associate” (1999, p. 138). 
 
 34 
with the idea of “sickness.” Locke emphasizes that examples of association are manifold, and 
occur not only in madness but also in “the steady calm course of […] Life” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 395). 
Nonetheless, Locke takes care to emphasize that association, even when isolated to a single 
complex idea in the mind of an otherwise rational man, is the same phenomenon that is called 
madness:  
“I shall be pardon’d for calling [the association of ideas] by so harsh a name as 
Madness, when it is considered, that opposition to Reason deserves that Name, 
and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free from it, but that if he 
should always on all occasions argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, 
would not be thought fitter for Bedlam, than Civil Conversation […]. That which 
will yet more apologize for this harsh Name, and ungrateful Imputation on the 
greatest part of Mankind is, that enquiring a little by the bye into the Nature of 
Madness, B.2 C.11 §13. I found it to spring from the very same Root, and to 
depend on the very same Cause as we are here speaking of.” (II.xxxiii.4 p. 395)  
I will discuss the origins of Locke’s theory at length in the next section and in the 
following chapter, but here it is worth noting that Locke’s discussion of madness in 2.11 provides 
a further, illuminating, example of association. Locke describes a madman who is certain his 
body is made out of glass. In Locke’s mature vocabulary, we might say that an association has 
formed between the idea of his own body, and the idea of the adjective “glass.” From then on, 
the madman cannot think of his body without thinking it is made out of glass. The two ideas 
follow each other so quickly that they are perceived as one simple idea. Locke notes that, 
nonetheless, mad people can make “right deductions” about what follows from this “Fancy” — 
believing themselves to be made of glass, they use “the caution necessary to preserve such brittle 
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Bodies” (II.xi.13 p. 161). Madness does not affect the capacity to make propositions, or reason 
about them; Locke differentiates madness from idiocy on precisely these grounds, writing,  
“In fine, the defect in Naturals12 seems to proceed from want of quickness, 
activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of 
Reason: Whereas mad Men, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. 
For they do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having 
joined together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths.” (II.xi.13, 
p. 161) 
In other words, madmen are not lacking in the capacity to correct any ideas, but have 
rather acquired ideas that are immune to these powers. As I lay out in Chapter 3, reasoning 
rightly about propositions that contain associated ideas leads to what I will call “mad errors,” 
with disastrous results. But the point here is simply that because they have not been generated 
through the powers of judgment, whose activities are sanctioned by God to deliver us to true 
knowledge and justified belief, associated ideas form an unruly mob rather than an orderly 
procession, running counter to the Stoic ideal of self-control that was so influential in Locke’s 
period (Garrett 2013). To attempt to disband associated ideas through reasoning with the afflicted 
individual is to “preach Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Discourses, the 
Pain of his Joints tearing asunder” (II.xxxiii.13, p. 398). Locke would have been familiar with 
the popular portrayal of the Stoic as sufficiently protected by his wisdom, to the point that he can 
                                                
12 “Naturals” refers to those Locke also called idiots, approximating those whom we would today 
call intellectually disabled. 
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find happiness even on the rack.13 Locke’s use of the image, by contrast, underscores the 
dominance of the non-volitional, passive powers of perception over the intellectual ones:  
“While this Combination is settled and while it lasts, it is not in the power of 
Reason to help us, and relieve us from the Effects of it. Ideas in our Minds, when 
they are there, will operate according to their Natures and Circumstances; and 
here we see why Time cures certain Affections, which Reason, though in the right, 
and allow’d to do so, has not power over, nor is able to against them prevail with 
those who are apt to harken to it in other cases.” (II.xxxiii.13, p. 398)14 
Locke recognizes several ways in which ideas become associated. The first is through a 
perversion of habit, which, as described above, Locke generally views as a human good. 
Nonetheless habit can become an “empire,” calcifying unattended-to chains of ideas into 
hardened complexes that cannot be modified when contradicted by further experience. The 
riskiest sort of habitual behavior is rumination, in which the mind reviews and reviews again the 
same chain of ideas, leading to their association. In the Essay Locke describes this process in 
physiological terms, writing that “Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding” due to 
repeated “Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same 
steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the 
Motion in it becomes easy and as it were Natural” (II.xxxiii.6, p. 396). As is typical, he disclaims 
his use of physiological language and emphasizes that he is only speculating on the mechanism 
                                                
13 Elsewhere in the Essay Locke describes the rack as causing pain that “possesses our whole 
Mind” (II.xxi.53, p. 268). 
14 It should be noted that Locke also accords ideas a tendency towards natural decay, writing 
arrestingly, “our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are fast approaching; where 
though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery 
moulders away” (II.x.5, pp. 151–152). This perhaps explains time’s ability to alter connections 
between ideas, even associative ones. 
 
 37 
that underlies the generation of association despite the “constant vicissitude” of ideas in 
experience.  
 Nonetheless, physiological language is invoked more often in discussions of association 
than other epistemological errors. Locke attributes enthusiasm, which I show in the following 
chapter to be a result of association, to “a warmed or over-weening brain,” a problem in the 
“vigor of mind” (1996, p. 218). It is never clear whether Locke believes these cerebral 
dysfunctions to follow from other causes, or themselves to be sufficient etiological accounts of 
association. Chance physiological dysfunctions may be all that can be said about those cases in 
which association occurs unexpectedly “in the steady calm course of […] Life” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 
395). Many of the examples Locke gives of association, however, are initiated by a strong 
feeling: disgust upon being sickened by honey, grief at the loss of a child or terror upon hearing a 
ghost story.15 A fleeting grimace by a friend, for example, experienced as hurtful, can lead to the 
terminal association of a beloved face with anger and fear, and the friend can become an enemy. 
While Locke does not explain the role of the passions in association he notes their ability to 
completely suspend the “liberty of thought,” that is, the intellectual labor of correcting our ideas 
that allows for free and rational decision-making (II.xxi.53, p. 268). 
 As noted at the beginning of this section, the ambivalent role physiology plays in Locke’s 
account of madness is unusual for his time. The following section will explore what led Locke to 
develop a fundamentally ideational account instead of adopting a neurological one like so many 
of his contemporaries. I argue that, rather than being motivated by Locke’s epistemological 
                                                
15 See Charland (2008). Rapaport also notes the importance of the passions in Locke’s theory of 
association (1974, p. 68). 
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concerns, his turn away from physiology was part of a broader stance about medicine that itself 
had a significant impact on his philosophical commitments.  
2.4 AN IDEATIONAL ACCOUNT OF MADNESS 
 Charles Wolfe has noted the frequent treatment of Locke as an empiricist set on re-
founding the philosophy of mind on a physiological basis — from Kant, who calls Locke’s 
project a “physiology of the understanding,” to contemporary scholars who see him as a natural-
philosophical midwife easing the birth of neuroscience. I agree with Wolfe that “such readings 
[…] are […] not a matter of interpretation but are simply mistaken” (Wolfe, forthcoming). A 
quick comparison of Locke’s Essay with the likes of Thomas Willis’s Two Discourses 
Concerning the Soul of Brutes (1672) shows that, for his time, Locke spared relatively little ink 
for neurophysiology. In line with Willis, Locke notes that ideas are caused by “different degrees 
and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variously agitated by external Objects” (II.viii.4, p. 
133).16 But where Willis devotes an enormous volume to etiological accounts of cognition and 
psychopathology in terms of the animal spirits, Locke instead turns his gaze to “All those 
sublime Thoughts, which towre above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self” (II.i.24, p. 
118). Here I argue that, while not physiological, Locke’s language in the Essay is decidedly 
medical in the cultura animi sense.  
                                                
16 While Locke does not expand on this superficial physiological account, it clearly follows that 
of anatomical authorities like Willis and Descartes, the latter of whom describes the actions of 
the animal spirits in sensation as analogous to the rope of a bell which is pulled to transmit a 
signal (1985, p. 333) and who both describe the animal spirits flitting through the nerves to the 
brain to carve tracks in its soft matter, preserving memory or generating fancy. 
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 In the early modern period theories of mental illness underwent a sea change, part of wider 
development in medicine in line with the mechanistic turn in natural philosophy (Porter 1983). 
Out of dissatisfaction with Scholastic explanations came a desire to explain the properties of 
substances and bodies in terms of their underlying structures, rather than in formal terms, such as 
the virtus dormitiva Molière famously parodied in Le Malade Imaginaire (1673). The rise of 
iatrochemical explanations — that is, those integrating alchemical theories into medicine — 
challenged Galenist accounts of the humoral body that had been dominant for a millennium and 
a half. The vitalism of Paracelsus and Jan Baptist van Helmont was invoked to explain organic 
matter as spirited, driven towards development and pathology by active agents that reflected the 
macrocosmic processes in the microcosm of the body. Van Helmont’s theories of the archei, 
seeds or generative principles that caused not only the reproduction of matter but also of disease, 
localized illness within the body and challenged the holistic approach of the Galenist, with his 
emphasis on environment and on temperament.  
 The correspondence of Locke, as well as founding members of the Royal Society like 
Robert Boyle and Henry Oldenburg and later Isaac Newton, reveals a fascination with the 
alchemical processes generating spirit through complex relations of the earthly and celestial 
(Clericuzio 2009, p. 56).17 The fundamental methods of chemistry — distillation, fermentation, 
and fusion — became the experimental method of the physic as well as the bases for theories of 
the body. At the same time, the quantitative methods developed by advocates of the new 
mechanism also found a foothold in medicine, sometimes integrated with chemical approaches to 
generate a complex array of novel approaches to medicine (Wolfe 2011).  
                                                




 New treatments of madness grew out of the interchange between physicians such as Willis 
and the early members of the Royal Society, leading to the integration of mechanistic 
explanations into treatises on mental pathology and its therapies (Brown 1970). What has been 
called the iatromechanist approach grew in popularity after the Principia, culminating in the 
work of Archibald Pitcairne and leaving a mark on 18th-century writers like George Cheyne and 
William Cullen (Brown 1987; Wood 2003, p. 106). Taking their cue from Descartes’ hydraulic 
picture of the nervous system, iatromechanists sought to explain mental disorder in terms of the 
movement of the nervous fluids. At Oxford in the late 1650s Locke became interested in these 
new currents in natural philosophy and studied the lecture notes of Willis, whose groundbreaking 
work of neuropathology, Pathologicae Cerebri, would be published in 1667. Willis described the 
brain riddled with the animal spirits, “Substances highly subtil, and Aetherial Particles of a more 
Divine Breathing, which our Parent Nature hath hid in this Sublunary World, as it were the 
Instruments of Life and Soul, of Motion and Sense, of every thing” (1684, p. 3). In line with the 
Epicurean tradition Willis posited a sensitive soul as well as a rational one, and assigned 
perception, imagination, memory, and judgment to the former (Wright 1991).18  
 Physiological accounts of the mind remained compatible with Christian doctrine because 
they posited a rational soul that remained untouched in madness, but which was overrun by the 
diseased brain that housed the lower faculties. For example Daniel Sennert, whose work Locke 
studied intently during his early days as a doctor, posited that damage to the imagination made 
reason unable to perform its duties — working within a Galenic framework, he attributed this 
damage to the darkening effects of the black humor of melancholy (Walmsley 2004, p. 16). 
                                                
18 It has been noted that Locke was influenced not only by Willis’s iatrochemical theories of the 
sensitive soul but also by his moral-philosophical approach to mental disorder (Schmidt 2004). 
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Similarly in so far as he recognized (though did not much discuss) mental substance, Willis could 
agree with Descartes that this rational part continued on through mental infirmity and finally 
death, immortal, immaterial, and unchanging. While Willis replaced the humoral explanation 
with a spiritous one, and Descartes mechanized it, both argued that errors in perception — a 
material cause — impacted the mental. Thus, as Akihito Suzuki has put it, “John Locke was 
simply echoing contemporary medical opinion, when he wrote that madmen had not lost the 
faculty to reason but ‘by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for 
realities, they make right deduction from them’”(1995, p. 423). 
  On the grounds of this exclusion of the rational substance from the early-modern 
investigations of psychopathology, Suzuki argues that by the late 17th century mental phenomena 
were “not a proper medical concern.” He takes Locke’s contemporary Walter Charleton as 
exemplary of this stance, quoting his remark in 1680 that “thinking, knowing, judging, 
reasoning, concluding electing, willing […] being remote from the province of anatomists, I 
leave them to be handled by philosophers inquiring into the nature of the soul” (1992, p. 96). 
Suzuki concludes that by the end of the early modern period physicians and philosophers were 
studying fundamentally different objects, and, pace Kant, places Locke firmly in the 
philosophical camp, despite his professional commitments to the other side.  
 This bifurcation, however, ignores a third way: the cultura animi tradition. As described 
above, Corneanu argues that scholarly attention to the theoretical turn in early modern 
philosophy has overshadowed the continued interest in askesis alongside theoria. Following 
Bacon’s lead, natural and moral philosophy was applied by the likes of Locke, Boyle and 
Glanvill (as well as lesser-known physician-philosophers like Thomas Wright and Edward 
Reynolds) to the medical project of discovering regimens of the mind that could cure affective 
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and cognitive diseases.19 The cultura animi perspective emphasized the importance of utility in 
physic, in which “knowledge that is ‘practical’ can perform the required transformations in the 
soul, while ‘speculative’ knowledge fails in that endeavor and is thus sterile” (Corneanu 2012, p. 
58).  
 Locke’s allegiance to this tradition helps explain how, while his motivations are not 
physiological, they remain medical. As noted above, association is, for Locke, a medico-moral 
disease of the soul, which attacks the perceptive faculties rather than the active powers of the 
understanding. Locke uses the language of disease to describe not only problems with passive 
perception but also a plethora of “weaknesses and defects of the understanding,” such as mind-
wandering, hasty judgment, and prejudices, that keep men from the truth. “Of these there are as 
many possibly to be found,” Locke writes, “if the mind were thoroughly studied, as there are 
diseases of the body, each whereof clogs and disables the understanding to some degree, and 
therefore deserves to be looked after and cured” (Locke 1996, p. 187). This medical language 
was no mere literary flourish by an ignorant humanist. There is some debate about when Locke 
began to study medicine in earnest, but it is clear from his notebooks that by the late 1650s he 
was deep into the medical literature popular at Oxford (Milton 2001). By 1670 he was practicing 
medicine, and would continue to do so throughout his life, mostly as a favor to friends.  
The absence of any deep engagement with neurophysiology in the Essay calls for 
explanation in the work of a man devoted at the deepest levels to medicine and to natural 
philosophy. The answer, I think, is to be found in Locke’s particular medical orientation which, 
                                                
19 The tradition can be traced back further to the Augustinian conflation of illness and moral 
weakness (Augustine calls God “my most private Physician”) (Corneanu 2012, p. 52). Burton 
offers an interesting early case of the treatment of both the soul and body to redress a moral and 
mental failure, and the theme is well explored in Shakespeare and other literary figures. 
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unlike that of his peers, was staunchly anti-physiological. Given this orientation, while Locke 
was very much concerned with mental illness, he conceived of it in ideational terms as a 
widespread problem of development, one that had profound repercussions for human freedom 
and personal responsibility.  
 Before it manifests as a metaphysical quietism in the Essay (Yolton 1956, p. 97), Locke’s 
aversion to neurophysiology is visible in his earliest and deepest methodological commitments. 
From his early medical writings it is clear that Locke found speculative natural philosophy 
problematic specifically in circumstances where evidence from observation and experiment 
could not validate theory (Anstey 2011, p. 223; Anstey and Burrows 2009, p. 15). There is good 
reason to think that Locke’s refusal to “meddle with the physical consideration of the mind” 
(I.i.1, p. 43) was not because a medical avenue of investigation lay outside of his project, but 
rather because he thought physiology was the wrong way, tout court, to obtain answers about 
human understanding and its disorders.20 
 The grounds for such a position can be found in two of Locke’s medical fragments, 
“Anatomia” (1668) and “De Arte Medica” (1669). There is vigorous debate in the literature 
about the authorship of these fragments, which are written in Locke’s hand but have strong 
resonances with the contemporaneous work of the Puritan physician Thomas Sydenham, Locke’s 
friend and close medical colleague. 21 These debates are part of a wider one over the direction of 
influence between Sydenham and Locke, and to review and weigh in on them would take its own 
                                                
20 Nonetheless, his quietism on this front left the door open for the fleshing out of his 
developmental account of mental illness with neurophysiological content in the 18th century by 
the likes of David Hartley. 
21 While all parties agree the hand is Locke’s, this does not resolve the matter because there is 
evidence that Locke worked as Sydenham’s amanuensis and copied some of his essays into his 
commonplace books. See Anstey and Burrows (2009) for a review of the debate — though it is 
not a neutral one, since the authors seek to argue definitively against Sydenham’s authorship. 
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chapter. The former’s loyalty to empirical medicine, based on observation and experience rather 
than hypothesis or the practice of anatomy, becomes much more ardent and eloquent after his 
friendship with Locke, and his enthusiasm for Hippocrates and Bacon only then develop into a 
personal philosophy of medicine. In his mature works Sydenham embodies the ancient empiricist 
tradition, powerfully rejecting speculation and claiming that all ideas about pathology should be 
based on experience, since “we know what our five senses teach […]. The whole philosophy of 
medicine consists in working out the history of diseases, and applying the remedies which may 
dispel them; and Experience is the soul guide” (Wolfe 1961, p. 196). At the same time, Locke 
expresses admiration and gratitude for his friend’s innovative “way of the Physic” throughout his 
works and correspondence; and the timeframe of Locke’s developing thoughts on natural 
philosophical explanation and epistemology allow for Sydenham’s medical skepticism to have 
impacted Locke during the early stages of his philosophical career (Romanell 1984).  
 Despite diverse attempts to settle decisively the issue of influence and of the authorship of 
the fragments, all that is certain is that the two men shared a close collaborative relationship, in 
the clinical setting and also in their written works.22 In any event, it is clear not only that Locke 
                                                
22 A possibility under-explored in the extensive debate over the dubia is that different standards 
of authorship in the early modern period make the question about authorial ownership, as posed 
today, not appropriate. Thus, while agreeing with the contemporary consensus that Locke is 
writer of the texts based on their stylistic similarity to his work and dissimilarity to Sydenham’s 
as well as recent evidence from computational analysis, I believe it is impossible to ignore the 
evidence that Sydenham, not Locke, undertook (and left unfinished) a project of the magnitude 
suggested in the synopsis given in “De Arte Medica”; and that the authorial modifications in 
Sydenham’s hand to Locke’s draft of “Anatomia” suggest that he had input into the content of 
the draft; and that Sydenham was critical of speculative philosophy from before his friendship 
with Locke (Walmsley 2013). On the other hand, there is also strong evidence that Locke helped 
Sydenham write the more philosophical sections of his Observationes medicae (Meynell 2006). 
Locke’s penchant for co-authorship is evident in his work with Shaftesbury on The Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina, Letters from a Person of Quality, and other works. Ultimately I agree 
with Milton that “the factors that make the task [of assessing authorship] so intractable also to 
 
 45 
shared Sydenham’s position on speculative hypotheses in medicine, but that this position was 
part of a larger allegiance to the iatrochemical school of physic (Anstey and Burrows 2009, p. 
10). Among the new criticisms of Galenic medicine popular among iatrochemical physicians was 
the rejection of dissection as a method of medical knowledge-creation (Wolfe 1961).23 The 
knowledge necessary for the general practitioner was all available at the bedside.24 Corpses and 
animals could satisfy the curiosity of the natural philosopher, but were irrelevant for the object of 
medical study — the human body in vital motion. The author(s) of “Anatomia” argue along these 
lines,  
“All that anatomy can doe is only to shew us the grosse & sensible parts of the 
body, or the vapid & dead juices, all which after the most diligent search will be 
noe more able to direct a physitian how to cure a disease then how to make a 
man.” (Sydenham 1966, p. 85) 
While useful for helping a young physician or surgeon get oriented in the human body, 
gross anatomy is categorically incapable of revealing the “organicall constitution and that texture 
whereby [the body] operates.” Sydenham’s own writing echoes this: “However much, by 
                                                                                                                                                       
some extent reduces its importance” (Milton 2001). Thus I will refer to the author(s) of the 
fragments rather than rejecting the possibility that the conceptual content, though not the 
wording, was in part Sydenham’s. 
23 While Anstey (2011) has criticized Wolfe’s account by noting that the rejection of gross 
anatomy was popular amongst other “chymical” physicians in Locke’s day, he does not respond 
to Wolfe’s contrast between Locke and Boyle on the specific question of medical anatomy. I 
believe that Locke’s opposition to anatomy in the fragments is best read as a statement about the 
role of experimentation in medicine, which is less problematic for Anstey’s larger project than 
Wolfe’s broader observation that Locke and Boyle are opposed regarding anatomization in toto. 
24 This view was not shared by the majority of the advocates of the new science outside of 
medicine, such as many of the members of the Royal Society, and by many important physicians 
of the era, notably William Harvey. For two (quite different) taxonomies of these diverse 
orientations within the new science see Anstey (2011) and Wolfe (2010). 
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seriously inclining our minds, we may discover what Nature does, and by what organs she does 
it, the way in which she does it will always be unknown to man” (Wolfe 1961, p. 210).25  
 “De Arte Medica” acknowledges that it is part of human nature to seek out causes rather 
than simply observing “the operation of nature and the event of things” (Dewhurst 1966, p. 80). 
It offers a creation story for the hypotheses of contemporary medicine in which earlier thinkers 
“were curious in imagining the secret workmanship of nature” and fashioned these fantasies into 
a system which ultimately “has at last but confined and narrowed mens thoughts, amused their 
understanding with fine but useless speculations.” He who would build up medicine on axioms 
in order to make it into a science can pride himself on having “enlarge[d] the art of talkeing,” but 
has done little to improve the practice of physic. Importantly, “De Arte Medica” places medicine 
firmly under the heading of techne rather than episteme — in explaining why a physician has no 
need of chymical knowledge, it analogizes him to a cook, who does not owe “his skill in rosting 
and boyling to his study of the elements” (Sydenham 1966, p. 81). Throughout his career Locke 
discusses the importance of not applying the faculty of the understanding to tasks beyond its 
God-given purview. In “De Arte Medica” can be found an early application of this stance to 
medicine, in which it is explicitly excluded from scientific endeavor.26 
                                                
25 Wolfe notes that Sydenham’s passages on medicine reflect his wider commitments both in 
natural philosophy and in theology. An ardent Puritan, he rejected attempts to investigate the 
“abyss of causes” because it lay outside God’s plan for us. The mature Locke expresses similar 
sentiments routinely, as discussed below. 
26 The framework, and even the language, of this point is obviously Baconian. The next sentence 
continues, “The begining and improvement of the useful arts, and the assistances of human life, 
have all sprung from industry and observation; true knowledg grew first in the world by 
experience and rationall operations; and had this method beene continued and all mens thoughts 
been imploid to adde their own tryalls to the observation of others noe question physick, as well 
as many other arts, had been in a far better condition then now it is.” 
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 To the frustration of some later commentators,27 “Anatomia” rejects any possibility of 
science and technology improving such as to reveal, through tools like the microscope, the 
“minute and insensible” parts by which “nature performs all her operations on the body.” But it 
must be recalled that Locke and Sydenham were committed to the alchemical worldview, within 
which mechanical parts were simply insufficient to explain organic phenomena without the vital 
seminal ferments, or active powers, that caused development. “Morbus,” a fragment written by 
Locke in 1666, expresses the importance of seminal principles alongside “the bare mistion28 of 
ye parts” for the understanding of organic development and suggests that their study could 
generate a “more rationall theory of diseases” than either the Galenic or Paracelsian system 
(Walmsley 2000). Similarly, “There is something therefore in the body and juices,” the author(s) 
of “Anatomia” write, “too curious and fine for us to discern […] intus mens agitat molem” — the 
mind inside that moves the matter (Sydenham 1966, p. 92). The author(s) of the fragment note(s) 
that whether nature works on the minutest levels through “organicall texture” or a “kinde of 
ferment” is still an open question.  
 Could any investigations into the physiology of the human brain, by necessity (in Locke’s 
day) performed on dead tissue, be revelatory of the functioning of the understanding? It seems 
even as early as the late 1660s, a physiological approach to psychopathology would not have 
been viable for Locke. The author(s) of the fragments hold(s) that ideas are intimately involved 
in the functioning of the soma — “Anatomia” notes the physiological changes accompanying 
“the receipt of suddaine bad news” (Sydenham 1966, p. 91). Yet even “the quickest sighted 
                                                
27 See, for example, Wolfe (1961). The stance does seem particularly strange given that Robert 
Hooke and others were already detailing the “minute parts” of organic matter using microscopy 
in the 1660s. 
28 That is, “mixture.” 
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anatomist, assisted too by the best microscope,” could never locate “a fright which causes such 
diseases as epilepsies, hysterical fits, and fatuity.” Any natural history of the understanding must, 
accordingly, be reflective, based on perceived experience of the understanding “from the inside” 
rather than on physiology. The mature Locke later writes, “For my design being, as well as I 
could to copy nature, and to give an account of operations of the mind in thinking, I could look 
into nobody’s understanding but my own, to see how it wrought […]. All, therefore, I can say of 
my book is, it is a copy of my own mind, in its several ways of operation” (Locke 1889, p. 345). 
What Locke observed when his understanding turned upon its own operations was not the 
machinations of the fleeting animal spirits, but rather the perception of ideas.  
 Locke’s early skeptical views, expressed in the popular language of empiricist physicians, 
were foundational for his mature philosophy more generally. Because God gave us senses fitted 
to the macroscale on which we live, Locke argues in the Essay, our knowledge will always be 
imperfect and we will never be able to understand the complex processes by which the 
microscale constitutes the macroscale. This distinction between the underlying hidden 
corpuscular structures of the world and the qualities of them we perceive — the real and nominal 
essences of substances, respectively — is at the heart of his metaphysics. To believe we have 
found real essences of substances is, Locke suggests, impiety. In emphasizing observation and 
experience over speculation into hidden causes, Locke invokes the Baconian project, and indeed 
he identifies his own project as that of offering a “History of the first beginnings of Humane 
Knowledge; whence the Mind has its first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the 
laying in, and storing up those Ideas, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable 
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of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and Observation, whether I am in the right” (II.xii.15 p. 
162).29 
 Explain how sensations and perceptions interface with the understanding; “make it 
intelligible”; “and then,” Locke quips in the Essay, “the next step will be to understand Creation. 
For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal Spirits (which some make use of 
to explain voluntary motion) […] leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before.” In 
language that echoes that of the earlier fragments, he insists that to imagine we can understand 
the operations of our own minds is hubris, “an overvaluing our selves” (IV.x.19, pp. 629–630). In 
his response to Norris, for example, Locke notes again that all we can really know of ideas is that 
they are the result of motion. Locke’s motivation for the claim is that it is “so hard and almost 
impossible to keep in our minds the same unvaried idea long together” (Locke 1889, p. 469), 
suggesting that something changing rapidly causes ideas. He goes on in the paragraph to suggest 
the definition of ideas as “being in motion” is the best that can be gleaned — nothing can be 
known further than that ideas “are perceptions we experiment in ourselves.”  
 While carefully cataloging the diverse processes of the understanding as experienced 
through reflection, Locke consistently excludes speculation into the aspects of the understanding 
that cannot be perceived through either sensation or reflection: namely, the inner workings of the 
living brain, the “mind’s Presence-room” (II.iii.1 p. 121). While he often uses the language of 
contemporary neurology, echoing Descartes and Willis, to describe the “natural Causes and 
manner of Perception” (II.xiii.4 p. 133), terms like “animal spirits” have little explanatory power, 
                                                
29 Indeed, in his defense of his Essay against the Bishop of Worcester, Locke goes so far as to 
protest that he is not, in fact, attempting a new architectonic epistemology at all but merely a 
history: “that which your lordship calls my new way by ideas […] if it be new, it is but a new 
history of an old thing” (1889, p. 343). 
 
 50 
merely working to register the constitutive role of the body rather than describing mechanisms of 
the understanding.30 Locke professes his own way “dull” and “unphilosophical” in this regard, 
noting that because he theorizes about the nature of ideas based solely on what can be culled 
from sensation and reflection, he can conclude little more about their nature but that they 
“depend on, and are some way or other the effect of motion” (Locke 1889, p. 469). 
 Nonetheless, Locke’s mention of animal spirits (especially in Chapter 33, on association) 
has excited the attention of scholars, and Sutton is representative in claiming that Locke’s 
recourse to animal spirits in describing association is a “far cry from his official neutrality about 
the operations of the mind” (2010, p. 247). Wright (1987) maintains that Locke holds a “psycho-
physiological account” of association, inspired by his reading of Malebranche, who discusses the 
connection between neurological and mental phenomena explicitly. Wright points out that in the 
same letter to Molyneux where he first mentions his new chapter on the connection of ideas, 
written in 1695, Locke mentions his recent work on Malebranche in his response to Norris. 
Locke does not discuss Malebranche’s views in his letter — in fact, Wright’s claim that “Locke 
notes that he has almost completed his study of Malebranche’s philosophy” is a bit misleading, 
since Locke only notes in response to Molyneux’s query that he in fact gave up the study he 
began years before,31 and in a letter a month prior states that he has no plans to ever return to it 
                                                
30 For example: “If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce Ideas in 
it; and yet we perceive these original Qualities in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 
’tis evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by 
some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation, there to produce in our Minds 
the particular Ideas we have of them” (II.xiii.12, p. 136). Other examples from the Essay can be 
found in II.x.5 and II.xxvii.13). 
31 “My opinion of P. Malbranche agrees perfectly with yours. What I have writ concerning 
seeing all things in God, would make a little treatise of it self. But I have not quite gone through 
it, for fear I should by somebody or other be tempted to print it” (Locke 1979, p. 352). 
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“being myself fully satisfied about it” (1979, p. 287).32 However, support for Malebranche’s 
influence on Locke’s theory of association can be drawn from the fact that Locke had first read 
Malebranche’s De la recherche de la vérité two decades earlier in France (Milton 2001, p. 232), 
around the time he made his first notes about false ideas causing madness in his notebooks.  
 As Wright emphasizes, Locke’s new vocabulary in his chapter on association bears a strong 
resemblance to that of Malebranche, who writes about “natural” and “unnatural” connections of 
ideas. However, Malebranche’s natural connections are those that link traces that the animal 
spirits leave on the brain in response to external stimuli to the ideas of those external stimuli. He 
defines unnatural connections as the happenstance occurrence of a thought along with a 
particular stimulus to which it bears no relation: “Our having had certain thoughts at a time when 
there were some new traces on our brain often suffices to make it impossible for these traces to 
recur without our having the same thoughts again.”33 Finally, Malebranche recognizes 
connections due to “the will of men” (1997, p. 103). He emphasizes that natural connections 
strike the mind more deeply due to its repeated exposure to them, and this is as it should be. On 
the other hand “All the connections that are not natural can be and should be broken, because 
different circumstances of time and place are bound to change them so that they can be useful to 
                                                
32 Evidence from his archive reveals he left off working on his draft of the manuscript that would 
ultimately be published as “An examination of P. Malebranche’s opinion of seeing all things in 
God” (1706) in 1693 — quite definitively, since the last words of the manuscript are “Thus far 
1693.” Locke never returned to the manuscript. 
33 In The Passions of the Soul Descartes also recognizes perceptions that “differ from the others” 
insofar as “our will is not used in forming them.” These “imaginings” therefore “cannot be 
numbered among the actions of the soul, for they arise simply from the fact that the spirits, being 
agitated in various different ways and coming upon the traces of various impressions which have 
preceded them in the brain, make their way by chance through certain pores rather than others” 
(1985, p. 336). 
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the preservation of life” (1997, p. 106).34 Locke adjusts the vocabulary to refer to connections 
between ideas, rather than connections joining objects to perceptions of qualities. Nonetheless, 
his theory is in line with Malebranche’s insofar as it contrasts the natural and constant perception 
with the contingent, and the individual perception with the universal.  
 While the connection with Malebranche is an important one, what Locke takes from that 
source is ideational, rather than physiological, and the above discussion demonstrates that calling 
Locke’s account “psycho-physiological” is to exaggerate the case — his description of habitual 
associations as the result of the animal spirits in this chapter merely functions to reinforce what 
he says throughout the Essay, that there is surely some physical correlate for the passage of ideas 
through the mind in chains. In this respect the mention of animal spirits is no more explanatory 
than it is elsewhere in the Essay, where Locke often uses the motion of the animal spirits 
interchangeably with more abstract descriptions of the temper of the brain or the “motion” of 
ideas (e.g. II.x.5, p. 152, II.xxvii.27, p. 347, Locke 1996, p. 12, p. 226). In most cases, Locke 
believes “giving a new determination to the motion of animal Spirits […] clears not the difficulty 
one jot” (II.xxi.55, p. 269). It is the nature of perception, described through subjective 
observation of the understanding by the understanding, that constitutes Locke’s method of 
natural history, and it was this aspect of Malebranche’s thought that may have excited his 
attention.  
                                                
34 Malebranche’s own theory of mental illness interestingly distinguishes “visionaries of the 
senses,” who see things that are not present, from “visionaries of the imagination,” who are 
“excessive in all instances; they raise up what is low; they exaggerate what is small; they bring 
near what is remote. Nothing appears to them as it is. They wonder at everything, they exclaim 
about everything without judgment or discernment” (Malebranche 1997, p. 165). Malebranche 
suggests that the difference between the former and the latter is that “visionaries of the 
imagination” can pass as sensible, whereas the fantasies of “visionaries of the senses” are easily 
recognized: “everyone has reason for not believing that one can so easily become a cock or a 
king” (Malebranche 1997, p. 180).  
 
 53 
 Given Locke’s commitment to medicine as a curative art that is distinct from — indeed in 
cases hindered by — physiology, his abandonment of neuroanatomy is compatible with his 
treatment of association as medical. From Bacon onwards, the early-modern fascination with the 
moral betterment of the self through reason bled into medical practice, foreshadowing the 
obsession with mental hygiene that overtook England in the 18th century. Hooke writes of the 
importance of “rectifying the operations of the Sense, the Memory, and Reason,” while 
Descartes, who saw medicine as one of the great aims of natural philosophy (1985, p. 151), 
emphasized that using reason to control the passions is key to moral as well as physical health.35 
Likewise attending to the two sorts of human ailments, medical and spiritual, became a single 
task for Locke, managed through the attention to ideas via the powers of the understanding, 
rather than the mind’s material or immaterial substances. This focus on the right conduct of the 
understanding places Locke within the early modern movement that saw natural science as still 
committed to the ancient aim of philosophy: the living of a better life (Corneanu 2012; Garrett 
2013). This context, in tandem with his suspicion of psychophysiology, led him to generate a 
highly original account of mental illness.  
2.5 FREEDOM AND ASSOCIATION 
 I have shown that in his chapter on the association of ideas Locke presents a novel theory 
of madness as a pathology of ideas rather than of substance, recognized through phenomenology 
rather than physiology and treated through an original integration of philosophy and physic. 
                                                
35 See, for example, Descartes’ letters to Princess Elizabeth, especially (1985, pp. 249–251). 
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Locke does not give a mechanistic account of association as a pathology of the sensorium, nor 
does he contrast it with a nonmaterial treatment of healthy ideas as mental substance. Instead he 
characterizes madness as a result of the formation of ideas by forces outside the control of the 
understanding, ideas which enter the understanding through its receptive capacities which are 
most closely reliant on the sensorium: sensation and reflection. While psychopathology is no less 
ideational than healthy cognition, associated ideas are not the product of intellectual labor.  
 Besides clarifying Locke’s unique theory of association, this account can shed light on 
broader themes in his philosophy. This is so because Locke frequently uses madness as a trope, 
and understanding what he meant by it can clarify other areas of his thought such as his views on 
the ethics of belief (see Chapter 3) and personal identity (see Chapter 4). More immediately, 
associated ideas can act as a foil for healthy ones, and reveal to us what, for Locke, constitutes 
normal psychological functioning. The pathology that results from the automatic and passive 
connection of ideas makes clear that for Locke, mental health is reliant the active labor of the 
understanding. Indeed, Locke notes explicitly that the labor the healthy, rational mind performs 
is closely tied to human freedom:  
“If to break loose from the conduct of Reason, and to want that restraint of 
Examination and Judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse, be 
Liberty, true Liberty, mad Men and Fools are the only Freemen: But yet, I think, 
no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad 
already.” (II.xxi.50, p. 265) 
Locke has already told us that all the liberty man has lies in his ability to suspend his 
assent and correct his ideas. Here he notes the irony of his account, in which the constraint 
reason places on the connections between our ideas is constitutive of human freedom. This is the 
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heart of Locke’s concept of freedom, which is explicitly compatible with determinism — Locke 
writes that the determination of our will by our active faculties “’tis not an Abridgment, ’tis the 
end and use of our Liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer 
we are to Misery and Slavery” (II.xxi.48, p. 264). Indeed, “every Man is put under a necessity by 
his constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought” (ibid.). 
Even God, Locke maintains, cannot but choose what is good, not despite but on account of his 
absolute freedom.  
 While passages like this suggest that Locke equates freedom with the ability to arrive at the 
good through intellectual labor, there is some ambiguity. It is clear that somewhere in the process 
of suspending the will and correcting his ideas, the rational man becomes free, but it is not 
obvious where his freedom is located. Is it in the act of suspension, or the act of correction? 
Locke writes, for example,  
“If the neglect or abuse of the Liberty [man] had, to examine what would really 
and truly make for his Happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on 
it, must be imputed to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his 
determination: It was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own 
Happiness, and look that he were not deceived.” (II.xxi.56, p. 271) 
Some have read this passage to imply that the power of suspension can be equated with liberty, 
but recently Walsh (2015) has offered a careful textual analysis of the language Locke uses to 
describe suspension (as a “source” or an “inlet”) in order to suggest that suspension is merely the 
means to freedom, not constituent of it.  
 The text remains obdurate, but my discussion can offer some further support for Walsh’s 
interpretation. Locke notes that the suspension of the will until deliberation has taken place only 
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belongs to “intellectual Beings,” and follows naturally from “the inclination, and tendency of 
their nature to happiness” — “an obligation, and motive to them” (II.xxi.52, p. 267). As noted 
above, Locke believes the intellectual faculties of the madman to be perfectly intact, in contrast 
to the idiot.36 Nonetheless, Locke is explicit that madmen are not free in any meaningful sense — 
and as we will see in Chapter 4, this is supported elsewhere by his assertion that they cannot be 
judged as moral agents. While we have no reason to think that madmen cannot suspend their 
assent, Locke is clear that they cannot do work on their ideas. Therefore freedom can be defined 
in terms of that activity that the madman is incapable of: not the power to suspend judgment, but 
the means to make use of this suspension through the scrutiny and correction of ideas. Locke’s 
account of association endorses an interpretation of his theory of freedom as constituted by 
intellectual labor.  
 If this is right, the association of ideas has substantial ramifications for Locke’s broader 
theory of human nature. In the current chapter I have shown how associated ideas frustrate some 
of the powers in which freedom lies, namely the understanding’s sundry powers that allow for 
the evaluation of connections between ideas. In the next chapter I show the devastating effects of 
association on the understanding’s ability to manipulate chains of ideas, or propositions. Because 
associated ideas compromise the ability of the understanding to correct its own ideas, they also 
affect its capacity to reason probabilistically and justify its beliefs. As I show, associated ideas 
both directly (through complex ideas) and indirectly (through propositions) wreak havoc on 
moral agency, forcing Locke to rethink his ethics of belief in light of the phenomenon of 
madness.  
                                                
36 Idiots “perceive but dully,” and their paltry store of complex ideas means that they “will have 




3 MAD ERROR 
 
3.1 ASSOCIATED IDEAS AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 
 
 Locke came of age during the English Civil War, and was profoundly disturbed by the 
instability and violence that surrounded him. Born into a Puritan family, his religious and 
political loyalties were nebulous across his lifetime. His attitude is well captured in a letter to his 
father in July of 1659, in which he condemns both Royalists and Parliamentarians equally for 
ignoring the path God has chosen for humanity, that of serenity and fellowship.37 Douglas 
Casson describes the young Locke as a political and religious skeptic, writing seemingly heartfelt 
paeans within a few years praising first Oliver Cromwell and then Charles II as harbingers of 
peace (2011, p. 76). His strongest loyalty seems to have been to the abolition of the violent chaos 
he was born into, and he tried on a variety of different political and religious mantels in pursuit 
of this aim — authoritarianism as well as liberalism, Anglicanism as well as antitrinitarianism — 
before settling into his mature views. A crucial element of this normative program is the 
                                                
37 “I hope I am to be pardond on both sides if I am not quick sighted enough to see either that 
glorious fabrick of liberty and happinesse, or those goblins of warre and bloud which either side 
would perswade us they behold over our heads ready to drop downe on us, that which I looke to 
is the hand that governs all things, that manages our Chaos and will bring out of it what will be 
best for us and what we ought to acquiesce in, I have long since learnd not to rely on men” 
(Locke 1976, p. 83). 
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justification of belief, the active intellectual labor that goes into determining what we have 
reason to believe.  
 Casson catalogues Locke’s parallel frustrations across the diverse fields to which he 
contributed, noting some fascinating moments of interplay. Locke was closely involved with the 
Royal mint, and uses the metaphor of recoinage to describe the revisions to the philosophical 
discourse for which he so fiercely advocated (ibid., p. 9). He also accused religious enthusiasts, 
whom he saw as abusing their own mental faculties as well as the credulity of others to spread 
religious discord, of counterfeit “coining” (ibid., p. 6). All of Locke’s enemies — philosophical 
and religious zealots, political extremists, counterfeiters and charlatans — were in some sense 
guilty of the same crime: the abandonment of the authoritative powers sanctioned by God, and 
the debasement of the public sphere with the currencies of the private, the unlawful, the 
unaccredited, and the occult.  
 I defended the view in the previous chapter that the active powers of the understanding are, 
for Locke, the organs of human liberty. There I described how our complex ideas must be 
subjected to the scrutiny of the active powers, but Locke also believes that propositions must be 
labored upon to justify our belief. Our potential to come to right judgments is the direct result of 
our capacities to view ideas sequentially and to manipulate them, capacities given by God but is 
not in His image, since “we cannot say God reasons at all; for he has at once a view of all things” 
(Locke 1824, p. 251).38 The application of these capacities to our propositional beliefs is a moral 
                                                
38 Locke often compares the human intellect to the divine one and, even more frequently, the 
angelic one. The trope of the angel allows Locke to demonstrate not only the shortcomings of 
humanity’s natural state but also how individual men and women can rise a little higher up the 
chain of being. While we will never have “as clear Ideas of the radical Constitution of 
Substances” as the angels (III.xi.23, p. 520) and never be able “at one Glance to see the 
Connexion and Agreement of very many Ideas,” we come closest when, “by single and slow 
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duty: Locke writes that “the last resort a man has recourse to in the conduct of himself is the 
understanding,” for while the will determines action, the will is itself determined by “some 
precedent of knowledge, or appearance of knowledge, in the understanding” (1996, p. 171).  
  If man neglects to apply his intellect to the pursuit of his summum bonum he fails to pay 
“the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has 
given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour” (IV.xviii.24, p. 687). Views about 
theological, natural philosophical, and political matters that cannot be attributed to reasoning and 
judgment are condemnable, not due to their content per se but due to the way they were obtained 
— this is why, for Locke, the assumption that a proposition qualifies as innate knowledge just 
because we do not recall its origin is a dangerous one. Even if unscrutinized propositions are, by 
luck, true, they are no less sinful. To neglect the pursuit of proper inquiry and judge too hastily is 
to “fight against God, who is the God of truth, and do the work of the devil, who is the father and 
propagator of lies; and our zeal, though ever so warm, will not excuse us” (Locke 1996, p. 185).  
 Locke’s stance on moral culpability and the active faculties of reason and judgment are of a 
piece with his claims about the active powers that manipulate simple ideas, and he recognizes an 
analogous sort of pathology that compromises our agency over our mental propositions. Along 
with mad ideas, complex ideas that are combined through associations rather than healthy 
connections, Locke recognizes what I will call mad errors, propositions that, due to the presence 
of mad ideas, are equally intransigent against the powers of the understanding. Locke describes 
mad ideas — that the body is made out of glass, or that one is king of England — that are easy to 
recognize. The sorts of faulty propositions that motivate his discussion of mad error, however, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Steps, and long poring in the dark,” we assure that our ideas correspond to actual relations in the 
world and that our terms are used with care and precision (IV.iii.6, p. 543). 
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are more dangerous for being less obvious. It is these more subtle manifestations of madness that 
have all the feel of certain knowledge that Locke was most concerned with. In fact, it does not 
seem too strong to say his interest in association is motivated by his horror at how religious 
authorities proclaim divinely-delivered principles in order to sway their congregations and block 
access to the moral law. Locke needed a way to explain how so many minds could be moved 
against the current of reason (Tully 2009, p. 23).  
 Along with “Of the Association of Ideas” (Chapter 33), Chapter 19 of Book IV, “Of 
Enthusiasm,” was the only chapter Locke added to the fourth edition of the Essay in 1700. While 
Locke recognizes divine inspiration as a source of knowledge, here he argues that a revelation is 
only as good as the evidence for its divine origin. Without such evidence, it is no more than 
madness. Enthusiasm, “which laying by Reason would set up Revelation without it,” is the 
inevitable product of taking as foundational “the ungrounded Fancies of a Man’s own Brain” 
(IV.xix.3, p. 698) on account of an excess of “Melancholy […] mixed with Devotion” (IV.xix.7, 
p. 699). Of enthusiasts Locke writes, 
“Reason is lost upon them, and they are above it: they see the Light infused into their 
Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; ’tis clear and visible there; like the Light of 
bright Sunshine, shows itself, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: they 
feel the Hand of GOD moving them within, and the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot 
be mistaken in what they feel.” (IV.xix.8, p. 700) 
John Passmore (1978) has used the case of the enthusiast to argue that Locke’s account of the 
ethics of belief puts him in a bind, insofar as his epistemology cannot account for cases like these 
in which men are wrong even when they have all the necessary evidence in front of them to see 
their error. Religious enthusiasm seems to be a case in which Locke’s account of the automatic 
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action of the will in response to reasons breaks down; despite being exposed to the truth, 
religious zealots ignore what they perceive and continue to believe their falsehoods. Passmore 
writes that in his discussion of enthusiasm Locke faces his “greatest difficulties in defending his 
intellectualist account of belief,” and concludes that Locke’s treatment of enthusiasm marks a 
shift away from rationalism and towards a more psychological vision of belief as driven by the 
passions: “That dictum which in earlier versions of the Essay was little more than a passing 
remark — ‘what suits our wishes is forwardly believed’ — comes to occupy the centre of the 
stage” (1978, p. 205).  
 Ayers has rejected Passmore’s “rather startling interpretation” of Locke’s theory of belief 
as desire, arguing that while the passions may impede the suspension of assent, since they “are 
not responsible for the original conceits” we need not “suppose that Locke experienced any 
sweeping conversion to irrationalism” (1993, p. 112). Enthusiasts suffer from misconceptions 
rather than unreasonable passions; Ayers claims that Locke attributes their beliefs “not to the 
conventional passions or desires […] but to the imagination” (1993, p. 111). Ayers has been 
criticized for not defending his claim that enthusiasts are motivated by intellectual rather than 
emotive forces, and indeed he provides little textual support in his brief treatment of the topic 
(Williston 2002, p. 72). But that Ayers is right is clear from the two-stage treatment of 
enthusiasm that Locke offers up, describing first the presence of an intransigent idea and only in 
the second instance the false and peccable belief that the idea has been generated through 
revelation. Below I argue that it is this latter judgment that Locke condemns as unreasonably 
impressionistic, motivated by religious fervor rather than an indifferent love of truth. The first 
stage is simply an example of mad error, against which the active powers of the understanding 
are helpless, and for which the enthusiast cannot be blamed.  
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 Both Passmore and Ayers for the most part ignore Chapter 19’s associate, Chapter 33 — 
though Ayers dismisses the both of them in one breath as contributing little that is new to the 
Essay (1993, p. 112).39 But Locke’s discussion of association can shed important light on his 
theory of enthusiasm. Enthusiasm and madness are both problematic for Locke’s account of 
human understanding insofar as the usual powers of correcting falsehoods, assigning 
probabilistic judgments to truth claims, and generating new knowledge are shown to be 
defeasible. I conclude the current chapter by showing how, in characterizing enthusiasm as in 
part a medical failure, Locke preserves his intellectualist account of the human understanding 
while clarifying the circumstances under which it is insufficient to explain human action. As 
Tully (2002, p. 22) notes, Locke is concerned with “the factors that do govern assent, as opposed 
to those that ought to,” and accordingly Locke is the first to admit that in some cases human 
understanding fails miserably. He is interested, in other words, in the full gamut of human 
understanding, from rationality to irrationality, sanity to insanity, agency to patienthood. Insofar 
as he explains failures of the understanding as medical rather than moral, however, he is able to 
maintain his stance that epistemological and Christian betterment progress hand in hand as the 
result of self-discipline.  
 The next section describes how our propositional judgments are formed out of our complex 
ideas, and how they impact the affective relations we have with possible actions, what Locke 
calls the “uneasinesses” which directly determine the will. I will focus especially on Locke’s 
theory of habitual propositional knowledge. Section 3.3 shows how associated ideas compromise 
the truth-value of propositional thought, like a rotten ingredient that poisons a dish even when 
                                                
39 “If there was anything new in the fourth edition explanations of error in both ‘Of Enthusiasm’ 
and ‘Of the Association of Ideas,’ it lay in the more conspicuous role of the physiology of the 
imagination. Even that had been anticipated in a journal entry of 1682” (Ayers 1993, p. 112). 
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the recipe is followed to perfection. In Section 3.4 I show how propositions that contain 
associated ideas, which I am calling mad errors, differ from other sorts of intellectual failures. 
Finally in my last section I return to what has been called Locke’s ethics of belief, where my 
discussion will reveal that Locke was no naïve subscriber to Clifford’s Principle, that “It is 
wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” 
(Clifford 1974, p. 77). I show how Locke’s theory of mad errors can motivate his mature account 
of religious toleration, which excuses false belief while condemning the actions of enthusiasts.  
 
3.2 THE LIGHT OF REASON 
 
 In the Essay, and even more directly in the Conduct, Locke concerns himself with finding 
the best regimens for strengthening the faculties that generate moral knowledge. About these 
faculties Locke is fairly pessimistic: for the most part we labor in a “twilight of probability” and 
when it comes to the essences of things our groping after knowledge “leaves us in the dark” 
(II.xxiii.23, p. 308). But our saving grace is the light of reason, which Locke celebrates as 
revelatory—it is through this light that we know the moral law. The metaphor of light is 
ubiquitous in Book IV of the Essay, where Locke discusses knowledge, and also in the Conduct, 
where Locke describes “the clear light” of the mind that leads “into truth and knowledge” (Locke 
1996, p. 184). But the metaphor is most richly drawn at the very beginning of the Essay, where 
Locke compares the man who gropes for absolute certainty to 
“An idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-
light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine. The Candle, that is set up in us, 
shines bright enough for our purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, 
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ought to satisfy us: And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we 
entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our 
Faculties; and upon those Grounds, they are capable of being propos’d to us; and 
not peremptorily, or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, 
where Probability is only to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our 
Concernments.” (I.i.5, p. 46) 
How does reason assist with this prudential sort of discovery? Reason, Locke tells us, 
consists in those faculties that assist in the generation of knowledge, that is, in the “Perception of 
the Agreement, or Disagreement, of our own Ideas” (IV.xvii.2, p. 668). All ideas come through 
experience, but knowledge is primarily about the relations between ideas, and our awareness of 
those is a product of reason (an active power) and reflection (a passive one). Locke refers to the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas afforded through these methods as 
“seeing” (e.g., II.xvii.2, p. 669). Reason illuminates the relations between ideas that have been 
brought together in propositions, and can generate new propositions to provide deductions for 
those propositions that are initially opaque to us.40 
 When Locke describes ideas as “agreeing,” he refers to ideas that, when joined in an 
affirmative proposition, generate a truth: for example, “gold dissolves in aqua regia.” A 
proposition in which these ideas are in opposition (“gold does not dissolve in aqua regia”) would 
be a false one, and reason would allow us to perceive it as such. On the other hand, ideas that 
                                                
40 Locke makes it clear that the term “proposition” can refer both to the joining of ideas (mental 
propositions) and the joining of names (verbal propositions). Mental propositions can exist quite 
independently of the latter, although it is (for obvious reasons) impossible to demonstrate this in 
argument (IV.v.2, p. 574). 
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“disagree” generate true negative propositions: “a triangle does not have four sides.” Thus Locke 
writes: 
“For Truth, or Falshood, being never without some Affirmation, or Negation, 
Express, or Tacit, it is not to be found, but where signs are joined or separated, 
according to the agreement, or disagreement, of the Things they stand for. The 
signs we chiefly use, are either Ideas, or Words, wherewith we make either 
mental, or verbal Propositions. Truth lies in so joining, or separating these 
Representatives, as the Things they stand for, do, in themselves, agree, or 
disagree: and Falshood in the contrary.” (II.xxxii.19, p. 391) 
Knowing whether a proposition is true or false, then, results from our experience with the ideas 
in question, and our familiarity with their properties and relations.  
Locke recognizes four ways in which ideas can agree or disagree: in regards to identity / 
diversity, relation, co-existence (necessary connection), and real existence. The first two allow 
for propositions of the form “a circle is not a square,” or “an elephant is bigger than a mouse.” 
Other propositions use “is” or “is not” to make claims about the constant co-occurrence of ideas 
in experience, such as “gold melts when put in fire” or “man is not an omniscient all-powerful 
being.” The truth of some propositions can be perceived immediately, and assent occurs without 
the active powers of the understanding contributing at all. An example of such a proposition is 
that “Three are more than Two” (IV.ii.1, p. 530). Such intuitive knowledge, “like the bright Sun-
shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived” (ibid.). In these cases, reason is not required to 
elucidate the relationship between ideas because the agreement between them needs no 
mediation to be discovered. 
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  In other cases, knowledge of whether a proposition is a “mental truth” — that is, whether 
its “Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do 
agree, or not” — is not passively delivered up by perception. In these cases, the active powers of 
the understanding must do their work, bringing other ideas to bear. These intermediate ideas, or 
“Proofs,” function as middle terms, bridging two ideas in a demonstration that produces 
knowledge; reason lays “them in a clear and fit Order, to make their Connexion and Force be 
plainly and easily perceived” (IV.xvii.3, p. 669). Locke gives an example of this in an exchange 
with Stillingfleet, where he writes that “by the clear ideas of thinking in me [a simple idea 
accessed via reflection], I find the agreement of the clear idea of existence, and the obscure idea 
of a substance in me, because I perceive the necessary idea of thinking, and the relative idea of a 
support; which support, without having any clear and distinct idea of what it is, beyond this 
relative one of support, I call a substance.”41 This is demonstrative knowledge (IV.ii.ii., p. 532).42  
 When proofs are not available, the understanding instead relies on judgment, the power to 
make probabilistic assessments of whether our ideas are arranged so as to reflect “as in Reality 
Things are” (IV.xiv.4, p. 653). When judging, the understanding does not perceive the agreement 
of ideas but merely perceives reasons to believe that the probability of agreement is high (such as 
the frequent co-occurrence of two ideas in experience). Affirmation can be given on the basis of 
such probabilistic judgment, though it then falls short of assent. Unlike intuitive knowledge, 
                                                
41 As quoted in Yolton (1956, p. 255), who notes that this passage shows that Locke believes 
certainty of demonstration depended on the clear perception of connections between ideas, rather 
than the clarity of the ideas themselves. This is because truth or falsity, for Locke, is a property 
of propositions, not ideas. 
42 Locke gives another example in the Essay: “Men can determine themselves,” which relies on 
the previous knowledge that “Men shall be punished” and a chain of intermediate ideas: “God 
the punisher,—just Punishment,—the Punished guilty—could have done otherwise—Freedom—
self-determination” (IV.xvii.4, p. 673). 
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which can be produced through passive perception, judgment is always an act of the 
understanding, since it relies on the use of intermediate ideas to assess the probability of 
agreement or disagreement. And unlike either rational or intuitive knowledge, judgments are 
often false — we may be confident in a proposition because it seems to have a high probability 
when it is in fact wrong, and we may also make errors in assessing probabilities themselves due 
to the fallibility of sensation and reflection and the weakness of our intellectual endowments or 
of our will.  
  In establishing the truth or falsehood of a proposition, the understanding draws on three 
sources to fill in the connections between ideas or to assess the odds that such a connection can 
be drawn. The first is the person’s own experiences. Knowledge is, Locke writes, “founded on 
particulars,” and thus relies first and foremost on those connections between ideas that are 
preserved in the memory (IV.xii.3, p. 640). Another way to discover the relations between ideas 
is to increase the scope of this experiential knowledge-base by performing further “rational and 
regular experiments” (IV.xii.10, p. 645). And finally, the testimony of trustworthy authorities can 
also considered.43 These resources are brought to bear by the active powers of the understanding 
during the suspension of assent. Reason, by assessing the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
can generate or quell unease in the mind by elucidating connections between ideas and thus 
changing the grounds on which the will is determined to action. Because actions follow directly 
from the will, the exercise or neglect of reason not only determines whether we believe truly but 
also whether we act rightly.  
                                                
43 Locke cashes trustworthiness out in terms of the number of witnesses, their integrity, their 
consistency, and the uniformity of their opinion (IV.xvi.4, p. 656). 
 
 68 
 Locke pays particular attention to “maladies of assent” (Corneanu 2012, p. 90). Particularly 
dangerous is allowing ideas to join up in chains without attentive perception of their agreement 
and disagreement. This is what Locke considers a bad habit. But Locke also goes further than 
most in celebrating the cultivation of positive habits as transformative, both for the individual 
and society at large (Smith 2006, p. 832).44 While Locke emphasizes that all propositional 
thought must, at the first, be attended to, he recognizes that often people benefit when the 
movement from one idea to the next becomes habitual — analogous to the habits of perception 
that allow us to see a shaded circle as a sphere, he recognizes habits of judgment as essential to 
our functioning as limited beings. Thus Locke writes, 
“A man is said to know any Proposition, which having been once laid before his 
Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agreement, or Disagreement of the Ideas 
whereof it consists; and so lodg’d it in his Memory, that whenever that 
Proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation, 
embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, 
one may call habitual knowledge: And thus a Man may be said to know all those 
Truths which are lodg’d in his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, 
whereof the Mind is assured past doubt, as often as it has occasion to reflect upon 
them.” (IV.i.8, p. 528) 
Habits are beneficial when they make automatic chains of ideas that have been 
established to be trustworthy by judgment. In Locke’s developmental picture, personal habits 
impact the slow aggregation of true propositions that lead the individual to have a body of 
                                                
44 Descartes’s theory of habit, for example, is similar to Locke’s, but with a more negative 
valence — see his Letter to Arnauld, 29 July 1648 (Descartes 1983, p. 221).  
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demonstrative knowledge and justified beliefs: “change of Customs and Opinion bringing with it 
new Combinations of Ideas” (II.xxii.7, p. 291).45 Likewise bad habits of mind occur when 
propositions formed too hastily are repeatedly assented to without being scrutinized, escaping the 
attention. An example of a bad intellectual habit is a prejudice, in which a false proposition is 
assented to without being properly scrutinized and then believed habitually, such that the act of 
judging it to be true happens so quickly that it escapes attention, and it appears in the mind with 
all the authority of an intuition. Habits in some cases are better seen as chains of ideas 
representing actions, rather than propositions — a process, not a product. Locke in places 
describes habit as the “power or ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by 
frequent doing the same thing” (II.xxii.10, p. 293). The musician plays one note following the 
other automatically because he has willed his fingers to move in the same pattern over the frets 
many times, generating, as it were, a real state of affairs which he can perceive and remember. 
The chain of ideas constituting the strain can become naturalized, treated as though intuitive, and 
playing the first note can bring the others tumbling along to complete the tune. So while Locke 
talks about thoughts as habits, this may be shorthand for referring to the habitual perception of 
chains of ideas, whether or not they form propositional knowledge or beliefs.  
 Since all perception is conscious, it is clear that habits must, too, be conscious — though 
they may happen on the very edge of the ambit of awareness. Ideas that habitually follow each 
other, like the steps in certain repeated actions, must at first have been conjoined with attention, 
                                                
45 At the same time, Locke is particularly concerned about the development of bad intellectual 
habits in children, since in their case the contingent and capricious nature of perception is not 
sufficiently countered by the active powers of the understanding. Locke writes in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education of one unfortunate juvenile behavior that “the only cure for this, as for 
any other miscarriage, is by use to introduce the contrary habit” (Locke 1996, p. 107). He 
emphasizes the importance of, through habit and learning, improving children’s natural 
dispositions towards belief-formation. 
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and Locke acknowledges that it would be absurd for the grounds of assent to be recalled every 
time such judgments are used as evidence in the making up of new propositions. “It suffices,” he 
writes,  
“that [men] have once with care and fairness, sifted the Matter as far as they 
could; and that they have searched into all the Particulars, that they could imagine 
to give any light to the Question; and with the best of their Skill, cast up the 
account upon the whole Evidence: and thus having once found on which side the 
Probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an enquiry as they can make, 
they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories, as Truth they have discovered. and 
for the future, they remain satisfied with the Testimony of their Memories.” 
(IV.xvi.2, p. 658)  
Bad habits too have once been the subjects of attention, though not of sufficient attention. 
Propositions that become prejudices are thus “potential objects of contemplation” (Lähteenmäki 
2008, p. 96), annexed to consciousness, even if they resist reason’s attentions.  
 Accordingly bad habits can be viewed normatively, as the result of failures of the 
individual to rigorously appraise their thought: first when the original proposition was formed, 
and every time since as the chain of ideas slowly became habitual. Locke notes that the more 
habitual a physical or intellectual act is, the harder it will be to scrutinize, because it will pass 
more and more quickly before the understanding. Thus Locke can pun on his usual metaphor of 
reason as sunlight, writing that to allow bad habits to flourish is to “put our selves in the dark, or 
in the power of the Prince of Darkness” (IV.xix.13, p. 703). The moral failing is not the acting 
on a false idea, for Locke argues that once the powers of active perception offer up a judgment to 
the will, the will must act on it. It is also not a mistake of perception. Rather the sin is the failure 
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to apply the active powers to appraisal during the suspension of the will: “Errour is not a Fault of 
our Knowledge, but a Mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that, which is not true” 
(IV.xx.16, p. 706). 
  In section 3.4, I argue that despite Locke’s tendency to discuss mad errors within the 
context of the “empire of Habit,” his interpreters must not conflate habitual ideas and mad error, 
despite their close relation. But first, the following section examines the notion of the mad error 
in more detail. Locke envisioned the Essay as a Baconian natural history of the understanding, 
and accordingly enumerated not only instances of its powers, but also of its failures. The 
centrality of the active faculties of reason and judgment in the management of propositions made 
their failures important targets of investigation. The reliability of intuition was also a crucial 
linchpin in Locke’s account, and its faultiness in the case of the mentally ill was undeniable for a 
medical practitioner like Locke. In the previous chapter we saw that if ideas become associated 
during passive perception such that they are presented to the active understanding as one simple 
idea, they frustrate the active powers and cannot be revised. Such is the case of madmen who 
believe, for example, that they are the king of England, or that their flesh is made out of glass. 
When these ideas enter into propositions, they result in false propositions that appear, in the light 
of reason, to be true: “all must pay my royal personage due obsequence;” “nothing must touch 
my brittle skin.” The reasoning in such cases is sound — the ideas really do agree — but the 
ideas themselves are “wrong” in the sense explained above. Thus enthusiasts believe they are 
receiving knowledge from God but merely chase ignes fatui, “For all the Light they speak of is 





3.3 MAD IDEAS AND MAD ERRORS 
 
Locke chose to add his chapter on association to Book II of the Essay, which is devoted 
to the treatment of simple and complex ideas.46 But there is some ambiguity as to whether he saw 
madness as a phenomenon affecting ideas or propositions. In some cases, he seems to refer to 
madness as resulting from the erroneous joining of ideas into propositions:  
“In fine, the defect in Naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, 
and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason: 
Whereas mad Men, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For 
they do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having joined 
together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths.” (II.xi.13, 161) 
In this quote, madness seems to reduce to the sort of error Locke describes in his 
discussion of wrong assent or error in Chapter 20 of Book IV, in which he describes how 
judgment is ineffective against “Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but 
doubtful and false, taken up for Principles” (IV.xx.7, p. 711). This reading seems to have support 
from Locke’s earliest surviving reflections on madness, found in his medical notebooks kept 
around the time he was first drafting the Essay two decades before he wrote about association. 
Locke tells us that these early thoughts on insanity influenced his mature view of association: 
“This consideration of the thing itself [that is, madness] at a time when I thought not in the least 
on the Subject which I am now treating of [that is, association] suggested it to me” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 
395). In July of 1676, while traveling in France, Locke wrote in shorthand in his journal, “Query 
                                                
46 I thank Margaret Atherton for making clear to me the import of Locke putting the chapter 
where he did. 
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whether mania be not putting together wrong ideas and so making wrong propositions from 
them, notwithstanding the reasoning be right? But *idiocy* is a fault in the faculty of reasoning” 
(Dewhurst 1963, p. 70).47  
 But there is some ambiguity in Locke’s assertion that “mad Men put wrong Ideas together, 
and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason rightly from them” (II.xi.13, p. 161). The 
passage could be read as claiming that madmen choose the “wrong” ideas to assemble, thus 
creating wrong propositions, as the above quote seems to suggest. But it could just as well be 
interpreted as saying that the ideas madmen assemble into propositions are intrinsically wrong 
ideas — begging the question of what “wrong” means here. In the former case, madness would 
be due to the employment of fantastical or chimerical ideas in existential propositions.48 For 
example, the idea “God-with-shape” is a fantastical idea, and a proposition about it could result 
in absurdity, but not necessarily a falsehood — it could take the form of a conditional, such as “if 
God had a shape, then He would take up physical space.” What would make it a falsehood would 
be the addition of a claim about existence in the proposition, apart from the associated idea: 
“God-with-shape exists, and (therefore) takes up physical space.”  
  The problem with this sort of reading is that it is contradictory. Locke states that madmen 
have not lost the faculty of reason, and that their reasoning is right. He tells us, after all, that “a 
distracted Man fancying himself the King” may think with perfect sanity with regard to what 
                                                
47 Wright (1987) reports Henry Schankula’s crucial observation that Dewhurst mistranslates 
Locke’s “fatuitas” here as madness, which in Locke’s day was interchangeable with mania, 
rendering the sentence incoherent. A more accurate translation would be foolishness or idiocy, 
making it consistent with quotation that follows from 1677. While as noted idiocy is most closely 
analogous to the contemporary construct of mental retardation, mania and madness capture the 
symptoms of modern-day psychosis (hallucination along with cognitive and affective defects). 
48 That is, the class of complex ideas of substances which Locke defines as having “no 
Foundation in Nature, nor having any Conformity with that reality of Being, to which they are 
tacitly referr’d, as their Archetypes” (II.xxx.1, p. 372). 
 
 74 
should follow from his incumbency, such as the “suitable Attendance, Respect, and Obedience” 
of subjects (II.xi.13, p. 161).49 And Locke has told us that the combining of ideas into affirmative 
or negative propositions is the very work of reason. The second reading avoids this contradiction 
by viewing the ideas that make up propositions as wrong, with the propositions thus being only 
indirectly false. But this reading is problematic as well, since Locke makes clear that the terms 
“true” and “false” cannot meaningfully be applied to ideas of modes and substances, insofar as 
our ideas are “nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds” (II.xxxii.1, p. 384). 
Complex ideas are not able to introduce truth-value into a proposition.  
 A few weeks after Locke wrote the above in his journal, he returned to the topic of 
madness: 
“Query whether madness be not the wrong application of mad ideas to things that 
exist, but are neither having of wrong ideas nor wrong reasoning, and then so that 
it seems to exist wholly in *propositions, not simple ideas nor syllogismes*, for 
example [those] made in phantasy [such as] him to be either king or candle.” 
(Dewhurst 1963, p. 71)50 
                                                
49 Some of Locke’s examples of mad delusions, such as having a glass body or being a king, may 
be familiar to the reader from Descartes’ Meditations (1984, p. 13). While such examples are 
prevalent in early modern accounts of madness (as well as contemporary ones), it is still worth 
considering a possible influence. Unfortunately space does not permit a comparison of Locke’s 
theory of madness with Descartes’s more physiological account, or of the very different roles 
madness plays in their larger projects (but see Frankfurt [2008]). 
50 The bracketed additions are Dewhurst’s. In the original manuscript (MS. Locke f. 1, pp. 358–
359) the selection is written partially in Locke’s shorthand (he used a variant of the stenography 
invented by William Cartwright and widely attributed to Jeremiah Rich regularly in his journals). 
I am quite certain that Dewhurst has made a translation error, and in the main text have replaced 




In the earlier passage quoted from his journals Locke attributes madness to wrong ideas, and he 
does so again in the Essay. In this passage, however, he contrasts wrong ideas with “mad ideas,” 
which are applied to things “that exist.” Unlike the earlier quotation and Locke’s mature 
formulation of his theory of madness in the Essay, this passage makes it clear that when claiming 
that madness is a pathology of propositions, Locke is not referring to the sort of construction of 
propositions that constitutes syllogistic reasoning, but a narrower class of existential 
propositions. Mad ideas become problematic due to their relation to things in reality, and the sort 
of ideas that Locke is worried about in this passage are those that refer to things in the outside 
world — that implicitly posit existence.  
 There is a place for this sort of idea within Locke’s mature taxonomy. As mentioned above 
the Essay the chapter on associated ideas follows directly upon the one treating on true and false 
ideas, and Locke’s conflation of mad ideas with propositions in the above passage would suggest 
that they are a subclass of the latter. As noted, Locke emphasizes that truth values can properly 
be attributed to propositions, rather than simple or complex ideas, insofar as they constitute facts 
about relations between ideas. However, he notes that the terms “true” and “false” can be useful 
for distinguishing a unique type of “tacit” proposition, which often contributes unnoticed to a 
complex idea: 
“Though Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propositions; 
yet Ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what Words are there, that are not 
used with great Latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper 
Significations?) Though, it think, that when Ideas themselves are termed true or 
false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that 
Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular Occasions, wherein 
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they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of 
Affirmation, or Negation, which is the Reason of that Denomination.” (II.xxxii.1, 
p. 384) 
Thus one may refer to a manticore as a mythological creature, and in so doing simply 
employ a fantastical idea. A fantastical idea can be colloquially called false, however, when it is 
employed in a proposition that gives it existential heft. If one uses “manticore” to refer to a real 
creature that one might see on an exotic voyage, one’s idea of the manticore smuggles in the 
property of existing, and can be assessed for its truth-value. Given the infelicity of calling 
complex ideas false, Locke writes that ideas such as these “may very fitly be called […] wrong 
Ideas, according as they […] disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred” (II.xxxii.26, 
p. 394). Locke’s ambivalence about attributing madness to wrong ideas in the quotations above 
seems to be resolved by this formal definition, though it would seem in his journals he used 
“wrong” colloquially, rather than in the technical sense developed later.  
 Associated ideas are thus complex ideas that are wrongly presumed to exist, and which can 
cause existential claims of which they are a part to be false. Thus while Locke’s chapter on 
association ideas is a contribution to his discussion of complex ideas, not of propositional 
knowledge, as the conclusion of Book II it also functions as the segue to the following books on 
language, knowledge and belief. For Locke makes clear that association has terrible implications 
for human rationality. He writes, 
“Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted are not less frequent and 
powerful, though less observed. Let the Ideas of Being and Matter be strongly 
joined by either Education or much Thought, whilst these are still combined in the 
Mind, what Notions, what Reasonings, will there be about separate Spirits? Let 
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custom from the very Childhood have join’d Figure and Shape to the Idea of God, 
and what Absurdities will the Mind be liable to about the Deity?”  
In these examples a mad idea — the combination of God with figure and shape — 
becomes a building block for a proposition — a “Notion” or “Reasoning” — that is false. The 
ideas in a proposition, say, “God-with-shape takes up physical space,” may agree with each 
other, and it may be reasonable to affirm the truth of the proposition. But perception of 
agreement between the ideas “God-with-shape” and “physical space” does not, in this case, 
constitute a truth, because falsehood is implicit in the mad idea of “God-with-shape.” 
 This sort of proposition which the reason judges to be certain but which is in fact false due 
to the presence of a mad idea is what I mean by mad error. Mad errors have the same perceptual 
feel as intuitive knowledge — the light of reason shows them to be true. And indeed our reason 
correctly tells us the ideas agree, since surely if the fantastical notion of “God-with-shape” did in 
fact exist, it would follow that He would take up physical space. In the healthy mind, the 
mistaken connection between the idea of “God” and “shape” would have been ferreted out, but in 
the case of the associated idea, the fantastical nature of the idea is unidentifiable, its existence is 
tacitly assumed, and it contributes to an intransigent belief that has all the feel of certain 
knowledge.  
 In the fourth edition of the Essay Locke describes mad errors as a universal affliction, 
beginning his discussion of associated ideas with the observation that everyone is familiar with 
the presence of something “really Extravagant” in the reasoning of even their most sensible 
acquaintances. When it comes to certain topics, men otherwise rational would be “thought fitter 
for Bedlam, than Civil Conversation” (II.xxxiii.1, p. 395). A central question must be how, if 
mad errors are so widespread, these pathological propositions can be differentiated from intuitive 
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knowledge. Locke considers the possibility of mad error to be a threat to his definition of 
knowledge, and considers a possible line of criticism: 
“If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of agreement or 
disagreement of our own Ideas, the Visions of an Enthusiast, and the Reasonings 
of a sober Man, will be equally certain. ’Tis no matter how Things are: so a Man 
observe but the agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all 
Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air, will be as strong Holds of Truth, as 
the Demonstrations of Euclid. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as 
certain knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of 
what use is all this fine Knowledge of Men’s own imaginations, to a Man that 
enquires after the reality of Things?” (IV.iv.1 p. 563) 
Locke offers two sorts of arguments to assure his reader that there is a privileged 
distinction in his psychology between knowledge and mad error. The first is the authority of 
sensitive knowledge, which is guaranteed by the fact that the mind is incapable of manufacturing 
simple ideas, guaranteeing that such perceptions are “ordained and adapted” to “the Wisdom and 
Will of our Maker” (IV.iv.4, p. 564). Simple ideas, by definition, cannot be mad. But this 
distinction will not satisfy the reader who is concerned about distinguishing mad errors from 
propositional knowledge in practice: to the afflicted, associated ideas can seem like simple ideas, 
so judgments about whether knowledge claims are justified cannot be made from the inside.51 
                                                
51 Though the obliviousness of the afflicted is qualified in Chapter 33, where Locke discusses the 
case of a man who, indulging and surfeiting on honey, is unable to disassociate the taste of it 
from the feeling of severe sickness. Locke’s description of the makes clear that the man knows 




Indeed, the assurance Locke hopes to provide with his notion of sensitive knowledge will only 
reinforce the wild certainty of the madman regarding his own intuitions.  
 Locke notes that some complex ideas only refer to archetypes of the mind’s own making, 
such that propositions involving them need not, in fact, conform to real things in order to be true. 
This point is not relevant to mad errors, which as described above always refer to purportedly 
real things, rather than the mind’s own archetypes. Regarding substances, Locke emphasizes the 
importance of comparing relations between ideas judged to exist by the mind with new ideas, 
such that probabilistic judgments can be refined. For madmen, however, even ideas about 
substances seem certain, and as such the adjustment of their judgments on the basis of new 
probabilities is impossible.  
 It would seem, then, that the arguments Locke makes for the reality of our knowledge 
cannot rule out the possibility that our perceptions of truth are illusory, since they rely on our 
capacity to differentiate the perception of agreement between ideas from the mere judgment of 
agreement — a capacity that is lost in madness. This accords with Locke’s claim in Chapter 33, 
that no process of introspection can cure the association of ideas. The specter of mental illness 
has profoundly bleak implications: how can anyone ever know that his or her perception of 
agreement between ideas is justified at all? 
 Locke, of course, did not intend anything like this radical skepticism, and I shall argue in 
what follows that he has an in principle defense of the reality of knowledge: it can be 
distinguished by the acts of intellectual labor that constitute it. The constitutional history of mad 
errors is far different from healthy knowledge or justified belief. This does not counter the 
problem of identifying madness, however. On that point I suggest that, by relegating the 
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association of ideas to the medical sphere by identifying it as madness, Locke relegates the threat 
sufficiently for his own interests.  
 First, however, I must address a possible concern, which is that Locke, contrary to the 
narrow reading I have given of association, in fact accepts the existence of unmediated thoughts 
in the form of habit. Under this reading, castles in the air — that is, chains of ideas that do not 
correspond to reality — include all sorts of unattended-to ideas that follow each other 
immediately, outside of the oversight of the understanding. Many of these unattended to chains 
of ideas are important for the day-to-day functioning of men and women, who, unlike angels, 
cannot be fully aware of every idea that passes through their minds. Before proceeding with my 
argument for the role of mad errors in Locke’s larger project, in the following sections I present 
evidence for why various other types of error should not be conflated with those caused by mad 
ideas.  
 
3.4 WHAT MAD ERROR IS NOT 
 
 In previous sections I described how Locke’s account of madness amounts to a concession 
that in some cases we may perceive a proposition to be true that is, in fact, false. Yet when an 
associated idea is part of a proposition, the error is not, in fact, one of reason — we can perceive 
correctly that the subject and predicate agree, and still be wrong about the truth-value of the 
proposition. This is because the agreement is based on a falsehood implicit within the associated 
idea itself, which reason cannot recognize or correct. If this type of mad error is common in 
human cognition, Locke’s intellectualist picture becomes worthless as a guarantor of the reality 
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of our knowledge. On my reading it thus becomes crucial to differentiate mad errors from other 
sorts of intellectual errors that are correctable.  
 Locke’s commentators often extend his account of associated ideas beyond the bounds he 
gave it. Most frequently, mad errors are equated with habit. Wolterstorff, for example, writes that 
Locke’s discussion of the association of ideas aims to highlight the confusion of “ideas produced 
by custom with the agreement and disagreement that they possess intrinsically” (Wolterstorff 
1996, p. 161). Chapter 33 is also seen as gathering together Locke’s rangy reflections on our 
epistemic failings: Wright writes that Locke’s earlier discussions in the Essay of “Wrong Assent, 
or Error […] seems to presuppose the theory of association of ideas” (Wright 1987, p. 110). Here 
I will consider these interpretations in turn, and show how Locke’s account of mad error is more 
precise than each allows for.  
 Turning first to the comparison of associations with habits, the first thing to remember is 
that habits are, for Locke, chains of ideas that “produce actions in us, which often escape our 
observation” (II.ix.10, p. 147). These acts can be either physical or mental, that is, perceptual; in 
the Conduct Locke writes of habits, “as it is in the body, so it is in the mind” (Locke 1996, p. 
187). To say an action is habitual is to say that it can be undertaken outside of the ambit of 
attention. Locke describes two different sorts of habits, with very different etiologies. On the one 
hand, chains of ideas that result from acts of the understanding can become, we may say, actively 
habituated; this is how we form beneficial habits. Such habituated chains of ideas perform two 
important functions in Locke’s psychology. As we have seen human freedom, for Locke, is 
circumscribed by an individual’s ability to suspend their assent until the active powers of 
perception have assessed the relationship between ideas. This power, he writes in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, is the result of diligent labor of habituation:  
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“It seems plain to me that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power 
of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires where reason does not 
authorize them. This power is to be got and improved by custom, made easy and 
familiar by an early practice.” (Locke 1996, p. 29) 
Improved habits of perception allow disciplined judgment to overcome mind-wandering (Locke 
1996, p. 206) and make philosophy possible (ibid., p. 187).  
 Beneficial habits also allow men and women to navigate their environment without being 
constantly preoccupied by the exhausting enterprises of reason and judgment. Recall that Locke 
allows for habitual knowledge, in which demonstrations of the agreement or disagreement 
between ideas can be stored up such that the thinker need only recall the fact of the proved 
demonstration, rather than perceiving again every step of the proof (IV.i.8). Probabilistic 
judgments can also be actively habituated, such that the act of judgment can happen without the 
attention of the active powers of perception, almost automatically. Locke says beliefs can be 
habitual, though this must be shorthand for what he really intends: that the process of judging, 
that is, the stepwise performance of the active understanding, happens with little attention.  
 Locke also talks of habit or custom in a negative light, when propositions form not as the 
result of an intentional mental act but through the lazy acquiescence of the understanding — 
what we might call passive habituation. Most frequently he talks about the force of dubious 
authority figures in swaying the judgment of those in whom the active faculties are not 
sufficiently honed, like children. It is here that the case for mad errors qua bad habits becomes 




“This sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, 
and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the 
Disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education 
is often rightly assigned for the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general name for 
the thing it self: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther who would trace 
this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to shew 
whence this flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds, and wherein it 
consists.” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 395) 
While bad habits can cause mad errors, Locke emphasizes that they are not reducible to 
them. Most obviously, Locke notes that the reader must “look a little farther” because, as we 
have seen, “this sort of unreasonableness” is due to a specific sort of problem of ideas. Bad 
habits can form without containing associated ideas, and in this case they will be rectifiable 
through the efforts of the understanding, and the instantiation of inverse good habits. But while 
passive habituation leads to prejudices that are curable, it is also a risk factor for the association 
of ideas: habituation can play a role in forming associated ideas through their frequent co-
occurrence in passive perception. And when associated ideas form, bad habits can lead to mad 
errors. For “When two things in themselves disjoin’d, appear to the sight constantly united; if the 
Eye sees these things rivetted which are loose,” Locke asks rhetorically, “where will you begin 
to rectify the mistakes that follow?” (II.xxxii.18, p. 401). The only intervention for association is 
prophylactic: children must be protected from fantastical ideas, false principles, and other forms 
of indoctrination. 
 The close connection Locke draws between habits and mad errors may suggest to his 
reader that since habits are not all bad, associated ideas cannot be either. And there is some 
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evidence that Locke sees some “sane” chains of ideas as phenomenologically identical to mad 
ones once they become habituated. In his discussion of habits of perception, Locke suggests that 
good habits can too lead to the collapse of ideas into a complex in which the relations appear 
certain and necessary, and which cannot be altered. His famous discussion of Molyneux’s 
problem is one such example, and he describes a similar case in his discussion of association in 
the Conduct.52 Arguing for the incurability of associated ideas he writes, 
“This is for caution against this evil, before it be thoroughly riveted by custom in 
the understanding; but he that would cure it, when habit has established it, must 
nicely observe the very quick and almost imperceptible motions of the mind in its 
habitual actions. What I have said in another place about the change of the ideas 
of sense into those of judgment may be proof of this. Let anyone not skilled in 
painting be told when he sees bottles and tobacco pipes, and other things so 
painted, as they are in some places shown, that he does not see protuberances, and 
you will not convince him but by the touch: he will not believe that, by an 
instantaneous legerdemain of his own thoughts, one idea is substituted for 
another.” (Locke 1996, p. 219) 
This is the closest Locke comes to using the terms of association to refer to beneficial 
habits that become automatic. What he is really interested in is not mechanical connections 
between ideas per se (pace Hume, for example); but rather the failures of the active 
understanding that cause pathology. Thus the association of ideas is fundamentally negative, 
                                                
52 The brief discussion of associated ideas in the Conduct was written at the same time as 
Chapter 33 of the Essay, around April 1695. Locke decided to exclude it when he added the new 
material to the Essay’s fourth edition, but his amanuensis recopied it in the late 1690s when 
Locke began to revise the notes that would be published (posthumously) as the Conduct. 
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providing a contrast class to the active powers of the understanding that are his true fascination. 
If Locke’s theory allows for “good” associations they remain irrelevant to his larger project, 
which sounds an alarum about the dangers of passive perception. Given the practical aims of his 
project, it is not surprising that he does not discuss immediate connections between ideas that 
result from active habituation, except to suggest, as he does in the Conduct, that perhaps those 
capacities we take to be innate are the result of this sort of process (Locke 1996, p. 173). His 
treatment of association is intended to pick out a particular threat to the understanding caused by 
the adoption of wrong ideas that has unique implications for personal identity, religious 
toleration and epistemic responsibility; the naturalization of right ideas interests him less.  
 Along with differentiating it from bad habits, the incorrigible nature of mad error also 
differentiates it from other types of wrong assent. Locke recognizes four varieties of error from 
the first edition of Essay on: the want of proofs, the want of ability to use them, the want of the 
will to use them, and wrong measures of probability. The first and third types of error Locke 
details are best characterized as epistemic failures, whose remedy he is quick to detail: “GOD 
has furnished Men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they 
will but seriously employ them that Way” (IV.xx.3, p. 708). The second and fourth are more 
complicated. The want of ability Locke attributes to “defects in the Organs of the Body, 
particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the dulness or intractableness of those Faculties, for want 
of use; or, as some think, in the natural differences of Men’s Souls themselves” (IV.xx.5, p. 709). 
At its extreme, the want of ability results in idiocy, but Locke recognizes some gradient.53 
                                                
53 Disappointingly Locke never attends to the question of how epistemic responsibility relates to 
mental capacity, but in conflating those of poor mental capacity with beasts, he suggests they 
should not be treated as persons. 
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 Locke’s discussion of the fourth type of error, “wrong measures of probability,” is the 
second place where earlier additions of the Essay can be viewed as anticipating Locke’s later 
discussion of association. Wrong measures of probability occur when individuals believe in a 
proposition not in accordance with reasons, but rather due to some external factor that effects 
their assessment of the relations between ideas, such as the submission of their judgment to false 
propositions, received hypothesis, passions or inclinations, or the authority of others. The first of 
these influences Locke describes in terms now familiar, of intransigent mad error: “What is 
inconsistent with our Principles,” Locke writes, “is so far from passing for probable with us, that 
it will not be allowed possible” (Locke 1996, p. 711). Accordingly Locke urges that we take 
great care in attending to what we, and our children, adopt as principles. Taking up the question 
of children, he notes, in language anticipating his discussion of association in the Conduct, that 
certain principles  
“fastened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or false) riveted there by 
long Custom and Education beyond all possibility of being pull’d out again. For 
Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those 
of this sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Memories, not having 
observed their early Insinuation, nor by what means they got them, are apt to 
reverence them as sacred things.” (IV.xx.9, p. 712) 
Correcting such entrenched principles is beyond the power of reason. 
Note that here Locke is not describing association as a case of wrong assent — “riveted” 
ideas may contribute to true or false propositions — but as a key risk factor for it. This passage 
emphasizes the difference between associated ideas and the wrong measures of probability that 
may follow from them, which I am calling mad errors. Unlike the other sorts of errors Locke 
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describes in Book IV, mad errors cannot be revised because they are not reducible to a wrong 
assessment of probability. They are not, in other words, errors of judgment, but are cases in 
which reason and judgment are compromised by the pathology of associated ideas. Rather than 
just being cases of poor reasoning, the afflicted’s perceptions are in “open defiance of their 
senses” (IV.xx.11, p. 714).  
  “Having joined together some Ideas very wrongly,” Locke writes of madmen, “they 
mistake them for Truths” (II.xi.13, p. 161). What can it mean, in Locke’s psychology, to mistake 
something for a truth? As we have seen, Locke locates the risk of epistemic error in belief, rather 
than in knowledge. While people can err in failing to pursue knowledge, once they have 
knowledge it is infallible. To know a proposition to be true is to perceive the fact of its truth, that 
is, the agreement of its subject and its predicate, and Locke seems to universally maintain that we 
cannot perceive agreement where there is none. Thus Wolterstorff, for example, writes,  
“What would Reason’s being in error consist of? Presumably it would consist in 
Reason, with respect to some falsehood, producing in one an experience which is 
phenomenologically no different from the ‘just knowing’ experience — this in 
turn producing a belief. Locke, so far as I can see, held firmly to the conviction 
that that never happens; as indeed he rejected the possibility that we have in us 
some other faculty which, with respect to falsehood, perfectly mimics the ‘just 
knowing’ experience.” (Wolterstorff 1996, p. 93)  
Wolterstorff maintains that in cases where people are wrong, their access to the truth is 
blocked on account of a stronger belief which either monopolizes their awareness or inhibits the 
act of perceiving itself (1996, p. 96). And yet Locke describes the effects of association precisely 
in terms of misleading phenomenology — a conflict between perception and reality. For the 
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madman, Locke writes, wrongly-connected ideas cause things to “constantly appear” other than 
they are, and “naturally so” — this is the central character of association that makes it “a disease 
of the mind as hard to be cured as any” (Locke 1996, p. 218). For two ideas to be associated is 
precisely for one to follow the other with the immediacy that is, in the healthy mind, reserved for 
relations between ideas that are necessary due to the facts of the matter. “Such unnatural 
connections become by custom as natural to the mind,” Locke writes, “as sun and light. Fire and 
warmth go together, and so seem to carry with them as natural an evidence as self-evident truths 
themselves” (ibid.). Associated ideas appear, like simple ones, to be knowable through sensitive 
knowledge, and when they are parts of propositions they are as truth-functional as healthily 
connected ideas.  
 Contrary, then, to Wolterstorff’s claim that “On Locke's view, it never genuinely appears to 
us that we are ‘perceiving’ some fact when we are not; what happens rather is that sometimes we 
believe we are when we are not,” mad error is not a second-order belief about a perception, but a 
true perception of agreement between ideas that results in something that is not, actually, a fact. 
It is not that madmen think they are certain when they are not, it is that they are certain when 
they should not be. Madmen do not take some proposition to be true on the grounds of a faulty 
assessment of probability, but rather because of a perception of a relationship between ideas. 
This is not a false perception, but it produces a false proposition. Thus Locke writes that the 
afflicted “firmly embrace falsehood for truth; not only because they never thought otherwise, but 
also because, thus blinded as they have been from the beginning, they never could think 
otherwise” (Locke 1996, p. 218).  
 The active powers of the understanding that are compromised by association are not reason 
or judgment, but those that regulate the construction of complex ideas: our ability to compound, 
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abstract, compare, and otherwise analyze the connections between our simple ideas. Cemented 
together in passive perception, associated ideas become “almost one” such that the afflicted 
“confounds them in his mind;” he “scarce distinguishes them” (II.xxxiii.11, p. 398). This 
problem at the level of connections of ideas (rather than relations between ideas in propositions) 
is nowhere present in Locke’s account of false beliefs, which he defines as the acceptance of a 
proposition on the basis of faulty evidence. Unlike the major failures in understanding Locke 
details in the Conduct, namely the want of sagacity, deference to the opinion of others, the 
overcoming of reason by passion, or the development of undesirable habits, association is not the 
failure of the active powers of the understanding over which the agent has control, but rather of 
the passive power of reflection, the inner perception that characterizes intuitive knowledge. This 
capricious process disturbs the basic materials of thought, and renders the thinker unable to 
execute his sole epistemological, and moral, responsibility — the assessment of agreement 
between ideas. Because association confounds even the most self-disciplined intellect and 
preempts the ability of reason to correct the proclivities of the will, it differs from the other 
intellectual failings Locke describes in the Essay by being more like a somatic shortcoming than 
a moral one — a failure of the mechanisms of mind, rather than the person at its helm. 
 
3.5 MADNESS AND ENTHUSIASM: LOCKE'S SOLUTION 
 
 Madness in the early modern period was a term in flux, but for the most part it was used to 
describe an extreme degree of melancholic disease characterized by raving and violent behavior. 
While the boundary between melancholia and madness thus was much more defuse than the 
contemporary distinction between psychoses and affective disorder, melancholy severe enough 
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to be called madness was at times distinguished on three grounds that are pertinent to the current 
discussion. First, towards the end of the 17th century, madness began to be seen as diagnosed 
through the presence of delusions and hallucinations, which had previously been associated with 
milder types of melancholy (MacDonald 1981, p. 16). Secondly, mania was increasingly 
described in more medical, and less moral, terms than melancholia.54 Finally, while melancholics 
were often chastised for intellectual and moral weakness, mania was considered beyond the 
reach of reason. The madman’s false utterances and violent and bizarre behaviors were seen as 
beyond his or her control. Glanvill, for example, wrote of lunatics, “grant to them that they may 
be serious, believe themselves infinitely, and feel all those Warmths which they pretend” (Sena 
1973, p. 300). These indications of madness fall into line with Locke’s descriptions of mad error 
as beyond the reach of the will and ultimately unrectifiable by the powers of the understanding 
— and phenomenologically indistinct from knowledge.  
 In drawing the connection between madness and the sort of false “knowledge” that 
interested him — particularly, the wrong principles of the religious dissident — Locke was not 
original. The equation of dissident beliefs (especially radical stripes of Puritanism) with 
psychopathology, particularly mania, was a widespread strategy invoked by Latitudinarians and 
Broad-Church Anglicans in their attempts to delegitimize and undermine the religious zealots 
who staked their claims at the fringes of Protestant reform (MacDonald 1981). The aim of the 
accusation of madness was not to challenge the theology of dissenters, nor to charge them with 
fraud, but rather to remove them from the set of actors shaping the religious development of the 
nation after the upheavals of the 17th century by denying that their claims had meaning (Sena 
                                                
54 Willis, for example, described melancholy as treatable through rational self-government while 
madness demanded physical restraint and somatic therapies (Schmidt 2004, p. 584). 
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1973, p. 298). As in our own day, the mad and the manic of Locke’s time often hallucinated 
revelation, divine sight, or the presence of angels and devils. It was a powerful tool of 
delegitimization to put Quakers, Barkers, and other sects intent on proselytizing on the basis of 
their religious visions in the same camp as the truly mad.  
 In a 1656 letter to his father Locke wrote mockingly that Quakers would do well to go 
bareheaded (as he observed one doing in protest of courtly obsequy) on the grounds of “the head 
to hott being dangerous for mad folk.”55 That same year Henry More published his Enthusiasmus 
Triumphatus, which Locke purchased in 1662 as part of a collection of More’s philosophical 
writings (Harrison and Laslett 1965). More argued that enthusiasts (especially Quakers) were not 
willfully wicked, and certainly not controlled by the devil, but rather suffered a somatic disease. 
The aim of the volume was purportedly not to give reason for the persecution of enthusiasts as 
lunatics, but rather to promote tolerance of, and compassion for, their affliction. It is apparent, 
however, that More had a more cynical and politic aim: the disenchantment of heterodoxy. “For 
where the naturall causes of things are laid open,” he writes, “there that stupid reverence and 
admiration which surprises the ignorant, will assuredly cease” (More 1656, p. 2). Like Locke, 
More emphasizes that madness can be completely topical — he gives many examples of such 
delusions, including ones that appear in Locke’s writings, such as the man who believes himself 
made out of glass. In one instance he describes a man who, after falling into a pool full of 
minnows, is so sure he has swallowed some that he spends the next decade of his life seeking a 
cure for the frogs he can hear croaking in his belly. Despite having (in an attempt to learn about 
his condition) turned to the study of physic, this man, reasonable in all other things, cannot move 
past his delusion (More 1656, p. 12).  
                                                
55Locke to John Locke, Sr., 25 October 1656. MS. Locke c. 24, ff. 169–70. 
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 Locke describes the misbegotten certitude of the enthusiast in terms of the perception of 
agreement between wrong ideas: 
“Reason is lost upon them, and they are above it: they see the Light infused into 
their Understandings, and cannot be mistaken; ’tis clear and visible there; like the 
Light of bright Sunshine, shows itself, and needs no other Proof, but its own 
Evidence: they feel the Hand of GOD moving them within, and the impulses of the 
Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel”  
Here Locke is dismissive of the equation of visual and ideational perception that he elsewhere 
relies on so heavily, accusing enthusiasts of circularity insofar as, “their Perswasions are right, 
only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is strip’d of the metaphor of 
seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to” (IV.xix.9, p. 700). Viewing the propositions that 
enthusiasts champion as mad errors makes it clear why they fall short of knowledge, although 
they are phenomenologically identical with it. It also makes clear why Locke insists that 
enthusiastic delusions cannot be corrected through reason:  
“Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing. I do not mean, that we 
must consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition revealed from God can 
be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, then we must reject it: But 
consult it we must, and b it examine, rather it be Revelation from God or no: And 
if reason finds it to be revealed from God, Reason then declares for it, as much as 
for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every Conceit that 
throughly warms our Fancies must pass for Inspiration, if there be nothing but the 
Strength of our Perswasions, whereby to judge of our Perswasions: If Reason 
must not examine their Truth by something extrinsically to the Perswasions 
 
 93 
themselves; Inspirations and Delusions, Truth and Falsehood will have the same 
Measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.” (IV.xix.14, p. 704) 
Locke recognizes that sometimes persuasion can ape knowledge, insofar as reason really 
does “perceive” the agreement between ideas. What he insists on is thus not that the mad error of 
the enthusiast itself be scrutinized, but rather the additional inference that the proposition in 
question is divinely inspired be justified. While the associated ideas at the heart of enthusiasm 
cannot themselves be intervened upon, Locke emphasizes that it is within the power of the 
afflicted — and of those moved to believe in their claims — to assess the additional step that 
constitutes revelation. “He therefore that will not give himself up to all the Extravagancies of 
Delusion and Error,” he writes, “must bring this Guide of his Light within to the Tryal” (ibid.). 
Associations abide, but deference to them as the word of God can be intervened upon through 
reason. 
 More’s and others’ treatment of dissidents as not simply wrong but mad meant that 
enthusiastic claims were not appropriate topics for philosophical or theological debate, and it 
implied that the enthusiast’s proper place was not at the head of an impressionable congregation 
but within the grim isolation of the madhouse. This strategy generated a dilemma: equating 
enthusiasm with irrationality risked making all religious claims vulnerable to rationalist critique. 
In Locke’s additions to the fourth edition of the Essay we find a deft resolution to this problem. 
False principles incorporating associated ideas cannot be identified from within, since they are 
perceived in a manner that is experientially identical to intuition. Locke recognizes the 
implications for religious disputes, noting in his first Letter Concerning Toleration that when two 
churches are in disagreement, each may look equally mad to the other, even if one is based on 
reasoned principles and the other on false ones, for “every church is orthodox to itself; to others, 
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erroneous or heretical” (1824, p. 19). Nonetheless, Locke gives an account of mad error that 
makes it objectively different from justified belief, insofar as it cannot be managed by the active 
understanding.  
 Thus when the theological context is brought into view — and we must remember that 
settling matters of religious difference purportedly motivated the writing of the Essay itself — it 
is clear why Locke felt the need to draw a bright line between association and other forms of 
faulty connections between ideas. To protect his account from the related charges of skepticism 
and relativism, Locke needed to show that while enthusiasts really do have mad ideas, their sort 
of delusion is not an extreme of everyday epistemological error, nor a matter of relative 
judgment, but a distinct sort of mad error. Thus, the addition of Chapter 33 helped shelter 
Locke’s ethics of belief from the charge of irrationalism and to promote his political agenda. 
This may explain why, after his return to the question of toleration towards the end of his life, 
Locke renewed his interest in his earlier discussion of madness rather than simply expanding on 
his discussion of wrong assent in Book IV.  
 On the other hand, the conflation of enthusiasm with madness in particular brought with it 
the risk that religious dissidents, like madmen, would not be held responsible for their actions, 
and not seen as agents capable of sinning against the Church or against God. But while Locke 
does not hold enthusiasts responsible for their false principles, he does accuse them of 
committing an epistemico-moral failure by not questioning whether their delusions have a divine 
origin. The only religious beliefs that can be insisted on, Locke maintains, are those that are 
either clearly established through natural reason or certain to have been delivered through 
revelation (i.e., of Biblical origin). As Locke notes, a true prophet should have no trouble using 
his active faculties to meet this bar, since “God when he makes the Prophet does not unmake the 
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Man” (IV.xix.14, p. 704). One can imagine cases in which the individual’s assessment of the 
origin of his principle was itself an association — a madman imagining himself Moses, complete 
with a hallucinated burning bush. But Locke seems confident that most enthusiasts, despite the 
mad core of their “internal light,” are able to meaningfully ask themselves whether “This seeing 
is it the perception of the Truth of the Proposition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God” 
(IV.xix.10, pp. 700–701). While association may lead to a false affirmation of the former, even 
the madman has his faculties of reason sufficiently intact to assess the latter.  
 By viewing association as a medical problem, distinct in kind from wrong assent, we can 
temper Passmore’s claim that, “In short, the existence of the enthusiast constantly undermines 
Locke’s hopeful view of man.” Enthusiasm does indeed show the danger associations can play in 
the civic life of men, something Locke had long previously acknowledged about madmen. But 
by distinguishing mad errors from the grounds of their justification Locke is able both recognize 
that some religious views really are a form of madness, and hold those who try to enforce those 
views on others culpable for their actions. Furthermore, the notion that what enthusiasts are in 
fact responsible for is not the content of their principles but rather their treatment of them as 
revelation buttresses Locke’s arguments for toleration in the Letters, in which his concern is 
really about the imposition of ecclesiastical laws by those claiming to know God’s will. Locke’s 
description of enthusiasm in the terms of mad error thus supports his wider contention that 
religious heterodoxy is not in itself punishable by either the state or religious authorities. 
Nonetheless, without evidence for the divine provenance of purported revelation, he maintains 
that there is little reason to tolerate what may well be the “castles in the air” of a zealot. 
Accordingly, anyone who forces his religious views on others should be penalized by the civil 
magistrate. Locke’s theory of madness thus allows him to promote religious toleration without 
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authorizing nonconformist views, and condemn the authority of false prophets without 
undermining his program of toleration.  
 Locke’s views on enthusiasm in turn raise the question of whether there are parallel 
measures that can be taken against associated ideas in general — that is, whether the chains of 
ideas of the typical madmen also contain additional, justificatory premises that can be scrutinized 
even if the associations themselves cannot. To address this in the following chapter I investigate 
to what extent Locke has a positive theory of the sober and rational understanding, that can serve 
as a basis for explaining how associated ideas impact his ethics of belief. I argue that Locke’s 
definition of personhood proves relevant here, insofar as it shows what is necessary for an 
individual to be a moral agent. Moral agency is, for Locke, cashed out in terms of the ability to 
do intellectual labor basis of past experience, rendering the capacity to annex experience to the 
consciousness the central criteria for mental health. While Locke defines personhood in terms of 
rationality, personal identity can be disturbed by madness, and thus can be devastating to the 
(mad)man even as it leaves the person intact. 
 Within this framework we can view association not only as a risk to rationality, but also to 
the ability of the individual to be a free agent, to operate in a republic, to approach religion from 
a place of reason and judgment, and to take on moral responsibility. The madman is not a subject 
who can be said to “transgress against his own light” (IV.xvii.24, p. 688) but rather is an object 
of a failure of passive perception. The very possibility of this perversion of consciousness makes 
medical psychology central to Locke’s concerns. To be free, he believes, is to be self-governing 
— and to be self-governing is to be guided by the active powers of the understanding, rather than 
the animal or sensitive powers. Perhaps Locke’s profoundest contribution to psychology was to 
make the development of the active powers of perception the new nexus for intervention on the 
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individual, insofar as he “in effect transferred the clear identity from the ego to the separate 




4 ASSOCIATION AND THE SELF 
 
 
4.1 PERSONAL IDENTITY AND THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 
 
Locke wrote to Molyneux in 1692, inviting criticisms of the Essay and asking his friend 
what additions he would like to see in the second edition. Molyneux complied generously with 
Locke’s request, sending everything from line edits to the repeated but unheeded suggestion for 
additional support of Locke’s claim that a demonstrative moral theory was possible.56 Among the 
significant additions Locke made in response to his ongoing conversations with Molyneux was 
the Chapter 27 of Book II of the new edition, entitled “Of Identity and Diversity.” A 
consideration of Locke’s associationism suggests a new answer to the vexed question of whether 
Locke’s influential theory of personal identity is naïve, misguided, or just misunderstood. 
Debates over personal identity in the early modern period focused on the nature of the 
substance that receives divine judgment. Ambiguity about what, exactly, the Bible describes the 
resurrection of during final judgment gave rise to theological conundrums: Could the immaterial 
soul be complete without the body, or did it need the body to carry responsibility for its earthly 
actions? What happens to the conscious self between death and Judgment? What makes the 
sinner in life the same as the sinner judged after death? (Bynum 1990). Given the centrality of 
eschatology in 17th-century philosophy, it was necessary that Locke offer answers to these 
                                                
56 Molyneux begged off, perhaps regrettably, from Locke’s plea for suggestions about which 
repetitious passages to cut. 
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questions compatible with his “way of ideas.” Locke’s solution was to champion a new object 
for divine judgment distinct from the body and the spirit: the self. 
 Locke’s starting point is to raise the contentious specter of mortalism, the view that the 
soul can perish temporarily with the body, an extension of his insistence (pace Descartes) that 
the mind is not always thinking. In his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) — published 
anonymously due to its provocative claims — Locke makes little mention of the soul but 
describes how consciousness is annihilated in death and only raised up again by Christ on the 
day of judgment. Throughout his discussion of personal identity, Locke emphasizes that 
immaterial substance is insufficient to explain the persistence of selfhood: “’Tis evident the 
personal Identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness 
were annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no” (II.xxvii.23, p. 344).57  
 Locke also dismisses the importance of sameness of body during resurrection. In his 
response to Stillingfleet he writes, 
“The resurrection of the dead, I acknowledge to be an article of the Christian 
faith; but that the resurrection of the same body, in your lordship's sense of the 
same body, is an article of the Christian faith, is what, I confess, I do not yet 
know” (1824, vol. 2, p. 357).  
Indeed, he points out that readers of Corinthians “will see that [St. Paul] plainly distinguishes 
between the dead that shall be raised, and the bodies of the dead” (ibid., p. 372) — and argues at 
length that this mode is consistently employed throughout the New Testament. That Locke was 
self-consciously attempting to alter the terms of the eschatological debates during the years he 
                                                
57 While Locke emphasizes and reemphasizes the fallacies that result from viewing the soul as 
the condition for personal identity, as this quote suggests he is agreeable to the suggestion that 
consciousness is annexed to an immaterial substance (II.xxviii.24, p. 345). 
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was thinking about the association of ideas can be seen by his own careful shift in vocabulary 
from the fourth edition of the Essay’s discussion of resurrection from “the body” to “the dead” 
(Thomson 2008, p. 56). 
 Instead of the body or the spirit, Locke believes what will face Christ is the person, 
identified via that set of ideas corresponding to actions produced by the active powers of the 
understanding that are united by the same consciousness. Locke’s account of personal identity is 
summarized in Section 2 below. In it Locke emphasizes that “person” is a “forensick” term; his 
concern is with establishing what actions an agent is responsible for. Every Christian is an 
individual consciousness, and the experiences appropriated by that consciousness form a unified 
self that can stand before divine judgment and be righteously judged. Personhood is constituted, 
Locke believes, by those ideas that are annexed to the self in the proper way, as “the memories of 
a past consciousness” (II.xxvii.23, pp. 344–345). These memories delineate the self, and thus 
restrict the actions for which it can be held accountable. Despite frequent misinterpretations, the 
consciousness that signifies that ideas are memories is the identity condition for personal 
identity, rather than memories themselves. This radical interpretation of personal identity as “the 
sameness of a rational being” (II.xxvii.9, p. 335), well divorced from the more intuitive 
definitions of his day based around either the body or the soul, leads Locke to bite several 
bullets. 
Of particular relevance here is Locke’s insistence that if the agent is not conscious of 
having committed a past action, they are not responsible for it, even if they were observed to do 
it by others. In other words, even if the human organism committed an action, the perceiving self 
inside of it need not be guilty. Even more troubling to some critics, if I am conscious of having 
committed an action, I am culpable for it, even if, in the view of all outsiders, it was committed 
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by someone else. The worry is that divine judgment is in some way arbitrary if it is based on 
what individuals remember, as opposed to what they did, since memory can be faulty.58 Locke’s 
account suggests that not all bad actions are sinful, but only those that, contingently, can be 
recalled. Besides theological objections — the view seems to make God’s judgments somewhat 
haphazard, reliant not on His law on his creations’ mental states— the account seems to go 
against our intuitions. Bernard Williams, for example, urges us to imagine our body being 
tortured. Even if we are assured that in advance of the torture we would be stripped of all our 
memories, we expect to still be ourselves in a way that is meaningful (Williams 1970). 
 In what follows I argue that Locke’s account of association can make these bizarre 
ramifications of his theory more comprehensible by shedding light on what Locke means when 
he says we just are the consciousness of those ideas we have appropriated. Appropriation, I 
maintain, is the equivalent of those acts of the understanding that are association’s contrast class. 
Besides contributing to our reading of Locke on personal identity, then, the discussion will serve 
to underscore the centrality of the active understanding to Locke’s theory of human nature. 
 First I clarify Locke’s motivations for his account in Section 4.2, which situates Locke’s 
chapter in the debates over mortalism of his day, and over the puzzles for moral responsibility 
that result from weaknesses of the flesh. Building on arguments made in Chapter 2, I argue that 
Locke’s rejection of the physiological as the appropriate realm of investigation and intervention 
by the physician leads him to translate the moral-medical discourse around personal identity into 
ideational terms. Rather than the fleeting animal spirits that course through the brain, the 
                                                
58 If Locke’s account depends on memory being veridical, it falls into another trap, that of the 
circularity objection most famously proffered by Reid. Veridicality of memory must rely on the 
person being the same in some metaphysical sense as an earlier person, and this threatens to 
undermine Locke’s psychological account. 
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appropriate target for intervention is the ideas that, Locke suggests in places, they constitute. One 
aim of Locke’s theory of personal identity is to show that the substance of which consciousness 
is a mode is irrelevant to its management by the active faculties of the understanding. Important 
for this case is the question of the nature of madness, and in Section 4.3 I turn to the 
demonstrative role of mad error in Locke’s case for personal identity. Locke uses madness as an 
exemplar of failures of consciousness. I argue that Locke sees associated ideas as failing to be 
self-conscious, due to their opposition to intellectual labor. He believes continuity of personality 
to be suspended wherever madness occurs. In Section 4,4 I show how my reading can bolster an 
appropriationist reading of Locke’s account of personal identity, and reflect on its implications 
for to Locke’s broader commitments about human nature and its absence — what has been called 
the “soft underbelly of reason” (Gaukroger 2002).  
 
4.2 LOCKE'S ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
 Locke’s new chapter on identity and diversity considers two sorts of identity relations.59 
The first is synchronic identity, that is, the unique relationship a thing has with itself. Synchronic 
identity relations are established on the basis of location in place and time, for, Locke concludes, 
“whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone.” 
The relation of identity “refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, 
which ’twas certain, at that same instant, was the same with itself and no other” (II.xxvii.1, p. 
328). The sort of thing that exists in space and time is determined by its real essence or, due to 
                                                
59 The difference between Locke’s theory of identity in this chapter and that suggested in the first 
edition are substantial — see Ayers (1993, p. 206). 
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the mediocrity of human understanding, its nominal essence. Locke’s account of diachronic 
identity is simply an extension of this relation across time — the idea of the thing itself specifies 
what is essential to it, and sameness of this essential property indicates identity. In investigating 
what constitutes an identity relation for different sorts of things, Locke emphasizes that the 
essential properties that must remain constant across time and place vary depending on the sort 
of thing in question: for example, “in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, 
Identity is not applied to the same thing” (II.xxvii.3, p. 330).  
 In other words, once the particular criterion for identity for a given type of thing is 
established, the evaluation of whether identity obtains between an object at time t and an object 
at time v is no more difficult than seeing whether the criterion used to establish identity for that 
class of things remains the same across times t and v. The question is whether the synchronic 
relation of the essence of the thing with itself at time t is the same relation as the diachronic 
relation of the essential property of a thing at time t and the essential property of a thing at time 
v. Since synchronic identity is established via location in place and time, the identity relation 
means that all of the thing’s properties will be identical. In the case of diachronic identity, the 
essential property is identical but other properties need not be. For example, the same horse 
when a filly and when an old nag will have the same life, the identity criterion, for Locke, of 
being a living creature, but the matter that makes up its body will be different at these different 
stages. 
 Locke believes that the delineation of groups of properties into kinds is underdetermined 
by the ontology of the world— as Guyer has put it, in Locke’s view the complexity of the 
external world leaves us with the “burden of choice” when it comes to classification (2011, p. 
118). Accordingly the sorts of properties identity is constituted by are necessarily based on the 
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understanding’s own categories. While the identity of a mass of atoms can be established 
through the identity of matter (no addition or subtraction of atoms) if this criterion were applied 
to a living thing, like a horse, identity relations would not track the understanding’s own ideas 
about nominal essences. Ultimately, all identity relations are for Locke is a way to establish the 
appropriateness of applying names to things: “for such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, 
such must be the Identity: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possible 
have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter, with no 
small seeming difficulties” (II.xxvii.6, p. 332).   
Locke emphasizes this point especially in the case of human beings, writing,  
“’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity, or 
will determine it in every Case: But to conceive, and judge of it aright, we must 
consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be 
the same Substance, another the same Man, and a third the same Person, if 
Person, Man, and Substance, are three Names standing for three different Ideas.” 
(II.xxvii.7, p. 332)  
Man, Locke says, is merely a type of animal form, and being the same man only requires 
having the same life over time. Missing here is the traditional criterion of being a rational 
animal: even a madman has human identity, in Locke’s view. He even goes so far as to say that 
if a parrot could discourse more eloquently than most human beings, rather than calling the bird 
a man one would exclaim that it were a uniquely brilliant, even rational, parrot.60 Alternatively, a 
human who could only parrot back words without sense would still be called a man. 
                                                
60 The incredible narrative that Locke inserts into his chapter while making this case is worth 
mention. He retells a story told to him by, he claims, an extremely credible source, who 
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 A person, on the other hand, is not defined in terms of its substance or species but rather 
in terms of its capacity for certain forms of intellectual activity; it is  
“a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it 
self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does 
only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to 
me essential to it.” (II.xxvii.9, p. 335)  
 Recall that for Locke reason is the ability to compare ideas using (when necessary) 
intermediate chains of ideas in order to establish relations between them, while reflection is an 
inner sense that can observe mental phenomena. The ability to consider oneself to be the same 
across time and space relies on both the former and the latter capacities. Reflection allows for 
consciousness insofar as “Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind” 
(II.i.19, p. 115). And reason allows for the comparison of one’s current perception of oneself as 
oneself — one’s ipseity, or “the perception I have of my actions ‘from the inside’” (Balibar 
2013, p. 100) — with previous such perceptions. It is this sort of comparison that allows each of 
us to assess, from the inside, whether past actions were perceived by the same consciousness as 
currently constitutes our self.  
 Any being that thinks, according to Locke, has consciousness, since it is “impossible for 
any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive” (II.xxvii.9, p. 335). 
Consciousness is, then, itself a form of perception, but it does not, despite the previous quote, 
seem for Locke to be a higher-order perception of one’s perceptions, like reflection. It is not an 
                                                                                                                                                       
encountered a parrot capable of all manner of rational discourse. While the bemused Locke 
seems to present the story with credulity, it had no obvious impact on his view on animal 
rationality, which at other points in the Essay is revealed to be skeptical. Nonetheless this 
passage suggests he believes personhood to be possible in particular animals, despite their lack 
of a human identity. 
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idea about our ideas, but rather a perception of ownership that accompanies our present 
sensations and reflections:  
“When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that 
we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by 
this every one is to himself, that which he calls self: It not being considered in this 
case, whether the same self be continued in the same, or divers substances. For 
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ’tis that, that makes every 
one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, I.e. the sameness of 
rational Being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person.” (II.xxvii.9, p. 
335) 
Consciousness is also, Locke says here, all that is needed to constitute the identity of a 
person — much in the way that the same hooves and mane are not needed to make the filly the 
same horse as the nag, the same powers of reason and reflection are not needed for to make the 
person the same over time (Weinberg 2011, p. 400). All that is needed is the same consciousness. 
And in what does this sameness consist? Rather than a form of higher-order thought, 
consciousness is property of our ideas that tags them as ours — a feeling of “mineness.” It 
follows that, as Margaret Atherton has put it, “the effect of having experiences or registering 
experiences via consciousness will be to build up a distinctive outlook” (2008, p. 298). In 
discussing remembrance, Locke describes how “the Mind many times recovers the memory of a 
past consciousness” (II.xxvii.23, pp. 344–345). What makes this “past consciousness” a memory 
is that the self’s own consciousness is perceived as annexed to those ideas about the past which 
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are the object of the reminiscence. Personal identity is only established through the recognition 
of past ideas as my memories insofar as memories are ideas to which my current consciousness is 
annexed. 
 So it is the continuity of the same consciousness, my consciousness, rather than the 
chain of memories, that is the identity condition for persons.61 It follows that when Locke says 
personal identity consists in “the sameness of rational Being,” this signifies the felt sameness of 
being — assessed from the inside. Since no one can know another’s thoughts (he can only guess 
them through the words which the other chooses to represent his ideas), personal identity can 
only be established by the individual for him or herself. Consciousness is established 
phenomenologically through the dual faculties of reason and reflection: “If we take wholly away 
all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the 
concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity” 
(II.i.12, p. 110). 
  Since judgments about the identity of persons are always self-reflexive, and Locke 
acknowledges how deeply this limits the utility of the concept for establishing moral 
responsibility in ways that will be discussed below. For now let us note that personal identity 
differs from animal identity because while an outside observer might establish whether the same 
life or organization continued uninterrupted in a man, identity in the case of persons can only be 
established through reflection and is therefore by definition only calibrated subjectively. When 
establishing that a woman is the same woman I knew as a child, I must establish that her 
                                                
61 This is important because for Locke, a string of particulars cannot constitute identity — all 
things whose “Existence is in succession, such as are the Actions of finite Beings, v.g. Motion 
and Thought, both which consist in a continued train of Succession” are necessarily diverse 
(II.xxvii.2, p. 329). 
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organization or life has proceeded uninterrupted since the time of our initial acquaintance in 
grade school. When I establish whether a memory is, in fact, mine, I do not attempt to establish a 
genealogy of any feature of the event in question but rather assess whether the memory of the 
past action is currently accompanied by an idea of consciousness — a feeling of ownership, 
mineness. Locke emphasizes that a person establishes whether it “can consider it self as it self, 
the same thinking thing in different times and places […] only by that consciousness, which is 
inseparable from thinking” (II.xxvii.9, p. 335, italics mine).  
 Locke notes that in the ordinary usage man and person are interchangeable, but 
emphasizes that his aim in differentiating them is to establish a forensic term that isolates the 
moral responsibility of the agent, even if it seems to conflict with what we know of the man. He 
offers a provocative thought experiment: 
“Had I the same consciousness, that saw the Ark and Noah’s Flood, as that I saw 
an overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more 
doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames overflow’d last Winter, and 
that view’d the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same self, place that self in 
whatever Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same my self 
now whilst I write (whether I consist of all of the same Substance, material or 
immaterial, or no) that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, 
it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other 
substances, being as much concern’d, and as justly accountable for any Action 
was done a thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-
consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.” (II.xxvii.16, p. 340) 
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Here Locke insists that if he “had the same consciousness” of seeing the deluge described 
in Genesis as he did of seeing the overflowing of the Thames the previous year — even if that 
memory necessitated being thousands of years older than was possible — both would contribute 
to his personality, and he would be equally as responsible for any actions he remembered taking 
in Biblical times as those he recalled from the previous year. A few pages later Locke makes 
clear he is also committed to the inverse, also counter-intuitive implication of his theory:  
“For whatsoever any Substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, 
and by my consciousness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more 
belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, then if it had been thought 
or done by any other immaterial being any where existing.” (II.xxvii.24, p. 345) 
Here Locke offers up another thought experiment, the case of “two distinct 
incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by 
Night.” This is a Jekyll-and-Hyde situation, in which consciousness is split between two 
different characters, with different memories. Locke asks rhetorically whether “the Day and 
Night-man” would not be as distinct persons as, say, “Socrates and Plato,” despite the fact that 
the body they inhabit actually performed both the actions undertaken during the day, and those 
undertaken during the night. He concludes they would be two separate people (II.xxvii.23, p. 
344).  
Cases like these are a source of ire for critics such as Flew (1951), who follow Reid 
(1785) in arguing that Locke’s criterion has no way to distinguish between what a person 
actually did and what they think they did. Locke would put it as a difference between what the 
man did and what the person did; what the bodily or mental substance does may differ from what 
the person does, because the person is constituted by sameness of consciousness. His critics are 
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not satisfied by this because it makes Locke’s theory of divine judgment somewhat arbitrary — 
not all actions will be judged, because many are of forgotten over the course of life; and what 
actions each person will be judged for on the day of judgment cannot be predicted by what they 
were observed to do. In other words, there is no principled relation between those ideas that are 
annexed to consciousness and those we are morally responsible for that would seem able justify 
Locke’s psychological interpretation of personhood. In the following section I argue that the 
theory of associated ideas presented in the previous two chapters suggests such a justificatory 
relation.  
 
4.3 ASSOCIATION AND APPROPRIATION 
 
 As mentioned above Locke emphasizes that personal identity is a forensic term, 
“appropriating Actions and their Merit” (II.xxvii.26, p. 346). Critics have objected that, given the 
subjectivity of the calibration of personal identity by consciousness that Locke allows for, his 
identity condition for persons is ill-suited for forensics (Weinberg 2011). What use is a metric for 
establishing culpability in a court of law that can only be testified to by the accused himself? 
Locke acknowledges his theory’s shortcomings for earthly justice; his motivations are 
eschatological.62 The term “person” is a term of art for moral science, a language used between 
                                                
62 “For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the 
Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures justly punish him; 
because the Fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him" 
(II.xxvii.22, p. 344). Molyneux raises a concern with this aside of Locke’s. Surely, Molyneux 
argues, drunkards should be found guilty because their sin of intoxication caused their crime, and 
they were conscious when they began to drink. Locke acknowledges the point, but dismisses it as 
outside of his purview, writing, “But drunkenness has something peculiar in it when it destroys 
consciousness; and so the instances you bring justifie not the punishing of a drunken fact, that 
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the individual and God. Locke’s aim is to allow people to assess their prospects for the afterlife, 
and remind them that God will only punish those sinners who own up to their crimes: 
“The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that 
they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or whatever Substances 
soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed those Actions, 
and deserve that Punishment from them.” (II.xxvii.26, p. 347) 
Accordingly, his definition of the person need not assure continuity across the lifetime, 
but only assure fair treatment at the instant of final judgment. A question remains, however, 
about how well it succeeds at this goal — why should God’s assessment of our sinfulness be 
based on what we think? What makes consciousness the appropriate arbiter of responsibility?  
 The self is conscious of all the ideas it perceives, but only some ideas enter into the 
repository of our memory. These are ideas of which we have what Locke calls past 
consciousness — when we perceive them we know that we have perceived them before. The 
most obvious reason we could posit for these ideas being in our memories is that they are 
veridical — that is, that something that is us, some sort of substantial unity, really did the acts we 
remember doing. Locke is not particularly interested in this sort of metaphysics of memory. 
Rather, he his concerned with method: how were the ideas produced, when they were produced? 
The extent to which we remember ideas seems to be a product of the attention with which we 
originally perceive them: 
                                                                                                                                                       
was totally and irrecoverably forgotten, which the reason that I give being sufficient to do, it well 
enough removed the objection, without entring into the true foundation of the thing, and shewing 
how far it was reasonable for humane justice to punish a crime of a drunkard, which he could be 
suppos'd not conscious of, which would have uselessly engag'd me in a very large discourse, and 
an impertinent digression” (Locke 1979 Vol. 4, p. 785). He fails, in my opinion, to adequately 
respond to Molyneux’s point that ignorance of past actions can be feigned just as well on the 
grounds of madness as on intoxication (Locke 1979, p. 58). 
 
 112 
“That there are Ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking Man, 
every one's Experience convinces him; though the mind employs it self about 
them with several degrees of Attention. Sometimes the mind fixes it self with so 
much earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns their Ideas 
on all sides; remarks their Relations and Circumstances; and views every part so 
nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no 
notice of the ordinary Impressions made then on the Senses, which at another 
Season would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times, it barely 
observes the train of Ideas, that succeed in the Understanding, without directing, 
and pursuing any of them: And at other times, it lets them pass almost quite 
unregarded, as faint shadows, that make no Impression” (II.xx.3, p. 228) 
Ideas that are attended to are remembered: “Attention and Repetition,” Locke tells us, 
“help much to the fixing any Ideas in the Memory” (II.x.3, p. 150). The connection between 
attention and active perception is also touched on throughout the Essay.63 Locke describes 
attention is a key component of intellectual acts, writing, “Thinking, in the propriety of the 
English Tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is 
active; where it with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing” (II.ix.1, p. 143). In 
the cases where the formation of complex ideas is closely attended to, the connections between 
them tend to be natural; in the cases where propositions are formed with attention, they tend to 
be true. To attend to an idea is to see if it is in need of adjustment or correction by the active 
                                                
63 “Other Truths require a train of Ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and 
deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered” (I.iv.22, p. 99); “yet he will have 
but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to 
consider them each in particular” (II.i.7, p. 107) 
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powers to bring it in line with what is real and true. And correctness, for Locke, is next to 
Godliness — to have right ideas is to have ideas of the natural law. Locke’s hatred of mind-
wandering, inattention, and prejudice are because epistemic acts are moral acts — ideas formed 
with insufficient attention are condemnable.  
 Ideas that result either from our attentive labor or from our lazy neglect are equally our 
handiwork, the result of voluntary acts (or acts of omission) of the understanding. Past 
consciousness is, Locke tells us, “but a present representation of a past action” as ours 
(II.xxvii.13, p. 337). When that past action is represented as ours it is because it was a voluntary 
action, the result of intellectual activity. When we represent it, we represent the ideas in a 
proprietary fashion. Actions that do not follow from mental activity cannot be volitional, and are 
not registered in our consciousness as done by us. Given the close connection between those 
ideas of which we feel ownership — that is, that are annexed to consciousness — and our moral 
culpability, it makes sense that it is our self-made registry of our intellectual virtues and vices 
that we are judged by. As discussed in Chapter 2, human freedom is, for Locke, the result of the 
active powers of the understanding. Any acts not directed by those powers are not free, and 
therefore not subject to judgment.  
 Support for this interpretation comes from the fact that for Locke, mad errors disrupt 
personal identity:  
“But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable 
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different 
times make different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the 
solemnest Declaration of their Oppinions, Humane Laws not punishing the Mad 
Man for the Sober Man's Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did, 
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thereby making them two persons; which is somewhat explained by our way of 
speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides 
himself.” (II.xxvii.20, pp. 342–343)  
Why, given the associative theory of madness presented in the previous chapter, would 
Locke believe madmen to “at different times make different Persons”? Recall that association is 
a unique mental malady that differs from other weaknesses of the understanding in being a 
pathology of ideas, rather than reason or volition. When the madman applies his inner sense of 
reflection to his ideas, he is unable to evaluate the connections between them. Complex ideas 
appear to be simple ones because his active powers of understanding, while itself functioning 
normally, cannot disentangle the fantastical constructions of the diseased faculties of sense. If he 
had correctly assessed — that is, been conscious of — the simple ideas that got compounded, he 
could undo the association and replace his unnatural ideas with natural ones. But because the 
active powers of the understanding were excluded from the formation of the complex he sees a 
simple idea, rather than a compound one, and is helpless. 
 Because associated ideas are phenomenologically indistinguishable from necessarily 
connected ideas, they are treated by the understanding as “true” in the colloquial sense that 
Locke recognizes: they are truth-functional when used in propositions. Accordingly, the madman 
has beliefs and (what he takes to be) propositional knowledge that were not produced through the 
active understanding, that is, were not voluntary. Insofar as he passively perceives without 
actively perceiving, the madman is not conscious in the sense Locke uses it in his definition of 
personhood, akin to self-consciousness, which is “inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to 
me essential to it: It being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does 
perceive” (II.xxvii.9, p. 335). Thus mad ideas and the mad errors they contribute to are not 
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candidates for past consciousness of the type described above, in which the perceiver can 
recognize that he has perceived the chain of ideas before, because the mad idea was never 
originally perceived in an active, generative fashion.  
 Locke draws a close relation between the past consciousness of ideas and the ownership 
of actions, using “past selves” and “past actions” somewhat interchangeably to describe what it 
is that is united across time by sameness of consciousness to constitute the person. Given 
Locke’s account of voluntary action as that which is determined by our desires and beliefs, it 
makes sense that he slips between the ideas causing the action and the action itself. We might say 
that an action becomes ours by being the result of our free volition, that is, the result of the active 
application of our powers of understanding to our ideas. It is this sense in which personal identity 
is a forensic term: “person” is used by the self to refer to its acts of “appropriating actions and 
their merit,” that is, for its claiming as its own actions which result from acts of will (II.xxvii.26, 
p. 346).  
 Scholars sympathetic to this sort of interpretation of personal identity as the subjective 
identification of certain actions as ours have latched onto this language of appropriation to 
describe their view (Behan 1979; Winkler 1991; LoLordo 2012). According to appropriationist 
readings, the person just is the agent responsible for those actions that a single consciousness 
appropriates, or claims as its own; “Locke is interested in what we take the self to include, or in 
the self that comes about as a result of such takings” (Winkler 1991, p. 153). Those supporting 
this view rely on quotes like the following:  
“This personality extends it self beyond present Existence to what is past, only by 
consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes 
to it self past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it 
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does the present […] And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or 
appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, 
than if they had never been done.” (Locke, Essay, II.xxvii.26)64 
For the most part scholars sympathetic to the appropriationist reading have not written 
much about the nature of the appropriative act, despite that elsewhere in Locke’s writings, “to 
appropriate” — from the Latin appropriāre, from ad-proprius, to render one own, to deliver to 
the self — plays a crucial role. More than simply claiming something as one’s own, Locke uses 
the term to indicate the rightful transfer of an object from the public sphere to oneself, or maybe 
better, the transformation of an object from something outside of oneself to a part of oneself 
(Olivecrona 1974, 222). It is at the core of his theory of the origins of property in the Second 
Treatise of Government (1689); here the person appropriates objects through labor, through 
acting upon what is commonly held to make it one’s own. By cutting down a tree with the 
strength of his body, the farmer appropriates the lumber for himself, by mixing his labor with it:  
“Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the Ore I 
have digg’d in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, 
become my Property, without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour 
that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed 
my Property in them.” (Locke 1960, p. 289) 
Michael Ayers is suspicious of any meaningful connection between Locke’s discussion 
of appropriation in the context of personal identity and his later employment of it in the political 
                                                
64 Locke uses the term once more in Chapter 27, describing the man who remembers Noah’s 
flood as “being as much concern’d, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a 
thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did 
the last moment” (II.xxvii.16, p. 341). 
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setting. The concept of ownership in each setting is, he argues, quite different. While “external 
property is united to us by a merely legal or moral relation […] [o]ur actions themselves […] are 
‘appropriated’ to us by an entirely natural and given principle of unity, namely consciousness, 
rather than by some acquisitive act of acknowledgment or ‘owning’ on our part” (Ayers 1993, p. 
268). Etienne Balibar takes much more seriously Locke’s conception of the person as an 
individual “proprietor of himself,” whose intellectual labor is analogous to manual labor in being 
primarily an expression of human freedom (2013, p. 72). Following from the close 17th-century 
connection between consciousness and conscience (in French the same word, conscience, serves 
both purposes, and the English variation only emerged around Locke’s time), Balibar argues that 
Locke constructs “a parallelism of responsibility and property, of self-consciousness and 
‘property in oneself’” (ibid., p. 101).65 What is appropriated by consciousness to the self is 
actions, but of course, for Locke this means ideas of actions. Healthy complex ideas, Locke tells 
us, are connected through the workmanship of man, and he defines thinking as the activity 
(rather than the essence) of the soul. We act on the basis of our ideas, which drive our beliefs and 
desires about the world — that is, we act on the basis of reasons. What allows us to experience 
past actions as our own is that they were the result of active thought, that is, were free actions, 
determined by our volitions.  
                                                
65 This move can be traced to Pufendorf and Grotius, both influential on Locke’s theory of 
property. Olivecrona writes, “According to Grotius, means of subsistence could be appropriated 
in the state of nature without any preceding compact. What a man had collected became his own. 
It was included in the suum. Therefore it constituted an injury to rob him of it. The concept of 
injury had its usual significance in this connection. To take some fruits from him who had 
collected them was an injury in the same sense as giving him a blow or damaging his reputation. 
It was an attack on his personality. The underlying idea was that the personality of the collector 
had been extended so as to encompass the fruits” (Olivecrona 1974, p. 223). Actions were 
analogously appropriated to the person; for Grotius and Pufendorf, Olivecrona writes, “my 
actions are ‘my own’ because they are directed by the ego” (p. 224). 
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 In contrast, we can see why association — the passive construction of mental products 
— produces ideas that are not the property of the moral agent. It is true associated ideas enter the 
understanding and becomes the stuff of thought. In fact, we have seen that madmen can reason 
correctly about their mad ideas, like the man who thinks his body is made out of glass and is 
careful with it. We may say that the madman is conscious of the idea of his body being made out 
of glass, but not self-conscious of it, not having generated it. He did not make the idea, did not 
store a creative act in the repository of his memory, and therefore is unable to correct it through 
his labor. When he wishes to return to the original action in which the simple ideas were 
connected in order to appraise the connection — an ability that undergirds Locke’s moral 
epistemology — he cannot do it, because he never committed the act.  
 Thus we may see why, though the madman has ideas he is conscious of, when he is sane 
he does not stand in a relation of ownership towards those ideas. They are not of his person. To 
punish the sane man for what he did when mad is “to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin 
did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be 
distinguished” (II.xxvii.19, p. 342). The madman is not subject to the natural law — unable to 
discover it through reason, and spared from being punished when he breaks it on account of his 
condition. In this respect the madman serves as a foil for the unified person, and helps us see that 
for Locke personhood is a product of the labor of active faculties of mind, which either act in 
accordance with the moral law or allow for the “shameful neglect of what is in their power” 
(II.xxi.70, p. 281). To be a moral agent capable of receiving divine deserts, the individual must, 
when suspension allows for it, act on her ideas. Her successes and failures are all she takes with 
her on Judgment Day, and her consciousness keeps the logbook that she lays at the Gates for 
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divine review. This interpretation makes sense of Locke’s obsession with the management of the 
understanding, since to be rational is to gain access to the next life:  
“But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the 
other; if the worst, that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that 
the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who can without madness run the 
venture? […] Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not 
presently see, to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given?” 
(II.xxi.69, p. 282)  
 
4.4 THE PERSON AS A MEDICAL OBJECT 
 
Locke’s description of the madman above as having two “distinct incommunicable 
consciousness” at different times, causing him to lose, for forensic purposes, his personal 
identity, is analogous to his day-man/night-man example. However unlike that case — and the 
many other whimsical ones Locke provides, such as the prince and the cobbler, Socrates sleeping 
and Socrates awake, and so on — madness is not a thought experiment. It is rather, Locke 
claims, a universal affliction: “there is scarce a Man so free from it, but that if should always on 
all occasions argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for 
Bedlam, than Civil Conversation” (II.xxxiii.4, p. 395).  
 The example of the madman serves to show that Locke’s distinction between the human 
and the person is not purely academic. Rather it gets at the complex relationship between the 
powers of the understanding, human freedom, and divine restitution. In cases of complete mental 
wellbeing, in which reason and reflection allow for perfect memory, the human being and the 
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person can collapse into each other. But while in the moment the madman can exhibit reasonable 
thought, he is not capable of the developmental product of consciousness that is the self: he 
simply cannot perform the right kind of intellectual labor on his ideas to make them part of 
himself. Thus he is subject to precisely the sort of paramnesia Locke’s critics worried about, in 
which what he thinks are veridical beliefs are really just fantasies. Only when mental disease has 
led to the destruction of the smooth advancement of consciousness through the appropriation of 
ideas does it become clear that what supports moral responsibility is not the immaterial soul nor 
its unicity with the body, but the correct management of the understanding.  
 Reading Locke’s account of personal identity this way is to emphasize the normative 
nature of his epistemology, which takes medicine as the regulative ideal and extends its reach to 
the diagnosis and treatment of those mental failings that become moral. Once association has set 
in, its consequences are grave — madness has repercussions not just for this life, but for the next 
one. But failures of judgment are even more problematic, insofar as they are sins against God. 
Locke argues that once a human being knows what the good is — that is, what can ease his 
discomfort — he will do it. However, Locke argues,  
“Though his will be always determined by that, which is judg’d good by his 
Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because, by a too hasty choice of his 
own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; 
which however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future 
conduct, as if they were true and right.” (II.xxi.56, p. 271) 
Sutton refers to “Locke’s sad realism about the cognitive effects of the fall,” (Sutton 
1998, p. 249); in line with his contemporaries mentioned above in the cultura animi tradition, 
Locke clearly sees the human condition as a result of original sin. But he also emphasizes that 
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God has gifted humans with the understanding best suited to their circumstances, and further that 
through the use of this divine gift we can even alter our circumstances to become more angelic 
(I.i.5, p. 45, Locke 1996, p. 215). “If I may guess at Things unknown,” Locke muses in an 
unusually speculative moment,  
“I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made 
perfect, shall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which now, either 
wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reason having got 
some faint Glimpse of, we, in the Dark, grope after” (IV.xvii.14, p. 683).  
In this respect the Essay is really a study of human foibles, and the Conduct a wistful instruction 
manual for comporting oneself like a higher being. 
There are, however, limits to the improvement of the self, and these limits are precisely 
what defines human beings, and offer the key to their nominal essence that functions as Locke’s 
identity condition. After mentioning the outstanding memory of Pascal, who exhibited perfect 
recall, Locke notes, 
“For this of Mr. Pascal was still with the narrowness, that humane Minds are 
confin’d to here, of having great variety of Ideas only by succession, not all at 
once: Whereas the several degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, 
and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and 
constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once.” 
(II.xi.9, p. 154) 
At the foundation of Locke’s definition of persons as rational beings, then, lies the chain of 
connected ideas. In the nature of these connections — natural or unnatural — lies the fate of the 
human being.  
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Personhood brings with it the responsibility to attempt to improve these connections; 
Locke’s Protestant commitments show here and he is in step with his time, in which it became 
common to equate moral goodness with the maintenance of “‘character’ in the laudatory sense” 
(Leites 1988, p. 120), especially the maintenance and strengthening of the understanding. 
Original in Locke’s account is the recognition that sometimes we are not even granted the 
freedom to try to improve our lot. To neglect the understanding is to offend against God — “we 
can hinder both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not imploying our 
Faculties in the search for any Truth,” Locke writes. “If it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or 
Infidelity could not in any Case be a Fault” (IV.xx.16, p. 717). But it is also to be granted the 
potential to receive divine forgiveness, that is, grace — the sinner always has that capacity. The 
exclusion of the madman from rational agency on the basis of his disrupted personhood shows 
that this personal freedom cannot be assured. In the distinction between association and other 
forms of mental impairment can be found the criterion for moral responsibility.  
 My discussion of association as a powerful contrast class to healthy relations between 
ideas serves those scholarly accounts that differentiate Locke from archetypical associationists 
like Hume insofar as his ideational treatment of the self is not a mechanistic one: as Tuveson, for 
example, writes,  
“Experience for Locke is not a mere automatic connection of impressions, as if 
an adding machine were being set up. He always has the sense of a living being, 
with inclinations of its own, responding in a myriad of ways to a world which 
affects it in as many ways.” (1960, p. 40)  
What associated ideas stand in contrast with is precisely the adaptive nature of human 
understanding, which, through the powers of active perception that constitute its freedom, grows 
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and conforms in relation to its environment. Locke’s commitment to the developmental nature of 
the understanding is most obvious in his normative tracts on human understanding, The Conduct 
of the Understanding and Some Thoughts Concerning Education. 
 Childless himself, Locke approached the topic of the upbringing of children in a 
concerted way in the 1680s in response to the pleas of his friend, Edward Clarke, who was eager 
for counsel about the education of his sons. Locke ultimately published what would become a 
wildly popular compendium of child-rearing advice based on the letters he sent to Clarke, first in 
1693 and then in two additional printings during his lifetime in 1695 and 1699. Both Some 
Thoughts and the Conduct engage head-on the problem raised by Locke’s developmental account 
of rationality: in light of the contingency of all chains of ideas, how do we delineate the healthy 
from the pathological ideas, and protect our children from the latter? It is within this 
developmental context that Locke first writes about association, though, as described in the 
previous chapter, he attributes his discussion to his reflections on madness and the connection of 
ideas decades earlier. No doubt Locke’s interest in pedagogy served his political agenda. As 
Casson has written, “Instead of assuming the presence of preconstituted, rational individuals, 
Locke seeks to shape his readers into the type of people who will be able to sustain stable and 
just institutions” (2011, p. 261). 
 As we have seen the threat of madness was first recorded by Locke in his 1677 journal, 
in which he writes, “[O]ne may see of what moment it is to take care that the first impressions 
we setle upon our minds be comformable to the truth and the nature of things, or else our 
meditations and discourse there upon will be noe thing but perfect raving” (Dewhurst 1963, p. 
89). After revising Some Thoughts Concerning Education, which is littered with references to the 
power of habit and the importance of extraordinary care in the education of young people, Locke 
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formalized this early anxiety about the imminent threat of madness under the heading of 
“associated ideas” in his new chapter for the Essay. In his mature formulation, the boundary of 
rationality is policed by the understanding, which must parse ideas as they enter the mind 
through perception and make sure they are not unnaturally conjoined. In childhood, the 
understanding must be trained to perform this duty, but if it does not gain the appropriate 
vigilance, the faculties of reason and judgment become ineffectual mental appendages.  
  The importance of his concomitant reflections on child-raising and the conduct of the 
understanding for the present topic is clear from Locke’s insistence, in both Some Thoughts and 
the Essay, that in the education of children “there is not any one thing that deserves more to be 
looked after” than the association of ideas (II.xxxiii.9, p. 397). In the Conduct Locke gives a 
normative rather than historical treatment of association in which he emphasizes that one can 
only hope for a successful defense against bad habits and chance associations through 
inoculation — a careful attention to the ideas that get unnaturally connected during education. 
Children, he writes, must be carefully observed so that “they never suffer any ideas to be joined 
in their understandings in any other or stronger combination than what their own nature and 
correspondence give them.” In other words, children may not be able to themselves recognize 
when a relation between two ideas has become habitual, and thus are particularly at risk of 
forming associations. Because of children’s natural submission to authority, the careless words 
of adults — fables about ghosts, sprites, or devils lurking in the dark, for example — can leave 
lifelong associations. Learning to interrogate their own ideas not only saves children from the 
mania of association but also teaches them to do good science, to engage the world around them 
through induction and experiment.  
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 In his discussion of learning Locke mentions the importance of careful exercise and the 
slow building of strength of the understanding, to avoid putting minds “to a stress beyond their 
strength” which can undermine the performance of the rational faculties and destroy their vigor. 
Locke describes a battery of personal failings that can get in the way of the right exercise of 
reason, including laziness and fear — he applies the proverb, “Use legs and have legs” (Locke 
1996, p. 215) to suggest that the failure to be reasonable is due to a failure to develop the mental 
faculties, the way one would a muscle. He urges self-discipline, reminding his readers that 
failing to activate their reason is, literally, to give up their freedom: 
 “Men know the value of their corporeal liberty, and therefore suffer not willingly 
fetters and chains to be put on them. To have the mind captivated is, for the time, 
certainly the greater evil of the two, and deserves our utmost care and endeavors 
to preserve the freedom of our better part. And in this case our pains will not be 
lost; striving and struggling will prevail, if we constantly, in all occasions, make 
use of it.” 
Occupation for the mind, Locke continues in fine Protestant fettle, is the best possible medicine, 
and “it may not be amiss […] to make use of so profitable a remedy that is always on hand” 
(ibid., p. 227). As seen above, active perception takes effort, and while associations are immune 
to its curative effects the assessment of the connections between ideas the mind can recognize as 
in disagreement will hone the understanding.  
 Much of the Essay, and nearly the whole of the Conduct, is dedicated to advising readers 
on how best to govern their understanding in order to maintain their rationality without being 
swayed by passions or confused by language or bad habits. “I am only speaking,” Locke writes, 
“of what they should do who would deal fairly with their own minds, and make right use of their 
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faculties in the pursuit of truth; we fail them a great deal more than they fail us” (ibid., pp. 211–
212). Locke condemns men who would blame their sins on nature, since, he argues, moral 
failings are due to a mismanagement of assent, “the great principle and foundation of all virtue 
and worth” (ibid., p. 25). On the other hand, just men who utilize their reason to praise God and 
honor their covenant with Him can expect, in the next life, to be rewarded with a higher faculty 
of understanding that will render the clumsy tool of reasoning unnecessary: the complete 
certainty of the angels (IV.xvii.14, p. 683). 
 What Locke achieves in such passages is a new conception of the self as the sum of 
those ideas annexed to the same consciousness. The chains of ideas that are codified by habit 
into personal principles, factual knowledge, and probabilistic belief come to define the person. 
The influence of this view on the way personal development was conceived following Locke is 
suggested by shifts in theories of child-rearing away from the breaking of the child’s innate 
depravity through discipline towards a more sympathetic education in the right habits of mind 
(Spellman 1988, p. 212). Association is a prime example of Locke’s novel focus on the ideas 
themselves over the faculties that produce and moderate them.  
Patrick Romanell points out that Locke substitutes the Greek “Semiotike” for “logic” in 
his taxonomy of knowledge, and notes that in the early modern period “semiotics” had a medical 
connotation, referring, within Galenic medicine, to symptomatology. “For the science of 
knowing diseases in particular,” Romanell argues, “became in Locke the physician-philosopher 
the science of knowing in general” (1984, 148). In providing a natural history of the 
understanding, Locke pursues a nosology of the cases in which human understanding succeeds 
and fails, including its most common pathologies. Locke’s treatment of various mental 
pathologies through the Conduct, and his emphasis on a range of dangers that face children 
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during development, recognize the severity of the risks posed by association as unique within 
this array. A legacy of Lockean association, less celebrated but no less worthy of scholarly 
attention than the anti-Lockean associationism found in Hume, is the integration of pathology 




5 CODA: CASTLES IN THE AIR 
 
  “I Doubt not but my Reader,” Locke writes in Book IV of the Essay, “may be apt to 
think, that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, 
to what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or 
disagreement of our own Ideas: but who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there any thing so 
extravagant, as the Imagination of Men’s Brains?” (IV.vi.1, p. 562). Locke imagines his reader 
objecting that his account cannot differentiate between “the Reasonings of a sober Man,” such as 
the “Demonstrations of Euclid,” and the “Visions of an Enthusiast” which he refers to, repeating 
the odd phrase he has just applied to his own philosophy, as “Castles in the Air” (ibid., p. 563). It 
was a phrase of growing popularity in his day, used to describe an idle daydream or fancy, and 
by Burton to refer to the ravings of madmen.66 For Locke, the second application here clearly 
indicates a mad error: a chain of ideas containing irreparable associated ideas that stop it from 
being annexed to the consciousness. 
 Almost a century and a half later a young Charles Darwin (1809–1882), newly returned 
from his voyage around the world on the H.M.S. Beagle, began to think about insanity. In the 
privacy of a notebook (labeled M for its “metaphysical” contents) Darwin jots down a series of 
notes about “castles in the air.”67 One of his sisters reports never having such fancies — another 
                                                
66 Malebranche, when describing madness, uses a more archaic French form of the phrase, “un 
château en Espagne”: madmen “wonder at everything, they exclaim about everything without 
judgment or discernment […] they build castles in Spain” (Malebranche 1997, p. 165). 
67 It is clear from Darwin’s correspondence that he was familiar with the phrase in the 
nontechnical sense of fancy or mind-wandering. In a letter to his erstwhile professor John 
Henslow detailing his excitement over his upcoming voyage a young Darwin writes, “What 
changes I have had: till one to day I was building castles in the air about hunting Foxes in 
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has them often, “but not of an inventive class.” But Darwin is really interested in how castles in 
the air seem to defy the active powers of the understanding: “The facility with which a castle in 
the air is interrupted & utterly forgotten—, so as to feel a severe disappointment. In real train of 
thought this does not happen.” In a castle, Darwin writes, the “train cannot be discovered—is 
closely analogous to my Fathers positive statement that insanity is only cured by forgetfulness.—
& the approach to believing a vivid castle in the air, or dreams real again explains insanity” 
(Barrett et al. 2009, pp. 527–528).68 The Lockean themes here — castles in the air escaping 
consciousness, not being reformable, standing apart from healthy thought — are not 
coincidental, and the space between Locke’s castles and Darwin’s can suggest the contours for a 
more modest tradition within associationism — what we may call medical associationism — that 
flourished after the Essay.  
 In my introduction I argued that Hume takes hold of Locke’s notion of association as a 
form of pathology and universalizes it, suggesting an unsteadiness at the foundations of human 
cognition, with the justification of knowledge a question left on the table for later philosophers 
such as Kant to pick up. Locke would have been horrified by this interpretation of association as 
a universal mechanism of cognition, and would have rejected it as an architectonic of madness. 
He would also have rejected David Hartley’s Newtonian associationism, very different from 
Hume’s (whom Hartley apparently was ignorant of, and vice versa). Hartley used the term 
                                                                                                                                                       
Shropshire, now Lamas in S America” (Letter 118, the Darwin Correspondence Project). In 
another letter to Henslow written in 1848, an older and more sober Darwin draws a similar 
contrast to Locke’s, above: “I believe there exists,” Darwin wrote, “& I feel within me, an 
instinct for truth, or knowledge or discovery, of something same nature as the instinct of virtue, 
& that our having such an instinct is reason enough for scientific researches without any practical 
results ever ensuing from them […] I feel that such study is better than castle-building” (Letter 
1167, the Darwin Correspondence Project). 




“association” to refer to neurological processes that gave rise to ideas, and that could explain the 
relations between them. As we saw in Chapter 2, Locke had no interest in physiological 
speculations of this kind. 
 Most of all Locke would have been disturbed by the universality attributed to 
association by both Hartley and Hume, which left little role for the active powers of the 
understanding. Rather than being different in kind from healthily connected ideas, Hartley 
believed mad ideas were simply an extreme of the common sort of upset to the neural harmonics 
of the brain experienced in the course of everyday life — no line could be drawn between 
madness and sanity. Hartley draws a close connection between madness and personal identity, in 
notably Lockean terms; discussing madness he writes, 
“A particular Set of Ideas shall be extremely magnified, and, consequently, an 
unnatural Association of Sameness or Repugnancy between them generated, all 
other Ideas and Associations remaining nearly the same. Thus, suppose a Person, 
whose nervous System is disordered, to turn his Thoughts accidentally to some 
barely possible Good or Evil. If the nervous Disorder falls in with this, it increases 
the Vibrations belonging to its Idea so much, as to give it a Reality, a Connexion 
with Self. For we distinguish the Recollection and Anticipation of things relating 
to ourselves, from those of things relating to other Persons, chiefly by the 
Difference of Strength in the Vibrations, and in their Coalescences with each 
other.” (1749, p. 401) 
Nonetheless the intellectual labor so central to Locke’s theory of personality has been 
replaced, here, by the vibrations of nerves. Madness is not the defeat of the active powers by 
chaotic, unintentional forces, but an extreme of the common mechanisms of cognition. Hume 
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sees a similar fluidity between sanity and madness, though he frames it in ideational, as opposed 
to neurophysiological, terms:  
“As a lively imagination very often degenerates into madness or folly, and bears it 
a great resemblance in its operations; so they influence the judgment after the 
same manner, and produce belief from the very same principles. When the 
imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and spirits, acquires 
such a vivacity as disorders all its powers and faculties, there is no means of 
distinguishing betwixt truth and falshood; but every loose fiction or idea, having 
the same influence as the impressions of the memory, or the conclusions of the 
judgment, is receiv’d on the same footing, and operates with equal force on the 
passions.” (1978, p. 123)  
Again, for Hume madness is a difference of degree, not kind — he compares it to the 
impassioned state of the poet who, “in the warmth of poetic enthusiasm […] has a counterfeit 
belief” (ibid.). 
 Locke’s narrower conception of associated ideas as a distinct form of pathology that 
stands in contrast to healthy thought was abandoned, and his narrow diagnosis applied broadly. 
More generally the faculty psychology of Locke’s day was eclipsed in the 18th century by 
Newtonian models of cognition inspired by wave theory, by hydraulics, and by theories of reflex 
action. Towards the end of the 18th century physicians of the mind like William Cullen, William 
Battie and John Haslam enthusiastically took up Hartley’s model, and Thomas Arnold developed 
a new psychiatric nosology by combining the Lockean distinction between sensation and 
reflection and the Hartleian vibrational theory. Locke’s emphasis on healthy connections 
between ideas, and warnings about the dire effects of faulty connections, became the basis for an 
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associationist theory of psychopathology within a general associationist theory of cognition. 
Missing was the theoretical apparatus provided by the Essay that differentiated healthy 
connections from associations on the basis of the involvement of the understanding.  
 As Robert Hoeldtke has pointed out, however, the passive and mechanical picture of 
Hume and Hartley found resistance among a pocket of philosophically-oriented physicians in the 
early 19th century. While Hoeldtke finds resonance between this opposition to the “school of 
philosopher-physicians stemming from Locke to Hartley” and the early modern Scholastic 
metaphysics they replaced (Hoeldtke 1967, p. 43), it is better seen as a return to Locke. The 
regrowth of interest among psychopathologists in the faculties was due to the looming influence 
of Thomas Reid over Scottish philosophy, and his powerful rejection of the replacement of the 
understanding’s active powers with physiological processes. Philosophers sympathetic to Reid’s 
critique of Hume who were nonetheless taken by the general connectionist picture integrated 
elements of the new faculty psychology into their associationism. Thomas Brown (1778–1820), 
for example, replaced the term “association” with “suggestion,” to underscore the non-
determinative nature of connections between ideas and the role of the active intellect in picking 
and choosing between them (ibid., p. 56). Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) treated association as an 
ability of the mind, that worked in conjunction with attention to shape cognition. Madness was 
the lack of this capacity: 
“In madness, the power of the will over the body remains undiminished, while its 
influence in regulating the train of thought is in a great measure suspended; either 
in consequence of a particular idea, which engrosses the attention, to the 
exclusion of everything else, and which we find it impossible to banish by our 
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efforts; or in consequence of our thoughts succeeding each other with such 
rapidity, that we are unable to stop the train.” (quoted in Hoeldtke 1967, p. 57) 
Others in this tradition include James Prichard, John Conolly, and John Abercrombie, the 
latter of whom presents perhaps the most philosophically sophisticated account of madness as a 
breakdown in the voluntary powers of the understanding. Abercrombie (1780–1844) couches this 
distinction in the language of consciousness; mad ideas, he argues, are formed in the absence of 
our usual conscious awareness. Abercrombie collected a compendium of examples of what he 
called “double consciousness,” such as disorders of perception, somnambulance, fugue states, 
and madness, and explicitly tied such phenomena to pathologies of personal identity (Rieber 
2006, p. 15). Hoeldtke persuasively argues that the tension between the active and passive 
faculties brought on by the integration of the associationist and faculty psychologies in the 19th 
century allowed for the theorization of the sub-conscious, bolstered by a shot of German idealist 
philosophy from the pens of William Hamilton and others (Hoeldtke 1967, p. 62). 
These names — John Abercrombie, Thomas Brown, Dugald Stewart — are frequent in 
Darwin’s notebooks, and their unique strain of medical associationism was also fed to him by his 
grandfather, the famous Scottish philosopher Erasmus Darwin, and his father, a physician.69 
Darwin noted down cases of split consciousness from his father’s practice, and described the 
“castles in the air” — trains of ideas separate from the conscious self — that characterized mad 
                                                
69 “My father quite believe my grand F doctrine is true, that the only cure for madness is 
forgetfulness” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 523) — and, in a list of items to follow up on scratched in 
the back of his “M” notebook, “My Father about double consciousness.—& somnambulism” 
(ibid., p. 156). There are many more such references throughout Darwin’s notebooks to “my 
father’s theory” and double consciousness in general. 
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people.70 It is clear from the notebooks, however, that Darwin’s interest in psychopathology is in 
the service of his current obsession, in the late 1830s — the mechanism behind the inheritance of 
characteristics.  
Darwin was especially preoccupied with instinct. His proto-evolutionary notion was that 
instincts were like habits, but were developed over generations rather than the lifespan of the 
individual. But once he admitted to “Thought (or desires more properly) being heredetary,” he 
had to further confess to himself that “it is difficult to imagine it anything but structure of brain 
heredetary” and goes on to chide himself: “Oh you Materialist!” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 291). 
Darwin solves the problem in Notebook C, written just before Notebook M. A couple hundred 
pages into the volume he begins to refer to “My view of instinct,” and emphasizes his belief in 
the heritability of instinctual behaviors: “Man by effort of Memory can remember how to swim 
having once learnt,” he writes, “& if that was a regular contingency the brain would become 
webfooted & there would be no act of memory.” Instinct is therefore “memory transmitted 
without consciousness” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 292). 
For evidence Darwin draws on his father’s patients. One case, a Miss Cogan, was 
completely senile, but still able to recall the songs of her childhood. Darwin compares her 
humming to the song of a bird, writing, “Miss C. memory cannot be called memory because she 
did not remembered, it was an habitual action of thought-secreting organs, brought into play by 
morbid action” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 521). In his reflections Darwin is fascinated by the 
                                                
70 Indeed one of Darwin’s earliest memories, recorded in his autobiography, is of visiting the 
house of a family friend whose wife was deranged. “The poor creature,” Darwin writes, “as soon 
as she saw me, was in the most abject state of terror that I ever saw, weeping bitterly and asking 
me over and over again, ‘Is your father coming?’” The doctor, it turned out, had purposefully so 
terrorized the woman that the mere mention of his name could stop her violent behavior” 




varieties of trains of thought that could literally capture the imagination of the individual, 
overriding their ability to think freely. Miss Cogan was only able to communicate one of the 
trains of memory that existed in her brain, one that was of the embedded sort Darwin chooses to 
call instinctual — a castle in the air. In the healthy brain, he believes, different trains are woven 
together; a combination of the traces of inherited habits, the habitual actions acquired in the 
individual’s own lifetime, and the actively manufactured chains of ideas created in moments of 
conscious reasoning, during which mental energy is expounded.  
Darwin admits that he can read a novel for hours, but any length of time spent producing 
work as demanding as his recently-completed paper on the geography of Glen Roy seems 
“analogous to muscle in one position great fatigue. May explain excessive labour of inventive 
thought” (ibid., p. 541). In other words, “Perhaps one cause of the intense labour of original 
inventive thought is that none of the ideas are habitual, nor recalled by obvious associations. As 
by reading a book” (ibid., p. 540). It is precisely the capacity for this kind of mental work that is 
diseased in the mentally ill.  
It is in this sense that Darwin contrasts “the labour of invented thought” with the building 
of “castles in the air,” in which the mind first flits from idea to idea in patterns of connection that 
the castle-builder might not be critically aware of, such that, emerging from one’s castle, one 
might be at a loss for how one arrived there in the first place. The only way to recover the 
fantasy is “by going to the beginning of the castle,” because otherwise the “train cannot be 
discovered.” Any student who has ever day-dreamed can sympathize with Darwin’s observation 
that “the facility with which a castle in the air is interrupted & utterly forgotten” can lead to 
“severe disappointment,” as well as the contrast he draws with a real train of thought, which (for 
better or worse) one cannot lose track of because of “papers, &c &c round one” (ibid., p. 527). 
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Insofar as a castle in the air is not accessible to the analyzing intellect, even though the 
castle-builder is vividly aware of its construction, Darwin concludes that the lost associations 
that constitute the architecture of a castle resemble the thoughts of a madman. The isolated train 
of thought that makes up an abandoned castle is “analogous to my Father’s positive statement 
that insanity is only cured by forgetfulness.-- & the approach to believing a vivid castle in the air, 
or dreams real again explains insanity” (ibid.). Lunacy will lift if the invalid is able to neglect a 
pathological train of memory for a healthier one, much in the way a scholar cutting off a 
daydream abandons his fantasy to devote himself to hard analysis. Darwin’s thesis is that the 
more intelligent a man (or animal) the more he is able to focus and avoid slipping into instinctual 
action. As is its wont, his mind races ahead, sniffing out evidence to support his idea: “Do people 
of weak intellects easily fall into habits. Get facts about instincts of mongrel dogs” (ibid., p. 
596). 
It is worth noting that to the extent that Darwin clarifies what he means by consciousness, 
it is a Lockean view. Scribbling on a sheet he stuffed into a folder called “Old & Useless Notes” 
Darwin writes, “Consciousness is sensation […] with memory added to it” (ibid., p. 601). In 
other words, consciousness for Darwin is merely the ability to connect immediate experience 
with previous ideas. Darwin wrote in the margin of Abercrombie’s Inquiries Concerning the 
Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of Truth that the “insane man has perfect consciousness 
– somnambulism has not” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 607). The problem with madness, as with 
dreams, Darwin declares in his notebook, is the madman has two or more incommunicable 
consciousnesses: “parallel trains of thought necessary heirs to every action, & always running on 
in mind [are absent so] one [can] not compare the castle with them, and therefore [can] not doubt 
or believe.” (ibid. p. 547). Unlike the somnamulist, however, the madman may have a perfect 
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grasp of the trains of thought that tell him about the external world, with merely some 
aberrations that form an additional and pathological train of thought. Rather than a lack of 
sensory input from the external world, he is troubled by a disease of ideas, the “unfolding & 
generalizing of the means by which an instinct is transmitted” (ibid., p. 576). 
Darwin’s new sketch of the madman is of one plagued with “double individuality,” in 
which the brain has “whole trains of thoughts, feeling & perception separate, from the ordinary 
state of the mind.” Here Darwin finds a powerful new vocabulary to explain to himself his idea 
of instinct. “Now if memory of a tune & words can thus lie dormant,” he muses in considering 
the case of Miss Cogan, “during a whole life time, quite unconsciously of it, surely memory from 
one generation to another, also without consciousness, as instincts are, is not so very wonderful” 
(ibid., p. 521). By the end of Notebook M Darwin is ready to argue that all innate ideas are 
merely such inherited trains of thought. Just as the experiences of the individual leave striations 
on the brain which can continue to weave in and out of conscious experience in the form of 
memory, the experiences of one’s ancestors remain as acquired characteristics.  
Darwin even considers (this is his metaphysical notebook, after all) the implications of 
his theory of the inheritance of ideas for church doctrine:  
“The possibility of the brain having whole train of thoughts, feelings & perception 
separate, from the ordinary state of mind, is probably analogous to the double 
individuality implied by habit, when one acts unconsciously with respect to more 
energetic self […] Agrees with insanity, as in Dr Ash’s71 case, when he struggled 
as it were with a second & unreasonable man. –If one could remember all ones 
father’s actions, as one does in second childhood, or when drunk they would not 
                                                
71 Dr. Ash was another patient of Darwin’s father’s. 
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be more different, & yet they would make one’s father & self one person--& thus 
eternal punishment explained.” (ibid., p. 538) 
These are very Lockean thoughts, not only because of their forensic valence but also for 
their engagement with the question of innate knowledge and inborn depravity. Darwin would 
have of course have learned about the debate surrounding innate ideas at Cambridge, and he 
reflects on it in his journal after reading a review of the works of Coleridge in the Westminster 
Review (1840). Darwin paraphrases the author — writing anonymously, but now known to 
scholars to be the young John Stuart Mill — as follows: 
“[He] says the great division amongst metaphysicians – the school of Locke, 
Bentham, & Hartley, &. The school of Kant to Coleridge, is regarding the sources 
of knowledge.—whether ‘anything can be the object of our knowledge except our 
experience.’—is this not almost a question of whether we have any instincts, or 
rather the amount of our instincts—surely in animals according to usual 
definition, there is much knowledge without experience. So there may be in men.” 
(ibid., p. 610) 
This foray into professional philosophy is rare for Darwin, but not unique. He engages 
directly with the question of innate knowledge in one other place I have found, writing, “Plato 
[…] says in Phaedo that our ‘necessary ideas’ arise from the preexistence of the soul, are not 
derivable from experience.—read monkeys for preexistence.” The remainder of Notebook M is 
preoccupied with field observations of the expression of emotion in apes and men, as Darwin 
turns theory to praxis and begins to investigate the natural history of human reason in the living 
fossils of our next of kin.  
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 With his original account of instinct, a key step in the development of his revolutionary 
theory of natural selection, Darwin answered an anxious prompt written (also in a private 
notebook) by Locke centuries earlier: “How birds imitate sounds if they doe not heare and 
retrieve the idea of those sounds in their memorys, and consequently have sence, is hard for me 
to conceiv” (Dewhurst 1963, p. 130).72 Darwin’s solution is revolutionary: habits can, outside of 
the ambit of consciousness, become hereditary, such that while all our ideas are a result of 
experience, we nonetheless already come into the world with some preformed. Darwin’s solution 
would have been unthinkable without the particular strain of medical associationist thought that 
re-enlivened Locke’s original theory of association as consciousness-splitting and passive, in 
contrast (if not in conflict) with the active powers of the understanding. We may find rather 
uncharitable, then, Darwin’s note that “He who understands the baboon would do more towards 
metaphysics than Locke” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 539). 
 
                                                
72 It seems Locke only admitted this anxiety to himself, laughing it off in public. In an anecdote 
of Yeats’s retold by Craig (2007, p. 130), “when Locke’s French translator Coste asked him 
now, if there were no ‘innate ideas,’ he could explain the skill shown by a bird in making its nest, 
Locke replied, ‘I did not write to explain the actions of dumb creatures,’ and his translator 
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